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ABSTRACT
Computer networks have revolutionized the life of every citizen in our modern intercon-
nected society. The impact of networked systems spans every aspect of our lives, from
financial transactions to healthcare and critical services, making these systems an attractive
target for malicious entities that aim to make financial or political profit. Specifically, the
past decade has witnessed an astounding increase in the number and complexity of sophisti-
cated and targeted attacks, known as advanced persistent threats (APT). Those attacks led
to a paradigm shift in the security and reliability communities’ perspective on system design;
researchers and government agencies accepted the inevitability of incidents and malicious
attacks, and marshaled their efforts into the design of resilient systems.
Rather than focusing solely on preventing failures and attacks, resilient systems are able to
maintain an acceptable level of operation in the presence of such incidents, and then recover
gracefully into normal operation. Alongside prevention, resilient system design focuses on
incident detection as well as timely response. Unfortunately, the resiliency efforts of research
and industry experts have been hindered by an apparent schism between theory and practice,
which allows attackers to maintain the upper hand advantage. This lack of compatibility
between the theory and practice of system design is attributed to the following challenges.
First, theoreticians often make impractical and unjustifiable assumptions that allow for
mathematical tractability while sacrificing accuracy. Second, the security and reliability
communities often lack clear definitions of success criteria when comparing different system
models and designs. Third, system designers often make implicit or unstated assumptions
to favor practicality and ease of design. Finally, resilient systems are tested in private and
isolated environments where validation and reproducibility of the results are not publicly
accessible.
In this thesis, we set about showing that the proper synergy between theoretical anal-
ysis and practical design can enhance the resiliency of networked systems. We illustrate
the benefits of this synergy by presenting resiliency approaches that target the inter- and
intra-networking levels. At the inter-networking level, we present CPuzzle as a means to
protect the transport control protocol (TCP) connection establishment channel from state-
exhaustion distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS). CPuzzle leverages client puzzles
to limit the rate at which misbehaving users can establish TCP connections. We modeled
the problem of determining the puzzle difficulty as a Stackleberg game and solve for the
equilibrium strategy that balances the users’ utilizes against CPuzzle’s resilience capabili-
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ties. Furthermore, to handle volumetric DDoS attacks, we extend CPuzzle and implement
Midgard, a cooperative approach that involves end-users in the process of tolerating and
neutralizing DDoS attacks. Midgard is a middlebox that resides at the edge of an Internet
service provider’s network and uses client puzzles at the IP level to allocate bandwidth to
its users.
At the intra-networking level, we present sShield, a game-theoretic network response
engine that manipulates a network’s connectivity in response to an attacker who is moving
laterally to compromise a high-value asset. To implement such decision making algorithms,
we leverage the recent advances in software-defined networking (SDN) to collect logs and
security alerts about the network and implement response actions. However, the programma-
bility offered by SDN comes with an increased chance for design-time bugs that can have
drastic consequences on the reliability and security of a networked system. We therefore
introduce BiFrost, an open-source tool that aims to verify safety and security proper-
ties about data-plane programs. BiFrost translates data-plane programs into functionally
equivalent sequential circuits, and then uses well-established hardware reduction, abstrac-
tion, and verification techniques to establish correctness proofs about data-plane programs.
By focusing on those four key efforts, CPuzzle, Midgard, sShield, and BiFrost, we
believe that this work illustrates the benefits that the synergy between theory and practice
can bring into the world of resilient system design. This thesis is an attempt to pave the
way for further cooperation and coordination between theoreticians and practitioners, in the
hope of designing resilient networked systems.
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To those who have paved the way for us to prosper.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Computer networks play an essential role in today’s societies. They have revolutionized
every citizen’s daily life. From financial transactions to healthcare, elections, social networks,
and critical services, networked devices have become an essential component of societal
and economic well-being [1]. Thus, it is critical to protect the continued development and
progress of our societies by ensuring the security, reliability, and availability of our networking
infrastructure, at both the software and hardware levels.
From a security perspective, our increased dependence on networked systems has created
ample space for malicious entities to enact attacks that have drastic consequences. In fact,
2018 witnessed the largest-ever recorded Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, tar-
geting Github; it reached a peak bandwidth of 1.35 Tbps [2]. Similarly, in 2016, three college
students contributed to a nationwide Internet outage by creating the Mirai botnet; access
to many major websites (such as Amazon, Netflix, and Visa) was disrupted due to an attack
on the Dyn domain name system (DNS) provider [3].
Furthermore, the massive amounts of data that networked companies collect about their
users are a very lucrative target. Hackers can compromise such companies’ internal net-
works to gather critical consumer data, such as Social Security numbers [4], credit card
numbers [5, 6], and healthcare records [7]. At a larger and more critical scale, attackers
illegally acquired social-networking information to influence the outcomes of the 2016 U.S.
presidential elections [8, 9]. Those incidents highlight the ever-increasing scale and implica-
tions of the security vulnerabilities of our networked systems; indeed, criminal cyber-activity
is estimated to have cost the global economy an astounding $600 billion to date [10].
Similarly, from a reliability perspective, the cost of benign downtime in today’s data
centers is estimated to be $7,900 per minute [11]. Although it enjoys a long and rich his-
tory [12], reliability analysis today is facing the challenges of the increased complexity and
programmability of today’s systems. More specifically, the introduction of software-defined
networking (SDN) and programmable data-planes has provided network designs with flexible
programmability at the expense of higher chances of benign failures [13]. Therefore, it is
of the utmost importance to incorporate reliability analysis that uses appropriate modeling
and verification techniques as part of the design and implementation of computer networks.
1.1 CYBER RESILIENCY
Faced with the challenges described above, security and reliability engineers and re-
searchers have accepted the inevitability of incidents and malicious attacks. The question
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is no longer that of securing only the perimeters of our networked systems; it is more of
designing systems that are cyber resilient. Cyber resiliency is a networked system’s ability
to maintain an acceptable level of operation and proper service in the presence of failures
and targeted attacks, and to then recover gracefully into normal operation [14, 15, 16]. The
definitions of “acceptable operation” and “proper functionality” are system-specific and are
often determined by the services provided by the system and its users’ expectations. For
example, an e-shopping website can tolerate failed connection attempts or network delays
on the order of seconds. On the other hand, an online gaming service provider has a signifi-
cantly lower tolerance to network delays since, it must provide a near-real-time service to its
clients. Nevertheless, resiliency is concerned with the ability to provide service continuously,
even if at an acceptable level of degradation, in the presence of failures and attacks.
Achieving cyber resiliency rests on three important functions: (1) prevention, (2) detec-
tion, and (3) response [17]. Most of our early efforts in system security focused on prevention.
However, the increasing complexity of attacks, and the large uncertainties in the The In-
ternet moved the community towards pouring more efforts into detection and response [18].
Cyber-resilient design builds on the effective and successful tools developed in the realm of
fault tolerance. However, it must go beyond addressing benign and predictable failures to
account for dynamic attackers that launch targeted attacks. The presence of such attack-
ers significantly increases the uncertainty that designers have about their systems and their
inputs, and thus creates greater challenges. It is our hypothesis in this thesis that cyber re-
siliency can be enhanced by integrating theoretical and model-based analysis of systems with
practical and secure engineering.
1.2 STATE OF THE ART
To address the hard challenges faced by our networked systems, government agencies have
set national agendas to promote cyber-resilient networking design, especially for critical
services and infrastructure such as the interconnected power grid [14]. For example, in
2013, then-President Barack Obama issued an executive order setting the U.S. policy to
“enhance the security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure and to maintain
a cyber environment that encourages efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity while
promoting safety, security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil liberties” [19].
The academic and industrial communities responded with increased efforts that proposed
secure-by-design and resilient systems. Driven by the successes in the field of cryptogra-
phy [20], computer theoreticians attempted to model and analyze systems and prototypes
and measure their relative security and resiliency properties such, as availability, integrity,
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confidentiality, reliability, and safety [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. On the other hand,
network and systems engineers ventured to propose and implement secure and resilient de-
signs that can reduce the increasing and often unpredictable waves of failures and cyber
attacks [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35].
Unfortunately, however, the efforts of the researchers and industry experts have been
hindered by an apparent schism between theory and practice, which allows attackers to
maintain the upper hand advantage. For example, the security community is deeply fractured
between fierce proponents [36, 37] and fierce opponents [38] of security metrics. Similarly,
despite enormous governmental efforts, we are yet to see a widely accepted definition of what
a science of security is, let alone definitions of the requirements for sound scientific security
experiments [20, 39, 40].
We attribute the apparent lack of compatibility between theory and practice to the fol-
lowing challenges:
• Impractical and unjustifiable assumptions: Theoretical computer scientists often sac-
rifice practicality for mathematical tractability. Systems in general, and networked
systems in particular, often do not exhibit many of the properties needed by math-
ematically solvable frameworks. For example, in control theory, it is a standard as-
sumption to consider a system to be described by a set of linear differential equations.
However, actual systems seldom exhibit this linearity. Similarly, when attempting to
quantify the impact of security attacks [27], modelers often place probability values
on attack steps that are not reasonably justifiable (e.g., the probability of success of a
certain attack step, or the probability that an attacker will adopt such a step). That
makes the mathematical model easier to reason about, yet does not create an accurate
map of reality.
• Undefined success criteria: As mentioned earlier, resiliency and security do not have
well-defined success metrics. Questions such as “Is the system secure?” or “How secure
is the system?” often do not have quantifiable answers. Therefore, it is challenging to
model and design a system when the success metrics of the system are not well-defined.
• Unstated and unclear assumptions: In contrast to theoreticians, system designers often
sacrifice clarity for practicality and ease of design. Assumptions made at design time
often remain unstated which hinders the ability of future researchers to build accurate
and practical mathematical models of the systems.
• Irreproducible experiments: Finally, resilient and secure systems are often tested in pri-
vate environments so that validation and reproducibility of the results are not possible.
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That leaves the community unable to understand and evaluate the appropriateness of
a given design or solution.
Therefore, the resiliency and security of our networked systems, and, in turn, the stability
of our societies, rests on our ability to integrate sound theoretical modeling and analysis
with practical design and engineering. Bridging the gap between theory and practice is a
goal we set out to achieve in this dissertation.
1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS
In this thesis, we set about showing that the proper integration of theoretical analysis and
practical design can enhance the resiliency of networked systems. For that purpose, we focus
on two essential properties of networked system designs: (1) theoretical soundness and (2)
practical realizability 1. We provide a formal definition of these two properties and discuss
them in detail in this thesis. We will, however, restrict ourselves in this chapter to informal
definitions.
We define a design to be theoretically sound if it can be modeled by a mathematical model
that accurately captures its behavior, and if all inferences made about said mathematical
model are valid with respect to a set of assumptions. Also, we define a design to be practically
realizable if it can be built in practice while having (1) input parameters that are quantifiable
through observations and data analysis, and (2) well-defined and quantifiable metrics of
success and proper service.
The goal of practical realizability forces modelers and designers to think carefully about the
assumptions they make in their analyses. The assumptions must be at an appropriate level
of abstraction such that they can achieve some level of mathematical tractability without
sacrificing faithfulness to the system’s actual nature. That balancing act must encompass
a careful consideration of the success metrics by which a design is deemed to be achieving
proper service.
Complementary to practicality, theoretical soundness compels system designers to clearly
state all of their designs’ implicit assumptions as well as the expected input and output
relationships. Such assumptions and relationships form the ground upon which analytical
reasoning about a model is built and guarantees about performance and reliability are proven.
Finally, the combination of soundness and practicality cannot be achieved without thorough
testing. That requires reproducible experiments that will allow multiple designers, modelers,
and analysts to validate a set of obtained metrics.
1Not to be confused with the notion of “realizability” in control theory.
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Figure 1.1: Design approaches using traditional reasoning (left) and our integrative reasoning
(right).
Therefore, in this work, we set out to validate the following thesis statement:
Cyber resiliency of intra- and inter-networks can be enhanced through the inte-
gration of theoretically sound and practically realizable networking designs across
multiple network layers.
Figure 1.1 contrasts the traditional system design approach (left) with the approach we
adopt in this thesis (right). Traditionally, theoretical modeling and analysis and implemen-
tation were seen as separate, non-interleaving processes performed by often disjunct groups
of designers. At the end of the modeling phase, simulations were conducted to assess the
model’s properties, which would then be used to drive the prototyping and implementation
phase. On the other hand, once a prototype has been built, experiments are conducted to
evaluate the design, and that could lead to another modeling phase.
In this thesis, we show that theoretical modeling and practical design are interleaved pro-
cesses that cannot be conducted separately, especially when dealing with designs for security
and reliability. Both modelers and practitioners must work from a shared set of assumptions
and success metrics. Those assumptions and success metrics must be driven by the con-
straints on the implementation, rather than a focus on mathematical tractability. Inferences
on the success metrics, made during the theoretical modeling phase via simulation and ana-
lytical reasoning, will drive the realizable implementation of the design. Using experiments,
the designers revisit their assumptions and possibly add new success metrics, thus driving
a new and interleaved phase of modeling and analysis. This integration between theoretical
modeling and practical design should be the basis for secure and reliable networking design.
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Table 1.1: Summary of thesis contributions. IER and IAR refer to inter-networking resiliency
and intra-networking resiliency, respectively. GT refers to game-theoretic techniques, while
CT refers to control-theoretic techniques.
Solution IER IAR
Theoretical
Tools
Deployment
Target
Property
CPuzzle X –
GT:
Stackelberg
game
kernel patch availability
Midgard X – CT kernel patch,
middlebox
availability
sShield – X
GT:
zero-sum
game
SDN
integrity,
confidential-
ity
BiFrost X X formal
methods
open-source
tool
safety,
reliability
1.3.1 Summary of Contributions
At the core of this dissertation is an attempt to understand how the integration of sound
theory and practical implementation can lead to secure and reliable networking designs.
Our investigation is driven by assumptions and success metrics that can act as the gateway
between theoretical modeling and practical design. To inform our exploration, we pose the
following research questions:
1. What does it mean for a model to be theoretically sound?
2. What does it mean for a design to be practically realizable?
3. Where do current networking designs fail in providing availability, confidentiality, and
reliability?
4. How can the integration of theoretical and practical reasoning be used to improve the
state of current networking design?
Table 1.1 summarizes our approach to validating our thesis statement and answering the
above research questions. We address the challenges of designing a resilient networking
infrastructure by combining the results of four system designs. At the inter-networking
level, CPuzzle [41] enables network resilience to state-exhaustion DDoS attacks at the
transport layer. Midgard extends CPuzzle to combat volumetric attacks at the network
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layer. At the intra-networking level, sShield [42] dynamically protects a high-value asset
from potential attackers moving laterally in the network. Finally, BiFrost [43] is a design-
time tool that allows for scalable verification of data-plane programs specified using the P4
language.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the different parts of a network where our proposal approaches are to
be deployed. We consider, without loss of generality, an internetworking scenario consisting
of several clients connecting to a remote server and requesting a particular service. CPuzzle,
Midgard, and sShield are all online solutions that get triggered during attacks, while
BiFrost is an offline analysis tool. CPuzzle is a Linux kernel patch that resides at both
the client and server ends, i.e. at both ends of a communication. Midgard comprises of two
components: (1) a Linux kernel patch applied to the client machines and (2) a middlebox (the
Midgard box) residing at the ingress of the server’s upstream Internet Service Provider
(ISP). Internally, sShield is a game-theoretic dynamic topology modifier that leverages
the presence of SDN switches at a local network. Finally, network administrators can use
BiFrost to verify properties about their SDN deployments that use programmable switches.
CPuzzle
CPuzzle is a theoretical and practical framework for employing client puzzles as a means
for tolerating TCP state-exhaustion DDoS attacks. A TCP state-exhaustion attack attempts
to consume entries in a victim server’s TCP queues, namely the listen and accept queues.
When those queues overflow, the server stops accepting new connections, and benign clients
7
are thus denied service. Our work in CPuzzle is grounded in the observation that defending
against such attacks is no longer solely the responsibility of the network. Rather, it is up to
the edge devices (the clients and the victim server) to participate in achieving resilience.
To that end, we developed a theoretical framework that allows a victim server to ask its
benign users and the malicious bots to solve computational puzzles. Such puzzles serve as
virtual payment for slots in the TCP queues and achieve the goal of rate-limiting malicious
actors. We model the problem of selecting the puzzle difficulty as a Stackelberg game [44] in
which the server is the leader, and the users and bots are the followers. The model captures
the trade-off that the server must consider in balancing the user’s computational load against
its ability to rate-limit the attackers.
Based on the obtained solution, we designed and implemented a prototype of the CPuzzle
framework in the Linux kernel networking stack. Our design favors efficiency and stability
at both ends of the communication channel. To evaluate our approach, we deployed CPuz-
zle on a testbed network comprising 30 machines on the DETER [45] academic testbed.
Our evaluation shows that CPuzzle can effectively enhance our infrastructure’s ability to
tolerate TCP state-exhaustion attacks while balancing that ability against the computa-
tional cost for benign users. Our results also highlight how CPuzzle increases the cost to
attackers: rate-limiting the attackers forces them to purchase or compromise more botnet
machines. We are providing open-source access to the kernel patch as well as all scripts
needed to reproduce our experiments on the DETER testbed.
Midgard
We propose Midgard to complement CPuzzle in combating multi-vector DDoS at-
tacks that target the consumption of network bandwidth as well as computational resources.
Midgard is an in-network DDoS resilience mechanism that combines the benefits of cloud-
based defense solutions with those achieved by puzzle-based rate-limiting. To that end, we
suggest the addition of IP puzzles that are distributed by a middlebox (the Midgard box)
residing at the edge of a victim server’s ISP. When an attack is detected, the Midgard
box monitors and seamlessly distributes puzzles to all users and monitors the round-trip
time (RTT) taken by every request. This RTT value presents a reflection of each user’s
computational capabilities, allowing the Midgard box to achieve the desired rate-limiting
while adapting the puzzle difficulty to each user’s prowess as well as ts previous behavior.
In designing Midgard, we leveraged the sound theoretical tools of control theory to
design a network controller that allocates bandwidth resources to each user based on her
estimated computational prowess, her puzzle difficulty, and her behavior. The controller
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aims to achieve fairness among benign users while thwarting the effects of the malicious
actors. We implemented Midgard by using eBPF and AF XDP sockets in the Linux kernel to
allow for a combination of fast packet processing in the kernel space and puzzle generation
and verification in user space. We also developed a patch for the IP networking stack of
the kernel to support IP puzzles. To evaluate our approach, we deployed Midgard on
the DETER testbed and launched bandwidth exhaustion attacks against a victim server. Our
experiments showed that Midgard can effectively rate-limit misbehaving users by forcing
them to solve harder and harder puzzles.
BiFrost
To address the challenges introduced by the flexibility of programmable data-planes, we
propose and have developed BiFrost, a tool for scalable and efficient circuit-level ver-
ification of programmable data-planes. BiFrost exploits the fundamental feature of a
data-plane program; namely that it describes a bounded hardware pipeline. We therefore
leverage previous work on software verification that uses circuit-level approaches [46] to
translate a P4 program into an equivalent sequential circuit expressed as an And-Inverter-
Graph (AIG). That translation introduces two main benefits: (1) the ability to make use of
mature, well-established, and scalable circuit verification techniques, and (2) the ability to
verify equivalence between multiple compilations of the same program. The latter advan-
tage is especially beneficial when one is faced with a heterogeneous networking environment
composed of switches from multiple vendors. We implemented BiFrost using C++ and
evaluated it on real-world data-plane programs written in the P4 language. Using BiFrost,
we detected header validity bugs in two open-source programs. In such cases, an attacker,
using a well-crafted packet, can force a programmable switch to read from invalid memory
locations, thus introducing nondeterministic behavior that can lead to reliability and secu-
rity incidents. In addition, we evaluated BiFrost on a large set of data-plane programs and
showed that we could prove properties about those programs in < 3 minutes. We plan to
release BiFrost as an open-source tool that can be used by data-plane developers to verify
their designs.
sShield
Intrusion detection systems (IDSes) provide network administrators with a plethora of
monitoring information, but that information must often be processed manually to enable
decisions on response actions and thwart attacks. The gap between detection time and
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response time, which may be months long, may allow attackers to move freely in the network
and achieve their goals.
sShield is a game-theoretic network response engine that takes practical actions in re-
sponse to an attacker that is moving laterally in an enterprise network. The engine receives
monitoring information from IDSes in the form of a network services graph, which is a graph
data structure that represents vulnerable services running between hosts, augmented with
a labeling function that highlights services likely to have been compromised. We formulate
the decision-making problem as a defense-based zero-sum matrix game that the engine an-
alyzes to select appropriate response actions by solving for saddle-point strategies. Given
the response engine’s knowledge of the network and the location of sensitive components
(e.g., database servers), its goal is to keep the suspicious actors as far away from the sensi-
tive components as possible. The engine is not guaranteed to neutralize threats, if any, but
can provide network administrators with enough time to analyze suspicious movement and
take appropriate neutralization actions. The decision engine makes use of the monitoring
information to decide which nodes’ disconnections from the network would slow down the
attacker’s movements and allow administrators to take response actions.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present our definitions of
resiliency, theoretical soundness, and practical realizability. We then turn to inter-networking
resiliency and present CPuzzle in Chapter 3 and Midgard in Chapter 4. Subsequently, we
discuss our approaches to intra-networking resiliency by presenting BiFrost in Chapter 5
and sShield in Chapter 6. Finally, we conclude and present our notes for the future in
Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 2: THE ROAD TO CYBER RESILIENCE
The rapid increase in technological advancements over the past decade has brought a com-
parable increase in the arsenal of attack vectors that malicious actors can leverage to launch
devastating attacks. The ubiquity of connected devices, ranging from home appliances to
smartphones and desktops, offers adversaries a variety of lucrative targets that are relatively
low-cost and high-reward. Just as connectivity has become an inevitable part of our lives,
cyber threats assert themselves as an undeniable fact of the connected lifestyle. The myth of
the “fully secure system” has been decisively debunked, and systems engineering is moving
into the era of resilient computing.
In this chapter, we motivate and define cyber resilience by drawing an analogy from the
field of fault-tolerant computing. We highlight some of the recent technology failures in
adopting the resilience design methodology and the often drastic consequences that have
resulted from doing so. Finally, we discuss how our proposed approach, namely the integra-
tion of theoretical soundness and practical realizability, can be a cornerstone to the building
of resilient networks.
2.1 A LOOK THROUGH FAULT-TOLERANT DESIGN
The notion of system resiliency enjoys a rich history that has grown from the need to
develop dependable and reliable systems that can withstand hardware software failures [47,
48]. As early as the construction of the first networks, designers and engineers realized that
failures are bound to happen and that systems must be able to continue to provide a certain
level of service even if such failures occur. That realization led to the development of the
rich fields of dependability and fault tolerance, which introduced a variety of techniques,
both theoretical and practical, to allow networks and systems to withstand benign failures
and continue to operate acceptably.
Although not labeled initially as “resilient” systems, fault-tolerant designs gained vast
popularity and enjoyed high levels of success. Many mission-critical systems, such as airplane
navigation systems, airspace controllers, and telephone and data networks, enjoy a high
level of reliability enabled by years of fault tolerant design work. Furthermore, even in this
era of high interconnectedness, cloud computing offers unprecedented levels of reliability
and availability due to efficient and well-designed replication and reliability strategies. For
example, most current cloud computing providers, such as Google, Microsoft, and Amazon,
offer their customers service-level agreements that guarantee 99.999% availability [49, 50, 51].
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That translates to just a few minutes of downtime every year while providing continuous
service across the world. Such designs leverage years of fault tolerant design research in
areas such as georeplication and data duplication (e.g. RAID) to provide continuous service
at guaranteed latencies and prevent unexpected data loss. Such techniques illustrate an
important design paradigm: the fact that faults and failures are not always preventable.
Therefore, designers must account for their presence and design for both prevention and
tolerance.
We attribute the success of fault tolerance techniques in enabling designs that can with-
stand benign faults and failures to the following characteristics:
Strong ties to physical phenomena. The study of hardware faults and failures in current
networking designs builds upon years of studies of the natural phenomena that underly the
operations of such designs (for example, the switching of transistors and the representation
of data through magnetic waves). Thus designers can gain a better understanding of the
operations of their designs by leveraging the literature of the physical sciences.
Predictability. The fact that the operation and failure of systems can often be traced to
underlying natural phenomena presents designers with an attractive property: predictability.
Fault-tolerant designs benefit from studies that estimate the lifetimes of their components.
Such studies allow designers to build statistical models of the operation and failure behavior
of the systems they are building, and thus predict when failures may occur and account for
their presence in the designs.
Synergy between theoretical studies and practical designs. The predictability of
system failures has allowed designers to develop theoretical models that can effectively act
as mediators between the practical designs and the theoretical studies and simulations that
are to be performed on the models. Most models are based on assumptions tied to well-
studied physical phenomena, which enables a rich understanding of the system’s behavior
and makes it possible to leverage theoretical models to design fault-tolerant systems. The
fact that assumptions are based on real and measurable parameters allows models to reflect
of the practical reality, and that allows designers to transition easily from a theoretical design
to a practical prototype with tangible fault-tolerance guarantees.
As an example of that synergy, the designed of the TCP congestion avoidance and control
algorithm [52] leveraged sound control-theoretic methodologies to design an estimator for a
packet’s round-trip time. The algorithm uses the estimated value to control the TCP socket’s
sending rate in response to the network’s inferred congestion state. By using real-time feed-
back from the network (i.e. measurements of a packet’s travel time), the algorithm can
effectively adapt to changes and congestion events in the network. The design of this algo-
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rithm shows that sound theory, coupled with quantifiable input parameters and measurable
success metrics, can lead to the design, and later refinement, of a robust algorithm.
2.2 FROM FAULT TOLERANCE TO RESILIENCY
Traditional approaches to security and resiliency have focused on building systems that can
build and harden perimeter defenses to prevent malicious attacks. However, as the num-
ber of successful high-impact attacks has increased, security engineers have realized that
prevention alone is not enough; attacks change and evolve at a rapid rate that traditional
perimeter defenses cannot keep up with. For example, although initially considered the holy
grail for protecting personal computers, antivirus software eventually proved unable to effec-
tively keep pace with the rapid rate of malware change, leaving it helpless against targeted
and sophisticated malware [53, 54, 55]. That led the senior vice president of information
security at Symantec, the inventors of commercial antimalware software, to declare antivirus
approaches “dead” [56].
The success of dependable and fault tolerant design methodologies has led researchers, gov-
ernment officials, and industry leaders to reexamine their cybersecurity approaches. Thus,
the notion of resiliency has surfaced as a fundamental design principle in the fight against
malicious cyber entities. At its essence, resiliency is a system’s ability to detect failures
and attacks, maintain acceptable and proper operation in the presence of those failures and
attacks, and recover a normal state of operation in a timely and graceful fashion.
In conjunction with fault tolerance, researchers turned to the human immune system
for inspiration and analogies to drive reasoning about the resiliency of networked systems
against known and unknown threats. Fault tolerance and the human immune system present
beneficial starting points for reasoning about the resiliency posture of networked systems.
However, the presence of targeted and adaptive adversaries introduces several fundamental
differences that require us to reconsider such analogies to avoid making erroneous decisions.
System resiliency possesses several crucial characteristics that make it fundamentally dif-
ferent from fault tolerance or human immunology. Specifically, we consider the following
properties.
Human engineering and the presence of software components. Modern computing
systems are the result of the engineering and composition of numerous hardware and software
components. The interactions among those components are rarely governed by predictable
rules. The presence of software programs written in general-purpose, Turing-complete pro-
gramming languages makes the process of modeling the different behaviors of networked
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systems impractical and often computationally intractable. For example, it is feasible to
predict when a magnetic hard disk drive will fail by studying the physical properties of the
mechanical phenomena that govern its operations. On the other hand, buffer overflows are
hard to predict since they result from design-time bugs that cause undefined behavior. Such
behavior can then be exploited by an attacker to trick the memory manager and the instruc-
tion decoder into executing malicious instructions or reading confidential data blocks; the
execution of such an exploit relies on the interactions among several software components
that lead the CPU to execute malicious instructions. Therefore, modeling and prediction
of buffer overflow exploits, let alone detecting them, does not enjoy the same stochastic
predictability properties enjoyed by the hardware fault tolerance approaches.
Targeted and resourceful adversaries. In contrast to benign failures, adversaries have
well-defined targets and may enjoy access to numerous resources to support their attacks.
From leaked password databases to repositories of working exploits to unpatched systems,
attackers can build a vast arsenal of attack methods that they can employ at relatively low
cost. The past decade witnessed the emergence of advanced persistent threats (APT) that
involve powerful, well-funded, and determined adversaries targeting critical infrastructure
and government agencies (e.g. the Stuxnet worm, the Ukrainian power grid attack, and the
Target and Equifax data breaches). It is much more challenging to predict the behavior of
such a strategic and sophisticated attacker than to predict a benign fault, and it may be
impossible.
Insider threats. In addition to external threats, resilient systems must consider the
possible threats emanating from malicious internal actors, such disgruntled employees. Such
actors are especially difficult to model and analyze when one is designing resilient systems.
Insiders enjoy low-cost access to critical resources that can form the basis for launching
severe and impactful attacks.
Rapidly adaptive adversaries. Although the human immune system has evolved robust
mechanisms for combatting intruding organisms, such as microbes and viruses, it cannot
fight them off entirely when they change their genetic makeup rapidly. Viral infections
such as the flu and the common cold can still escape the human immune system’s grasp.
Similarly, intelligent adversaries can rapidly change their attack tactics in response to added
security measures, sometimes even leveraging new security designs to uncover new flaws and
gain more attack vectors. Security measures that do not take into consideration adaptive
adversaries might increase the protected system’s attack surface, ironically providing the
adversaries with more weapons to add to their arsenal.
Those challenges make the process of designing resilient networked systems very difficult
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and require increased cooperation between theoreticians and practitioners. The adaptive
and intelligent nature of the adversaries poses several challenges for theoretical modeling and
analysis; however, it does not render the process futile. By working closely with engineer-
ing teams, theoreticians can learn to make reasonable assumptions and perform worst-case
analyses that allow them to make design decisions that can translate into practical imple-
mentations. Similarly, engineers and practitioners must carefully state and document their
assumptions and provide feedback to the modeling teams to make design decisions that favor
the system’s resiliency.
In light of the challenges and requirements, the goal of this dissertation is to illustrate
how the synergy between sound theory and realizable design can lead to improved network
resiliency. We start by defining sound theory and realizable designs, and then present CPuz-
zle, Midgard, BiFrost, and sShield as evidence of the power of synergizing theory and
practice.
2.3 DEFINITIONS
To formally define theoretical soundness and practical realizability, we draw on notions
from the theory of formal systems [57] to reason about models and their implementations.
Definition 2.1 (System Model). A system model M is a tuple (V, S,R, L, T ) such that
V is a set of variables,
S is a set of states,
L : S × V × T → R is a labeling function,
R : S × T × {, L} → S × T is a transition function, and,
T = τ0, τ1, . . . is a monotonically increasing sequence of time values.
V is the set of variables whose behavior the modeler is interested in capturing. To do
so, the modeler defines a set of states S where each state s ∈ S captures the values of the
variables in V at that state. L is a labeling function that represents the relationships among
the variables of the model at different states. For example, L can be a logical formula or a
probability distribution over V . T represents a sequence of time instants, which can be either
discrete or continuous, as defined in [58]. Finally, R is a transition function that defines the
possible transitions between the states of the model. We do not place any restrictions on
the types of the transitions, i.e., they can be deterministic, stochastic, or nondeterministric
(that last of which is represented by ).
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Definition 2.2 (Realization). In a networking context, a realization or implementation of a
model M is an interpretation, through software or hardware or both, of the model’s semantics
that assigns values to its set of variables V and defines semantics for S, L, and R.
Note that a realization D of a model M can define a set of variables V ′ ⊆ V that subsumes
M ’s variables. In that case, M is referred to as an abstraction of D, and R can be thought
of as the projection of D’s possible transitions onto V .
For example, RFC 793 [59] is a model of the Internet’s Transmission Control Protocol
(TCP), and different operating systems, such as Linux, Windows, and OpenBSD, provide
various implementations or realizations of that RFC. In addition to defining the seman-
tics of the RFC, those implementations include several other components, such as memory
managers, thread managers, and network device drivers.
Definition 2.3 (Soundness). Given a model M , a set of assumptions A : V × S →
{true, false} and a set of inference rules Γ, the system (M,A,Γ) is said to be sound if
and only if starting from A, any valid formula f : V × S → {true, false} proven by
following Γ over M is valid for any realization D of M .
In other words, soundness ensures that any property or metric that can be obtained by
reasoning about a model M over a set of assumptions A will be valid for any realization or
implementation of the model.
Definition 2.4 (Practical Realizability). Given a model M and a set of assumptions A, a
realization D of M is said to be practically realizable if D can be feasibly implemented and
D does not violate any of the assumptions a ∈ A.
Definitions 2.3 and 2.4 rule out any theoretical model that makes unreasonable assump-
tions about the real systems it must represent. At the same time, the combination of
soundness and practical realizability forces engineers to make clear and explicit assumptions
that modelers can take into consideration when conducting their analytic studies. As pre-
viously stated, our goal in this dissertation is to show that sound modeling and practically
realizable design can lead to the enhancement of the resiliency posture of our networked
systems when faced with both formidable adversaries and benign faults.
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CHAPTER 3: CPUZZLE: CLIENT PUZZLES FOR STATE-EXHAUSTION
DDOS ATTACKS RESILIENCY.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the scale and complexity of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) at-
tacks have grown significantly. The introduction of DDoS-for-hire services has substantially
decreased the cost of launching complex, multi-vectored attacks aimed at saturating the
bandwidth as well as the state of a victim server [60, 61]. Common mitigations for large-
scale DDoS attacks are focused around cloud-based protection-as-a-service providers, such as
CloudFlare. When under attack, a victim’s traffic is redirected to massively over-provisioned
servers, where proprietary traffic-filtering techniques are applied and only traffic deemed be-
nign is forwarded to the victim. The relative success of such over-provisioning techniques in
absorbing volumetric attacks has pushed attackers to expand their arsenal of attacks to span
multiple layers of the OSI network stack [62]. In fact, 39.8% of the attacks launched through
the Mirai botnet were aimed at TCP state exhaustion, while 32.8% were volumetric [63];
the source code contained more than 10 vectors in its arsenal of attacks [64].
State exhaustion attacks are particularly challenging as they target stateful devices such
as firewalls, load balancers, and application servers. Attackers can disguise them as be-
nign traffic by leveraging a large number of machines that can use their authentic IP ad-
dresses [60], and can bypass cloud-based protection services [65, 66], capabilities, and filtering
techniques [29, 30, 31, 32, 67, 68] by sending slower and non-spoofed traffic. This situation is
further exacerbated by the imbalance between the cost of launching a multi-vectored DDoS
attack and the cost of mitigating one. Launching an attack incurs an average cost of $66 per
attack and can cause damage to the victim of around $500 per minute [69]. Furthermore,
such attacks cannot be mitigated by employing geo-distributed Content Delivery Networks
(CDN) as these CDNs still need to provide stateful services (such as TCP and HTTP) to
the original victim’s users; cloud protection services in fact recommend that defenses against
state exhaustion attacks should reside at the victim’s premises [65].
In this chapter, we revisit the application of client puzzles as a mechanism for resisting
state exhaustion DDoS attacks. Client puzzles are a promising technique that alleviates the
cost imbalance between the attacker and the defender with only software-level modifications
at the end hosts and no changes to the Internet infrastructure [70, 71]. In essence, client
puzzles attempt to hinder the malicious actors’ ability to flood the server by forcing all
clients, benign and malicious, to solve computational puzzles for each request they make.
While TCP client puzzles are a promising technique for resisting state exhaustion attacks,
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they have not seen their way into adoption because of (1) the lack of guidelines on how to
set the difficulty, and (2) the lack of publicly available implementations and performance
studies [70, 72, 73]. A TCP client puzzle’s difficulty determines the computational burden
placed on the server and clients. Current standards [73, 74] suggest using a fixed difficulty
level for all clients in order to maintain a stateless protocol, they however do not provide any
sound ways for selecting the appropriate difficulty level. Difficulty selection becomes even
more challenging when the victim serves clients with a mixture of power-endowed devices.
Additionally, the few existing implementations of TCP client puzzles [34, 35, 72, 75] are
outdated and are not publicly available, further hindering the community’s ability to evaluate
their effectiveness and adopt them.
In this chapter, we make the following contributions to address the shortcomings of TCP
client puzzles research. First, we introduce a theory for determining an appropriate TCP
puzzle difficulty based on the game-theoretic Stackelberg interaction between the defender
and the clients [76, 77, 78] (Section 3.3 and Section 3.4). Using the theory we established, we
provide a practical method for selecting the TCP puzzles difficulty based on the defender’s
capabilities and the expected computational prowess of the clients.
Then, we describe how we designed, implemented and evaluated an extension to TCP to
support client puzzles using our practical difficulty-setting method. We incorporate puzzles
into the TCP handshake and otherwise do not interfere with the operation of the protocol.
We efficiently encode the challenges and their solutions into the options of the TCP header,
resulting in low packet-size overhead to the protocol packets and no significant changes the
TCP header. Then, we implement TCP puzzles as part of the Linux kernel TCP stack
(Section 3.5). Our patch is publicly available at https://github.com/nouredd2/puzzles-utils.
We evaluated the performance of our TCP puzzles against a range of attacks through
reproducible experiments performed using the DETER testbed (Section Section 3.6). Our
results show the effectiveness of TCP puzzles in boosting tolerance against state exhaustion
attacks. If a server using client puzzles with our game-theory-based difficulty setting method,
it can tolerate both SYN and connection floods that would bring down an unprotected
server or one that relies solely on SYN cookies [79]. Finally, we present a preliminary study
of puzzles-based queueing (3.6.5) as a technique to provide fair treatment to a mixture of
power-endowed devices.
3.2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
We first start by reviewing the TCP three-way handshake and TCP state exhaustion
attacks. We then present client puzzles and their current limitations. For the remainder of
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this chapter, we use the terms puzzles and challenges interchangeably.
3.2.1 TCP primer and SYN flood attacks
In current TCP implementations, a client initiates a TCP connection by sending a SYN
packet to the server. Upon receiving the SYN packet, the server saves state for this new in-
coming connection request in a data structure, often referred to as the Transmission Control
Block (TCB), and then sends a SYN-ACK packet and waits for the client to acknowledge
receipt of this packet. A half-open connection is one for which the client’s ACK packet has
not yet been received; those new connection sockets are queued into a listen queue. The
number of elements in this queue is upper-bounded by an implementation parameter, called
the backlog, that bounds the server’s memory usage to avoid exhaustion of the system’s re-
sources. Once a connection has been established, the server moves it into the accept queue.
A socket is removed from the accept queue once the server’s application accepts it for pro-
cessing. On the other hand, a half-open connection socket is removed from the queue if it
expires before it receives an acknowledgment from the client [59]. Once the server’s listen
or accept queue overflows, it either (1) no longer accepts incoming connections, or (2) drops
old connection sockets from the appropriate queue.
TCP SYN flood attacks aim to overflow a victim server’s listen queue by overwhelming
it with half-open connection requests. The attack forces the server to drop new incoming
connections, thus denying service to new clients [80]. A variant of the TCP SYN flood attack
is a TCP connection flood in which an attacker attempts to overflow the server’s accept
queue for the same purpose of denying legitimate clients the opportunity to connect to the
server. In a connection flood, the attacker completes the three-way handshake instead of
leaving the connections half-open.
Among the server-based mitigations for SYN flood attacks, the SYN cache and TCP SYN
cookies are the most common [79, 80, 81]. The SYN cache reduces the amount of memory
needed to store state for a half-open connection by delaying the allocation of the full TCB
state until the connection has been established. Servers that implement SYN caches instead
maintain a hash table for half-open connections that contains partial state information and
provides fast lookup and insertion functions. SYN cookies, on the other hand, operate by
eliminating the source of the vulnerability in TCP implementations: the state reserved for
half-open connections in the TCB. When SYN cookies are enabled, the server encodes a
new TCP connection’s parameters as a cookie in the packet’s initial sequence number, and
refrains from allocating state for a new connection until the cookie is again received from
the client and validated.
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The SYN cache aims to contain TCP SYN attacks by reducing the amount of state
maintained on the server for half-open connections. Although efficient against a single
attacker (or a small botnet), SYN caches do no provide protection against larger botnets for
which the attack rate can easily exceed the space allocated for the cache. Once the cache
is full, the server will default to the same behavior it performs when its backlog limit is
reached, defeating the purpose of the cache. Although SYN cookies eliminate the key target
of the SYN flood attack (the TCP backlog), they do not provide protection against large
botnets. Attackers in control of a large number of zombie machines with valid (non-spoofed)
IP addresses can, without added effort, overload the server’s listen queue with valid TCP
requests at a rate that surpasses the server’s ability to accept them. Because they only
tackle the problem only on the server end, SYN cookies are not a mechanism for stripping
the malicious actors of their ability to conduct exhaustion attacks; further, it is not clear
how SYN cookies can be generalized to serve as protection schemes for different types of
state exhaustion attacks [72].
3.2.2 Client puzzles
Cryptographic client puzzles have been proposed to counter an asymmetry in today’s
Internet: clients can request substantial server resources at relatively little cost. Client
puzzles alleviate this asymmetry by forcing clients to commit compute power as payment
for requested resources.
Client puzzles have previously been proposed as a mechanism to combat junk mail [82],
website metering [83], protecting the network IP and TCP channels [35, 71, 72, 84], pro-
tecting the TLS connection setup [34, 73], protecting key exchange [74], and protecting the
capabilities-granting channel [30]. In addition, client puzzles are at the heart of the min-
ing process of today’s cryptocurrencies [85, 86]. Upon receiving a SYN packet, the server
computes a puzzle challenge, sends it to the client, and does not commit any resources.
After receiving the challenge, the client will employ its computational resources to solve the
challenge and send the solution to the server. The server will then commit resources to the
client only if the solution is correct.
Despite its promise, several challenges face the adoption of client puzzles as a practical de-
fense measure against state exhaustion attacks. First, there is a shortage of implementations
that allow for the comparison and the evaluation of different types of challenge creation and
verification mechanisms. In this work, we implement clients puzzles in the Linux kernel and
provide access to our implementation as a kernel patch.
Second, an important advantage of client puzzles is the ability to influence the clients by
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setting an appropriate puzzle difficulty. However, there are no concrete and theoretically
backed recommendations for selecting the appropriate difficulty, especially when faced with
a mixture of power-endowed devices. Previous approaches [34, 71, 73, 74] suggest using a
fixed, victim determined, puzzle difficulty for all clients in an effort to maintain a stateless
protocol and to avoid creating a new state-exhaustion attack vector. These approaches do
not however provide concrete methods to select the difficulty level in a manner that reflects
the victim server’s load and its clients’ computational prowess. In our work, we present
a game-theoretic formulation of the difficulty selection problem incorporating the server’s
provisioning as well as the computational profile of its clients.
Furthermore, a fixed puzzle difficulty might lead to fairness concerns as low-powered de-
vices have to solve the same puzzles as higher-powered ones. RFC 8019 [74] suggests pro-
viding per-IP puzzles, however, it does not specify how the difficulties should be computed
nor how to avoid increasing the attack surface. The work in [72] attempts to alleviate this
problem by requiring clients to place bids on the server’s resources by solving increasingly
difficult puzzles. In addition to violating the TCP protocol by adding more round trips, this
mechanism can be exploited to target clients since it moves the puzzle initiation process from
the server to the client. In our thesis, we present a prototype puzzle-based queuing approach
that rewards slow sending devices with higher access priority to the server’s resources. It
maintains negligible state and falls back to a fixed difficulty if that state is exhausted.
Laurie and Clayton [87] present an economic analysis to argue against the use of proof-
of-work mechanisms to combat email spam. We agree with the authors that computational
puzzles do not possess “magical” properties that make them practical in every situation. We
however argue that state exhaustion attacks do not have the same nature as spam emails.
First, unlike spam, state exhaustion attacks do not depend on the involvement of human
users to click on malicious links. Second, DDoS attacks have a lower cost barrier as they are
launched from compromised botnet machines and not from specialized attacker hardware.
We believe that our theoretical and experimental results showcase the merits of proof-of-
work mechanisms in tolerating SYN and connection floods. In fact, our work complements
the security analysis performed in [88, 89, 90] with the required protocol engineering and
design, allowing for an improved understanding of client puzzles.
3.3 THE GAME-THEORETIC MODEL
In this section, we introduce our game-theoretic model for computing the puzzle difficulties
that balance the clients’ computational load as well as the server’s provisioning. We first
present our threat model and assumptions and then discuss our game-theoretic model.
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3.3.1 Assumptions and threat model
In our work , we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. Common state exhaustion attacks, specifically TCP connection floods
as well as higher-layer attacks, require the presence of a two-way communication channel
between the attacker bots and the victim server. That is evident from the nature of the state
exhaustion attacks as well as their ability to circumvent scrubbing and filtering techniques
by sending lower volumes of traffic [60]. The implication is that during a single-vector state
exhaustion attack, the victim server is able to receive packets from, and send packets to,
its legitimate users as well as the attackers’ machines. In the presence of a multi-vectored
attack, we assume the presence of volumetric attack mitigation techniques (such as cloud-
based protection-as-a-service); client puzzles will complement those techniques to provide
DDoS defenses against hybrid attacks.
Assumption 2. We assume that the attackers can control a large number of zombie ma-
chines that form botnets to coordinate large-scale attacks aimed at depleting a target server’s
resources. However, we assume that the attacker’s army of bots comprises commodity ma-
chines (e.g., workstations, mobile phones, and IoT devices) but not clusters of servers with
large computing resources. Such clusters are part of enterprise solutions and therefore em-
ploy better protective mechanisms than commodity machines, so are harder to compromise.
We further assume that the attackers can capture and replay packets, but are not able to
change their content; protection against integrity attacks is beyond the scope of our thesis.
The above assumptions are similar to the ones made in [71] and [72]. Moreover, client
puzzles do not require the end-server to differentiate between malicious and benign traffic.
In fact, the low-volume nature of state exhaustion attacks and the requirement for quick and
effective protective mechanisms can impede the accuracy of anomaly detection mechanisms.
3.3.2 Difficulty Selection as a Stackelberg game
We formalize the problem of selecting the puzzle difficulty similar to a network pricing
problem [76, 77, 78]. We model the problem as a Stackelberg game between the service
provider and the service users. The service provider is the leader who sets the difficulty of
the puzzles that the clients must solve to receive service. The users are the followers who
then choose their request rates to optimize their local utility.
Our model rests on the assumption that all clients are selfish agents seeking to optimize
their local utilities; we do not specifically posit a model for malicious bots. This assumption
is rooted in the following observations. First, before the attack starts, the server does not
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have the means to distinguish between benign clients and malicious bots. Second, TCP
by default treats every connection request it receives as a benign request, and thus sends
an ACK packet back without checking whether the request came from a benign user or a
compromised bot. Third, positing a specific attacker model would require the estimation of
attacker preferences and utilities, which the server has no means of measuring. This could
create a schism between the model and its application in the real world. We therefore treat
every request as if it is benign, and capture the presence of a large botnet by obtaining the
asymptotic solution for our model.
Let xi be user i’s request rate, for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, where N is the total number of
users in the system. Consequently, x−i =
∑N
j 6=i xj is the total request rate of all the other
users. Our model captures the puzzle’s difficulty by using the expected number of hash
operations needed to find and verify its solution. Let pi be user i’s puzzle; `(pi) is then
the expected number of hash operations that user i has to perform to find a solution to pi.
Let S(x¯ =
∑
i xi) be the expected service time for a user’s request. User i’s utility can be
written as
ui (xi, x−i, pi) = wi log(1 + xi)− ` (pi)xi − S(x¯) (3.1)
wi is a user-specific parameter that models the user’s valuation of the provider’s service. In
other words, wi represents the amount of work user i is willing to pay per request. log (1 + xi)
represents the user’s expected benefit when making decisions under risk or uncertainty [76,
91]. The utility function can be interpreted as the difference between the user’s expected
benefit and the amount of work she has to expend to solve a puzzle per request added to the
expected service delay she incurs. Each user, being a rational and selfish agent, will choose
a request rate that optimizes her local utility. That will lead to the users adopting the Nash
Equilibrium (or simply, equilibrium) rates x∗i for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N} such that
ui
(
x∗i , x
∗
−i, pi
) ≥ ui (xi, x∗−i, pi) , ∀xi > 0,∀i (3.2)
The service provider’s problem is to find a puzzle difficulty such that (1) it can effectively
reduce the impact of state exhaustion attacks and (2) minimize the amount of work the
server does to generate and verify puzzles. Let P be the space of all possible cryptographic
puzzles and g(pi) and d(pi) be the expected numbers of hash operations that the provider
needs to perform to generate and verify a solution to puzzle pi, respectively. We model the
provider’s problem as finding the puzzles p∗ = {p∗i ∈ P , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}} such that
p∗ = arg max
p∈PN
N∑
i=1
(`(pi)− (g(pi) + d(pi)))x∗i (3.3)
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Equation (3.3) captures the provider’s goal of maximizing the amount of work that the
clients have to perform to obtain service under attack while minimizing the amount of work
it must perform to generate puzzles and verify solutions. This formulation, in fact, captures
the trade-off between the puzzle’s complexity and the expected work that the provider needs
to perform to generate and verify puzzles. The tuple
(x∗ :=< x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
N >,p
∗ :=< p∗1, p
∗
2, . . . , p
∗
N >) (3.4)
represents the solution to the full Stackelberg game.
3.4 APPLICATION TO THE JUELS PUZZLE SCHEME
We now show how the framework we introduced in Section 3.3 can be applied to the
puzzles protocol presented in [71]. We first describe the puzzles protocol from [71] and
then show the solutions we obtain using our framework. For our modeling and analysis,
we assume that the server issues puzzles with the same difficulty for all of its clients, i.e.,
`(pi) = `(pj) ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. This assumption ensures a stateless protocol, follows the
IETF TLS puzzles draft [73], and is recommended in previous work [71].
A puzzle in this scheme is a bitstring of length l bits having m < l bits of difficulty. The
puzzle-issuing server starts by creating the hash y = h (s, T, packet-level data), where s is
a secret key; T is a timestamp; the packet-level data are a concatenation of the source and
destination IP addresses and ports; and h is a collision-resistant hash function. The server
challenges a client to provide k solutions to a puzzle P formed by the first l bits of y.
Upon receiving P , the client computes, by brute force, k solutions {s1, . . . , sk} such that
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, |si| = l and the first m bits of h(P, i, si) match the first m bits of P , where h
is the same hash function that the server used. The client then sends the solutions back to
the server, which in turn, verifies their validity and subsequently accepts the request.
The solution
Since obtaining a single solution of length m bits is best done by brute force, it requires
a maximum of 2m and an average of 2m−1 hashing operations. Since each puzzle requires k
solutions, solving a puzzle then requires an average of k×2m−1 hashing operations. Therefore,
for each user i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, `(pi) = k × 2m−1.
To capture the expected service time for the users, called S(x¯), we abstract the server’s
operation with an M/M/1 queue with a service rate µ. We argue that this abstraction is
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enough for our purpose, since the attacks in which we are interested target the TCP stack and
are independent of the application that the server is running; they are affected only by the
application’s ability to remove established connections from the accept queue. The service
rate µ can be obtained by running stress tests on the application provider’s infrastructure and
can capture different service optimizations such as replications and caching. Subsequently,
we express the expected service time as S(x¯) = 1
µ−x¯ , when x¯ < µ. This condition assumes
that the server is well-provisioned to handle the users’ load under regular conditions. We
therefore rewrite Equation (3.1) as
ui (xi, x−i, pi) = wi log(1 + xi)− k × 2m−1xi − 1
µ− x¯ (3.5)
We now turn to the provider’s formulation. We represent the space of all possible puzzles
as the set of tuples (k,m) where k ∈ N is the number of solutions requested and m ∈ N
is the number of bits of difficulty in each. Therefore we write P = {(k,m) , k,m ∈ N}.
As previously discussed, every challenge can be generated using only one hash operation;
therefore, we write g(pi) = 1, ∀i.
When the server receives a solution, it generates a hash from the received packet’s header
and then verifies each of the k solutions until it finds a violating one or deems the puzzle
correctly solved. If the server chooses which of the k solutions to verify uniformly at random,
it then needs an average of k
2
hashing operations. Therefore, we can write d(pi) = 1 +
k
2
, ∀i.
Since we assume that the service provider issues puzzles with the same difficulty for all
users, we henceforth write p = (k,m) = pi,∀i. We can then rewrite Equation (3.3) as
p∗ = arg max
p∈P
N∑
i=1
(
k × 2m−1 − 2− k
2
)
x∗i (p) (3.6)
Let wav be the average client valuation of the server’s service and α be the server’s asymptotic
service rate per user, under normal operation.
Theorem 3.1. The Nash equilibrium is achieved at p∗ = (k∗,m∗) such that:
`(p∗) = k∗ × 2m∗−1 = wav
(α + 1)
(3.7)
Proof. In order to analytically solve for the equilibrium solution of the game, we follow an
approach similar to that in [76]. We start by noting that the Nash Equilibrium solution of
the users’ game is not affected if we add the quantity
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∑
j 6=i
(
wj log(1 + xj)− k × 2m−1xj
)
(3.8)
to each users’ utility function. Therefore we can now build a strategically equivalent game
where each user’s utility function is
H (x1, . . . , xN , p) =
N∑
i=1
wi log(1 + xi)− k × 2m−1x¯− 1
µ− x¯ (3.9)
Now looking at the Hessian matrix of H we get
Hii =
∂2H
∂x2i
= − wi
(1 + xi)2
− 2
(µ− x¯)2 < 0, ∀i
Hij =
∂2H
∂xixj
= − 2
(µ− x¯)3 < 0, ∀i, j, i 6= j
(3.10)
Therefore H is negative-definite and thus H is strictly concave for 0 ≤ x¯ < µ. Additionally,
since H → −∞ as x¯→ µ, we can conclude the that optimization problem
max
xi≥0:∀i,x¯<µ
H (x1, x2, . . . , xN , p) (3.11)
admits a unique solution x∗ = {x∗1, . . . , x∗N} in the interval 0 ≤ x¯ < µ which corresponds to
the Nash Equilibrium strategies to the users’ game as defined in Equation (3.5). We obtain
the solution strategies by solving the first order condition of H where for i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
∂H
∂xi
(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
N , p) = 0 (3.12)
which translates to
wi
1 + x∗i
− k × 2m−1 − 1
µ− x¯∗ = 0, ∀i (3.13)
Let yi = 1 + xi, y¯ =
∑N
i=1 yi = N + x¯, and w¯ =
∑N
i=1wj, from which we obtain
wi
yi
=
wj
yj
, ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} (3.14)
or equivalently
yi =
wi
wj
yj, ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} (3.15)
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We can then rewrite y¯ as
y¯ =
N∑
i=1
yi =
N∑
i=1
wi
wj
yj =
w¯
wj
yj (3.16)
and thus we can express (3.13) in terms of y¯ as
L˜(y¯) =
w¯
y¯
− k × 2m−1 − 1
(µ+N − y¯)2 = 0 (3.17)
We can thus turn our attention to solving Equation (3.17) for N ≤ y¯ < µ + N . Since
∂L˜
∂y¯
= − w¯
y¯2
− 2
(µ+N−y¯)2 < 0, L˜ is strictly decreasing. Additionally, L˜(y¯)→ −∞ as y¯ → µ+N .
We therefore need L˜(N) to be non-negative so that L˜(y¯) would admit a solution in the
interval N ≤ y¯ < µ+N , which translates to
L˜(N) =
w¯
N
− k × 2m−1 − 1
µ2
> 0 (3.18)
or equivalently
k × 2m−1 < w¯
N
− 1
µ2
:= rˆ (3.19)
We can see rˆ as the maximum possible difficulty that the service provider can select while
guaranteeing that a solution for the clients’ game exists. We also notice that if the provider
had infinite resource, i.e., µ→∞, rˆ → w¯
N
which suggests that a client should not be charged
a price higher than the average user valuation of the provider’s services.
Furthermore, it is beneficial for the service provider to ensure that all clients participate
in the game, i.e., that xi > 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. This therefore translates to the
conditions on y¯
y¯ >
w¯
wi
∀i (3.20)
Now let y¯(k,m) be a solution to Equation (3.17) that satisfies condition (3.20) and where
(k,m) satisfy condition (3.19), and let x¯(k,m) be the corresponding value of x¯. We turn to
the provider’s problem of finding the optimal pricing p∗ = (k∗,m∗) that maximizes
I(p) :=
(
k × 2m−1 − 2− k
2
)
x¯(k,m) (3.21)
In order to obtain an analytical solution to the optimization problem in Equation (3.21)
we make use of the following approximation. We solve for the pricing p˜(k˜, m˜) that maximizes
I˜(p) :=
(
k × 2m−1) x¯(k,m) (3.22)
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Lemma 3.1. |I(p∗) − I˜(p˜)| < c for some constant c > 0, where p∗ and p˜ are the solutions
that maximize I and I˜, respectively.
Proof. Let p∗ = (k∗,m∗) and p˜ = (k˜, m˜) be the prices that maximize I(p) and I˜(p), respec-
tively. We therefore have that
k˜ × 2m˜−1x¯(k˜, m˜) ≥ k × 2m−1x¯(k,m), ∀k,m (3.23)
Let p′ = (k′,m′) be a price with minimum 0 < k′ ≤ k˜ such that k′ × 2m′−1 = k˜ × 2m˜−1 and
I(k′,m′) ≥ I(k˜, m˜). We can therefore write
I(p′) ≥ I(k,m)− (k
′
2
+ 2)x¯(k′,m′), ∀k,m (3.24)
and since I(p∗) ≥ I(p) ∀p we can therefore conclude that
|I(p∗)− I(p′)| ≤ (k
′
2
+ 2)x¯(k′,m′) <
(
(
k′
2
+ 2)µ
)
:= c (3.25)
and since x¯ only depends on k × 2m−1 and not on the individual values of k and m, p′ also
maximizes Equation (3.22) and thus solving for p′ brings us within a constant c of p∗, the
maximum of I. QED.
We can now proceed with finding a solution for Equation (3.22) following the approach
presented in [76]. By using the one-to-one correspondance between k×2m−1 and y¯ (and thus
x¯) presented in Equation (3.17), we can substitute y¯ in (3.22) and then compute p∗ using
the solution to the obtained equation. We then write the equivalent problem as finding y¯∗
such that
y¯∗ = arg max
N<y¯<N+µ
(
w¯
y¯
− 1
(µ+N − y¯)2
)
(y¯ −N) (3.26)
We define G(y¯) :=
(
w¯
y¯
− 1
(µ+N−y¯)2
)
(y¯−N). It is easy to see that ∂2G
∂y¯2
< 0 and thus G(y¯) is
strictly concave. Additionally, G(N + µ)→ −∞, we can thus conclude that G(y¯) admits a
unique maximum in the open interval (N,N+µ). We can then solve the first order condition
∂G(y¯)
∂y¯
:=
w¯N
y¯2
− µ+ y¯ −N
(µ+N − y¯)3 = 0 (3.27)
Obtaining a closed form solution for y¯∗ is not possible for finite N . Therefore we solve
Equation (3.27) asymptotically (i.e., as N →∞) as proposed in [76]. For that, we make the
following assumptions. (1) We assume that the average user preference wav(N) =
w¯
N
has a
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well defined limit wav as N →∞. (2) We assume that as the number of users grows larger,
the service provider can always service a fraction of its users, even if that fraction is small.
In other words, we assume that lim
N→∞
µ
N
= α for some α > 0. For convenience, we rewrite
Equation (3.27) in terms of xav(N) =
x¯
N
and wav(N) as N →∞ as
wav
(1 + xav(N))2
=
α + xav(N)
(α− xav(N))3N2 (3.28)
Equation (3.28) possesses a solution for xav(N) iff,
lim
N→∞
(α− xav(N))3N2 = γ (3.29)
for some γ > 0. We thus substitute back in Equation (3.17) and obtain the solution
k∗ × 2m∗−1 ∼ wav
α + 1
+
2α− 1
γ
2
3N
2
3
(3.30)
where f ∼ g denotes the fact that lim
N→∞
f
g
= 1.
Since we are considering the asymptotic solution, we restrict our attention to the first
order term of the solution in Equation (3.30) and thus obtain our desired form
k∗ × 2m∗−1 = wav
α + 1
(3.31)
In fact, as shown in [76], Equation (3.31) corresponds to the solution of the same problem
when ignoring the service delay at the server. Since SYN and connection flood attacks target
the TCP protocol and not the application layer service, it is convenient for the purposes of
this chapter to only consider the first order term of Equation (3.30), thus completing the
proof. QED.
Analysis
The equilibrium difficulty we obtained in Theorem 3.1 illustrates an important design
tradeoff between the server’s provisioning and the difficulty of the puzzles that the clients
should solve when the server is under attack. A well-provisioned server, i.e., one for which
α > 1, will be able to absorb a larger fraction of the attack and subsequently ask its clients
to solve less complex challenges. In that case, the clients help the server tolerate the attack
and commit fewer resources than they are willing to — the average number of hashes they
would need to perform to solve a challenge is less than wav — so the client achieves high
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Figure 3.1: Profiles of (a) client (wav) and (b) server (α).
utility. On the contrary, a server that is not able to handle all of its clients’ regular load,
i.e., one for which α < 1, would require its clients to solve harder puzzles (p∗ ' wav) and
thus achieve lower utility levels. Therefore, to tolerate an attack, the server asks its clients
to commit more resources, risking the dropout of more clients as the intensity of the attack
increases. Those clients with wi < wav would consider it best for them to drop out, since it
would be too costly as a function of the resources committed to obtain a connection.
We further note that our model and solution are agnostic to the application that is run
by the server. That, in fact, is consistent with TCP being a transport-layer protocol that
is independent of the type of application running on top of it. All our model requires is an
estimate of the server’s capacity to handle large loads (i.e., the parameter α), which can be
obtained by running appropriate stress tests. Server replication and load balancing are then
captured in our model through an increase in the value of α (given the same load).
Finally, we note that our result is not affected by the presence of long-lived TCP connec-
tions (for example, if HTTP/1.1 [92] is being used). The puzzles protect the TCP connection
establishment channel and allow users to connect to the server in the presence of malicious
attacks. The lifetime of the established connection is not affected by the presence or absence
of puzzles; in the case of HTTP/1.1, the goal of the challenges is to allow clients to establish
the TCP connection upon which the HTTP session persists.
Obtaining model parameters
The model parameters, wav and α, relate to the performance capabilities of the server and
the clients. We first describe an experimental procedure for obtaining the model parameters.
Then we discuss how we applied the procedure to an experimental setup to demonstrate the
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Nash strategy.
First, wav is the number of hashes we assume the client is willing to perform to complete
the TCP handshake. It represents the level of acceptable service degradation as each TCP
connection will take longer to finish. To find wav, we assume that 400 ms is adequate time to
establish a TCP three-way handshake for a legitimate client when the server is under attack.
Usability studies show that a 400 ms delay does not interrupt the user’s flow of thoughts [93].
Using that assumption, we find the number of hashes a machine can perform in 400 ms by
profiling the machines. wav is the average value obtained during the experiments.
Second, α is the service parameter of the server. It is directly related to the processing
power of the server. To obtain the parameter, we start by stress testing a server. The stress
test varies the rate of requests per second and records the time it takes to get service for each
rate. We compute α as the ratio of the service rate over the number of concurrent requests.
Finally, after obtaining wav and α, we calculate the equilibrium difficulty parameters
(k∗,m∗) by using Equation (3.7). The choice of those parameters exposes a trade-off between
the number of hashes the server needs to verify a solution and the probability that an
adversary can guess a solution. Choosing a very small k will increase the attacker’s ability
to guess a solution, and selecting a large k will increase the solution verification time. On
the other hand, if lower values of k are selected, the challenge difficulty m would increase
allowing the server to offset its lack of computational resources by asking its clients to solve
harder challenges.
Example
In the following, we present an example of computing the Nash equilibrium difficulty for a
server serving a variety of machines with varying processing powers. Starting with the client,
we obtain wav by profiling the number of SHA-256 operations per second. Figure 3.1(a) shows
the profile of three CPU types: (1) cpu1 is an Intel Xeon E3-1260L quad-core processor
running at 2.4 GHz, (2) cpu2 is an Intel Xeon X3210 quad-core processor running at 2.13
GHz, and (3) cpu3 is an Intel Xeon processor running at 3GHz.
The average number of hashes that can be performed over the three types of CPUs is
wav = 140630. Although the CPUs we profiled are not an exhaustive representative set of
the processing powers of a typical clientele, in all of our experiments, we leveled the playing
field by providing all the attackers with similar or better computational powers.
Then we estimate the server’s α parameter. We deployed an Apache2 web server on a
dual Intel Xeon hexa-core processor running at 2.2 GHz with 24 GB of RAM. We then used
the Apache benchmarking tool ab [94] to profile the performance of the server under regular
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Figure 3.2: TCP Options block for a SYN challenge.
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Figure 3.3: TCP Options block for a SYN solution with k = 1.
and high loads. Figure 3.1(b) shows the service rate µ and the service parameter α of our
server as the number of concurrent requests attempted by ab increases. Our server was able
to maintain a constant service rate under high load (µ ' 1100 requests/s), and thus the
parameter α converged to a value of 1.1 as the load increased. Thus for our example, with
wav = 140630 and α = 1.1, the TCP puzzle difficulty is set at (k
∗ = 2,m∗ = 17).
3.5 IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented the TCP challenges in the TCP stack of the Linux 4.13.0 kernel. The
puzzles are turned off by default and are only enabled when the socket’s queue is full. We
designed our implementation in such a way that the challenges take precedence over the SYN
cookies once the queue is full; we do, however, support SYN cookies as a backup option. We
provided support for dynamic tuning of the parameters of the challenges (k, m) through the
kernel’s sysctl interface.
We generate the challenge’s pre-image by hashing a string containing (1) a server’s secret
key, generated once at the start of a socket’s lifetime, (2) the server’s current timestamp,
(3) the SYN packet’s source and destination IP addresses, and (4) the packet’s source and
destination port numbers. We used the Linux kernel’s SHA256 hashing function, since it
provides the necessary pre-image resistance guarantees [71].
To avoid breaking the TCP definition, we inject the challenges and solution into the
options field of the TCP SYN-ACK and ACK packets. Figure 3.2 shows the format of the
TCP option we implemented to transmit a challenge in the SYN-ACK packet. We chose an
unused opcode (0xfc) to represent a challenge option. The Length field indicates the length
of each option block in bytes, including the opcode and the field itself. We allocate one byte
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each for the number of solutions k, the difficulty of the puzzle m (in bits), and the pre-image
and solution length l. Next, we insert the challenge’s pre-image. Finally, following the TCP
stack requirement, each option block must be 32 bits aligned, we, therefore, insert 0 to 3
NOP fields to ensure alignment.
Figure 3.3 shows the format of the TCP option used by a client to send a solution. Much
as in the challenge option, we made use of unallocated opcode (0xfd). Since the server
keeps no state about the client after receiving the first SYN packet, the client safely assumes
that the server has ignored its previously announced Maximum Segment Size (MSS) and
Window Scaling (Wscale) parameters. We then resend the MSS and Wscale values within
the solution, write down each of the k solutions, and perform alignment to 32 bits.
The benefits of adding the MSS and Wscale parameters to the solution option block are
twofold. First, it means that the challenge protocol will be self-contained; implementation
of the TCP stack usually ignores all options other than timestamps in any packet other than
the SYN and SYN-ACK packets. Therefore, support for the challenge protocol does not
require changes to legacy options parsing. The addition also provides us with the benefit of
reducing the space needed to resend the options in the ACK packet. For example, sending
the MSS values as a separate option would require 4 bytes, while we need only 2 in the
case of the self-contained solution option. Second, we encode the MSS value by using 16
bits (as defined in the specification of TCP), instead of the 3 bits provided by SYN cookies.
In addition, when SYN cookies are in place, the client and the server cannot agree on the
window parameters, which reduces the performance of the TCP connection.
Also, modern TCP implementations support the exchange of timestamps as options in
the TCP header. Our implementation makes use of the timestamps, whenever available, to
generate, solve, and verify challenges. However, if the timestamp option is not enabled (for
example, it was disabled by the client or the server), our implementation embeds the times-
tamp used in the generation of the challenge (an additional 4 bytes) in both the challenge
and the solution packets.
Furthermore, when the server’s accept queue overflows, its default behavior is to reject
new connections, even if the protection mechanism is in place. However, for our purposes,
since the goal of the puzzle protection mechanism is to throttle the rate of all clients (both
benign and malicious), we modified the listening TCP socket’s implementation to send a
challenge when the protection is in effect, even if the accept queue overflows. When the
server receives an ACK packet while under attack, it first checks whether the queue is full
and performs the verification procedure only if there is room to accept the connection. If
the queue is full, the server will ignore the ACK packet. In such a case, the user (whether
benign or malicious) assumes that the connection has been established and will begin sending
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application-level packets thus causing the server to reply with a reset (RST) packet to signal
that the connection was not established. This implementation choice achieves the goal of
deceiving the malicious users into thinking that they have established a connection when
they have not; the malicious agents that do not send application-level packets will not receive
a RST packet to indicate that the server has dropped the connection.
Finally, to combat replay attacks, we make use of the timestamp in the solution to check
whether a challenge has expired. This stateless mechanism hinders an attacker’s ability to
replay solution packets, since tampering with the timestamp will cause the solution verifi-
cation to fail. The timeout interval can be tuned through the kernel’s sysctl interface.
3.6 EVALUATION
Using our modified Linux kernel, we evaluated the performance of the TCP puzzles in
safeguarding a server TCP connection establishment channel from state exhaustion attacks.
We performed the experiments using the DETER [95] cybersecurity testbed. In the
spirit of moving towards a “science of security” through reproducible experiments [20], we
provide all of our experiment scripts and datasets online at https://github.com/nouredd2/
puzzles-utils.
The goal of our experiments is to evaluate (1) the effectiveness of TCP puzzles in protecting
against state exhaustion attacks, (2) the impact of TCP puzzles on service quality, and (3) the
ability of the Nash equilibrium puzzle difficulty to balance the client solution and the server
verification load as well as its ability to effectively rate-limit attackers. Our victim server
runs an HTTP application that accepts “gettext/size” requests and returns messages that
contain size random bytes. The clients run an HTTP client that requests text from the
server at a prespecified rate.
In a real-world deployment, service would be provided by a farm of servers, but our scenario
uses only one server and a smaller set of clients. In larger systems, since a load balancer
forwards TCP connection requests to individual servers, an attack has to ensure that its
wave of requests reaches all of the servers to effectively deny service. Therefore, adding more
servers allows a service provider to tolerate bigger attacks by large botnets. Our results
show that a server using TCP puzzles as a means for state exhaustion DDoS protection can
tolerate a larger botnet than an unprotected server can. We hence argue that when all the
servers in a farm employ our protection, the system will be able to tolerate a larger botnet
that is proportional to the improved tolerance of a single server. Our experiment scenario
thus studies the protection offered to a single server; the results are to scale when more
load-balanced puzzles-equipped servers are deployed.
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We consider two types of attackers. The first uses randomized source IP addresses to
target the server’s listen queue with a flood of half-open TCP connections (using hping3).
The second type uses real IP addresses to flood the server with established connections (using
nping) in an attempt to fill its accept queue and prevent new, legitimate connections from
being established. Unless otherwise stated, we use the following experiment parameters.
The set of clients contains 15 machines requesting 10, 000 bytes of data at exponentially
distributed time intervals, with rate rc = 20 requests per second. The botnet consists of 10
machines running an attack at a constant rate ra = 500 requests per second, amounting to
an overall attack rate of 5, 000 packets per second (pps). All of the malicious machines are
equipped with a computational power equal to, or greater than, that of the clients’ machines.
Except in Experiment 4, all of the machines in our setup were equipped with our modified
kernel.
Finally, except for Experiment 5, all the experiments used the same network topology with
well-provisioned link bandwidths so as to avoid link saturation. The backbone consisted of
three routers fully connected with 1 Gbps links. The server connected to the network with a
1 Gbps link, while all the other hosts connected to the network with 100 Mbps links. All of
our agents ran on physical machines with Ubuntu 16.04 LTS along with our patched Linux
4.13.0 kernel. We deployed the packet-monitoring software, tcpdump, on all of the machines,
and used the captures to measure the throughput at the server, the throughput at each host,
and the number of dropped TCP connections. We report here on the throughput since it
represents a direct assessment of the impact of puzzles on our application; nevertheless, we
acknowledge that different applications will require different metrics.
3.6.1 Experiment 1: SYN and connection flood protection
In the first scenario, we started a distributed SYN flood attack. Without protection, the
SYN flood filled the listen queue with half-open TCP connections, leading the server to
drop new incoming connections. We measured the throughput at a client and the server
for three settings: (1) no protection (control settings), (2) TCP SYN cookies, and (3) TCP
client puzzles. Figure 3.4 shows the throughput measured during the experiment. The attack
duration, shown by the shaded region, was initiated at t = 120 and concluded at t = 480.
The throughput’s behavior for both the server and client was consistent; we therefore restrict
our analysis to the server’s case. For the control setting, the server’s throughput dropped to
zero as soon as the attack started and returned to full capacity 30 seconds after the attack
ended. On the other hand, SYN cookies were effective at rendering the attack ineffective
and ensuring a constant throughput at the server throughout the attack. By storing partial
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Figure 3.4: Throughput at a client and server during SYN flood.
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Figure 3.5: Client and server throughput during a connection flood.
state of the connection in the TCP sequence number instead of in the listen queue, SYN
cookies provide protection against this type of attack. Finally, when low difficulty puzzles
are enabled, (k,m) = (1, 8), the throughput is unaffected during the attack. Similarly to
SYN cookies, the puzzles enabled reconstruction of a connection’s state with no use of the
listen queue. However, when we used the Nash equilibrium difficulty, (k,m) = (2, 17), the
throughput was reduced to 50 Mbps during the attack. This reduction occurred because the
equilibrium strategy is more aggressive than the easier setting; in this scenario, easy puzzles
were enough to alleviate the attack as the botnet was not completing the connection.
For the second scenario, we used the attacker nodes to launch a distributed connection
flood attack. We measured the same metrics as in the first scenario for three cases: no pro-
tection, SYN cookies, and TCP puzzles at Nash difficulties. The TCP puzzles at a difficulty
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Figure 3.7: Queue sizes during a connection flood attack.
of 8 bits were ineffective at protecting the server’s state. For readability, we elected not to
show these results in this plot since we will revisit various difficulty settings in Section 3.6.2.
Figure 3.5 shows the throughput of a client and the server during the experiment. We
used the sparkline in the client plot to mark when the server sent a SYN-ACK packet with a
challenge (bright tick) or without a challenge (dark tick). The results show that SYN cookies
are ineffective during a connection flood; the server’s throughput drops to 0, as it would if
no protection were in place. In both those cases, the server needs 30 seconds to detect the
end of the flood and fully recover. On the other hand, TCP puzzles at Nash difficulties
provide tolerance of the flood attack. The throughputs of the client and the server were
about 40% of their respective nominal rates. It is interesting to note that the throughput
periodically spiked during the attack phase. This occurs because not all the requests of
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Figure 3.8: Effective attack rate during a connection flood attack.
the clients required a puzzle, as shown by the dark ticks in the sparkline during the attack
phase. The performance improvement was due to the opportunistic nature of the protection
controller; that is, when the listen queue was not full, connection requests were answered
without a challenge, allowing a host to take advantage of the resource instantly. We also
note that easy puzzles were unable to affect the attacker bots’ connectivity rates and thus
provided no better protection than SYN cookies did.
In addition, we measured the impact of the TCP challenges on the CPU utilization of
the client, server, and attacker machines. Figure 3.6 shows that the impact on the server
of generating and verifying the puzzles was negligible; the server’s CPU utilization stayed
below 5% and did not exceed its nominal (under regular load) value. In accordance with
the nature of computational puzzles, the CPU utilization at the clients’ machines increased
during the attack, but still remained well under 20%, with an average of 10%. The attacker
machines, on the other hand, witnessed a spike in CPU utilization during the period of
the attack, reaching a maximum of 60%. These results show that our equilibrium difficulty
setting achieved our desired goals of (1) putting minimal overhead on the server in generating
and verifying puzzles, (2) inducing tolerable nuisance for the clients, and (3) effectively rate-
limiting the attackers’ established request rate and increasing their computational burden.
In fact, the sudden increase in the CPU utilization at the botnet machines can alert the
owners of these machines to the presence of malware.
We further studied the impact of the TCP cookies and puzzles on the server’s listen
and accept queues during a connection flood attack. Figure 3.7 shows that when SYN
cookies were the only defensive mechanism in place, both queues were fully saturated, which
explains the zero throughput observed by the benign clients. On the other hand, with TCP
challenges in place, the accept queue was almost always empty, which was a direct result
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Figure 3.9: Box plot of the client throughput for different puzzle difficulties.
of the puzzles’ ability to rate-limit every user, whether benign or malicious, to an average of
2 requests per second. In addition, the listen queue, although mostly saturated, showed
frequent openings that are consistent with the opportunistic nature of our implementation,
as indicated by the sparklines in Figure 3.4.
Finally, we showed that TCP puzzles (at Nash difficulty) throttled the attacker’s rate of
established connections. We measured the effective completed connection rate of all attackers
as seen by the server during the connection flood. The measurements, shown in Figure 3.8,
reveal that the attack rate was not affected by TCP cookies, achieving an average rate of
225 connections per second (cps), whereas puzzles severely limited the attackers’ rate down
to an average of 4 cps, a reduction by a factor of 37.
3.6.2 Experiment 2: Nash equilibrium strategy
In this experiment, we showed that the Nash equilibrium difficulty provides the optimal
balance between the clients’ throughput and the attack tolerance during an attack. We
selected the Nash equilibrium based on the capabilities of the clients and the server’s defense
requirements.
Figure 3.9 shows the average and standard deviation of the throughput of a client during
an attack. In general, for any k, if m < 12, the ease of solving the challenges did not affect the
attackers’ rate, so a denial of service occurred. The Nash equilibrium strategy resulted in the
most stable throughput, with an average of 3.90 Mbps and low variability. Even though some
of the other settings had a higher average throughput, their throughput was highly unstable,
reaching zero at many times. Further, we note that when the difficulty was set to (k = 2,m =
16), the throughput achieved a slightly better average with comparable variability. However,
the Nash difficulty setting provided the rate that balanced the acceptable cost a client was
willing to pay and the server’s ability to tolerate state exhaustion attacks by throttling the
attackers’ rates. In fact, at the Nash difficulty, the puzzles mechanism reduced the attackers’
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Figure 3.10: Impact of the puzzles on the attack as the size of the botnet and the flooding
rate are varied
average SYN sending rate from 2250 pps for (k = 2,m = 16) to 1668 pps, and the average
connection establishment rate from 30 cps to 22 cps.
3.6.3 Experiment 3: Botnet effectiveness
In the third experiment, we showed that TCP puzzles increased the server’s tolerance to
a botnet and required attackers to increase their botnet’s size to deny service. We varied
the botnet’s size and attack rate and measured the cumulative attack rate as seen by the
server, referred to as the connection completion rate. The connection completion rate is
the effective attack rate that actually impacts the server. In the first scenario, we set the
number of nodes in the botnet to 5 and varied the sending rate of each node between 100 and
1000 pps. Figure 3.10a shows the rate of completed connections as the rate of each attacker
machine was varied. The results show that the TCP puzzles were capable of rate-limiting
the effective attack rate. As the per-node attack rate increased, the effective attack rate was
limited to 11 cps in all cases.
In the second scenario, we varied the number of machines in the botnet while setting the
cumulative attack rate to 5, 000 pps; each machine’s rate was set at 5, 000/(size of botnet).
Figure 3.10b shows the measured effective attack rate as the number of machines was varied.
The results show that attackers had to increase the size of their botnets to increase their
effective attack rates. The effective attack rate, although it linearly increased with the
increase in the number of attack machines, only peaked at 25 cps. In contrast to the near-
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Figure 3.11: Percentage of established connections when TCP puzzles adoption is not com-
plete
constant rate in the first scenario, the effective attack rate increased in this scenario since
more machines were enlisted in the botnet. However, this increase did not reflect the increase
in resources being committed to the botnet. At this rate of increase, a botnet has to commit
500 machines to reach an effective attack rate of 5000 cps.
In conclusion, the attacker cannot increase the effective attack rate by increasing the
individual rates; she has to increase the number of machines in the botnet. TCP puzzles at
the Nash equilibrium difficulty significantly increased the cost of a state exhaustion attack.
3.6.4 Experiment 4: Adoption of TCP puzzles
In this experiment, we showed that a client solving the TCP puzzles is almost always able
to connect to the server regardless of whether the attacker elects to solve or ignore the puzzles
or select a combination thereof. On the other hand, a client that does not solve puzzles
gets erratic service when the attacker is solving the puzzles and almost no service when the
attacker floods the server without solving any puzzles. In this experiment, we used machines
that were not patched to support TCP puzzles; we tested four scenarios in which (1) neither
the attacker and the clients solved puzzles (NA,NC); (2) the attacker solved puzzles while
the clients did not (SA,NC); (3) both the clients and the attacker solved puzzles; and (4)
the clients solved puzzles and the attacker did not. We group scenarios (3) and (4) together
and label them (*A, SC). Figure 3.11 shows the percentage of completed connections for
all the proposed scenarios. We observe that a client solving puzzles is not denied service
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regardless of the attacker’s type; this happens because the attacker, being rate-limited when
solving puzzles and having its requests ignored when not solving, is not able to fill the
accept queue of the server. On the other hand, a non-solving client faced with a solving
attacker experiences a highly variable percentage of completed connections, reaching 0 at
some instances. The reason is the opportunistic nature of the puzzles controller (as observed
in Experiment 2); the rate-limiting impact on the attacker machines can empty slots in
the server’s queues, thus providing openings in which the non-solving client can establish
connections. However, when faced with an attacker that does not solve the challenges, the
non-solving clients are denied service, because the attacker’s vast resources beat the clients’
requests for the resources freed by the puzzles controller. We note that the service promises
provided by our implementation to noncompliant clients are similar, and sometimes better
than, those provided by network capabilities [67].
3.6.5 Experiment 5: Puzzle-based Queueing
In this experiment, we present a prototype solution that addresses the challenge that arises
from treating every user as potentially malicious, namely the possibility that more powerful
attackers will be able to control the majority of the server’s resources. To that end, we
modified the queueing behavior of the kernel’s TCP stack from a First In First Out (FIFO)
discipline to a priority-based behavior. Our design rests on the observation that a benign
user would have an average of nˆi =
2mi−1
βi
seconds between their requests, where βi is that
user’s hashing rate per second. So a user that can send more than one request in a single nˆi
interval is likely to be attempting to launch a connection flood attack.
We therefore allow each user i to solve puzzles at any difficulty mi > m
∗, and then tag
that user’s request with a weight ηi = bmixi c, where xi is the user’s request rate in a given time
interval ∆T . Computing the weights for each request requires the server to keep state about
incoming requests, which might also be a target of a state exhaustion attack. However, our
design safeguards against this vulnerability in the following manner. First, for each user i,
we need only dlog2(mmax)e bits to keep track of xi, where mmax is the maximum possible
puzzle difficulty bits (32 bits in our case). This is valid since when xi > mmax, the weight
is always 0, and thus we do not need to keep incrementing xi. We thus achieve a significant
reduction in state compared to that for a half-open TCP request. Second, we associate each
entry in our state with a timer that expires after ∆T microseconds and deletes that entry.
If we receive another request from the same user before the timer expires, we reset the timer
for another ∆T microseconds. Thus, our state will be used for only potentially malicious
users that are sending requests at a rate greater than 1
∆T
. The server can control the timer
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Figure 3.12: Evaluation of our prototype puzzle-based queueing
interval ∆T through the kernel’s sysctl interface. Finally, if the server’s state table is full,
it assigns the same weight to all requests and falls back to the same case as in Experiment
2.
We first evaluated the performance impact of performing priority queueing for every in-
coming request. We compared the average service time per request for 5 clients that were
simultaneously connecting to the server, each solving at a difficulty of 10, 11, 12, 13, and
14 bits, respectively. We differentiate between two cases: (1) the vanilla case in which we
used the FIFO queue, and (2) the priority queueing implementation. Figure 3.12a shows the
average service time for a single request in each case and indicates that, with 95% confidence,
our implementation incurs no performance penalty.
We then evaluated the effectiveness of our design when it faced a mixture of users solving at
different difficulties. We fixed the server’s minimum acceptable difficulty at (k = 2,m = 15)
and used 8 attacker machines and only 2 client machines (thus giving the majority of the
hashing power to the attackers). The client machines solved at the minimum allowable
difficulty, while the attackers used difficulties ranging from 15 to 19 bits. We varied the
state table timer (∆T ) from 10 ms to 1000 ms and measured the throughput at the client.
Figure 3.12b shows the throughput at a benign client as the timer interval ∆T was in-
creased. We notice that in all cases, the client was able to connect to the server and reach
a throughput of at least 4.5 Mbps. That is a significant improvement over the scenario pre-
sented in Experiment 2, in which for (k = 2,m = 15) the clients were not able to connect to
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the server (Figure 3.9). We also note that the length of ∆T had little impact on the observed
client throughput. However, when ∆T = 10 ms, the client saw its lowest throughput. The
reason was that the client was attempting to connect to the server at a rate of 20 packets per
second (i.e., a new connection every 50 ms). Therefore, for ∆T < 50 ms, the client’s timer
was always renewed, and thus the weight assigned to it quickly reached 0 and its requests
were treated as malicious.
3.7 LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the challenges facing the adoption of client puzzles and provide
an analysis of their limitations.
Software adoption: As showcased by our experiments, there is a great benefit for servers
to adopt client puzzles as a mechanism for tolerating state exhaustion attacks. By rate-
limiting users and protecting the server’s queues, client puzzles present service providers with
a chance to provide continuous service during state exhaustion attacks. Our implementation
has several features that make it easy to adopt. First, a server can easily support client
puzzles by simply patching its kernel. Second, our patch does not introduce any changes to
the normal operation of the server and sends challenges only when the queues overflow; the
TCP stack remains intact otherwise. Finally, our patch is compatible with earlier versions
of the Linux kernel provided they support cryptographic operations.
While servers are incentivized to adopt TCP puzzles by the increased tolerance of attacks,
clients, on the other hand, benefit from the promise of receiving service even during attacks.
As shown in Experiment 4, users that enable support for client puzzles are always able to
connect to the server. The users that choose not to adopt the challenges still receive full
service under regular load. However, during an attack, those users will be in contention with
the nonsolving attackers for the spots are freed up by the server’s opportunistic challenges
controller. That scenario is no worse than the case when no challenges are applied. Note that
our theoretical formulation validates this observation; a user that does not adopt challenges
is similar to one that values the server’s services at w = 0.
Replay attacks: Since the server does not retain state about an incoming connection before
receiving a valid challenge solution, an attacker might capture legitimate clients’ solutions
and replay them to overflow the server’s accept queue. We note, however, that for a replayed
solution to be validated, the attacker must retain the packet’s parameters (IP addresses, port
numbers, and timestamps). Therefore, a replayed solution can only be used to occupy one
slot in the server’s queue at a time. In addition, our implementation ensures that puzzles
expire after a set timeout interval. The timeout interval limits an attacker’s ability to carry
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out a replay flood effectively, and thus our implementation is resistant to such attacks.
Fairness and power considerations: Finally, client puzzles research faces an impor-
tant challenge arising from the presence of a nonuniform mix of power-limited (e.g., mobile
phones, IoT devices) and power-endowed (e.g., GPU-enabled desktops) benign devices. Mo-
tivated by the work in [70], in Experiment 5, we built a prototype design that is intended
to combine puzzle difficulty and request rates to assign weights to clients’ requests. Our
preliminary results are promising, and we plan to explore this further in the future.
3.8 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we presented a theoretical formulation and implementation of client puzzles
as a means for tolerating state exhaustion attacks. We addressed the challenge of selecting
puzzle difficulties by modeling the problem as a Stackelberg game in which the server is the
leader and the clients are the followers. We obtained the equilibrium solution that illustrates
a tradeoff between the clients’ valuation of the requested services and the server’s service
capacity. We then provided our implementation of the puzzles as a Linux kernel patch and
evaluated its performance on the DETER testbed. Our results show that client puzzles are
an effective mechanism that can be added to our arsenal of defenses against DDoS attacks.
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CHAPTER 4: MIDGARD: CROSS-LAYER DEFENSE TO VOLUMETRIC
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the scale and complexity of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks
have grown significantly. The introduction of DDoS-for-hire services has greatly reduced the
cost of launching targeted attacks to a low of $10 per-hour [96]. This is further exacerbated by
the increased adoption of poorly-secured, hard-to-patch, Internet of Things (IoT) devices,
rendering it easy for malicious actors to amass botnets of millions of devices [62]. The
direct exposure of IoT devices to the Internet has also allowed attackers to diversify their
arsenal of attacks and launch multi-vectored attacks that include bandwidth-exhaustion,
state-exhaustion, and application layer attacks [60].
DDoS-for-hire and IoT devices have greatly contributed to lowering the barrier of entry
for DDoS actors, thus creating a large imbalance between the cost of launching an attack
and that of sustaining one [69]. This imbalance is further brought to light by attackers that
employ reflection attacks such as DNS or NTP reflections. In fact, using poorly configured
memcached servers, attackers were able to reach an unprecedented 51,200x amplification fac-
tor [97]. It is therefore of paramount importance that we address this imbalance and reclaim
the defenders’ advantages.
Common DDoS mitigation techniques nowadays rely on the services of cloud- and CDN-
providers, such as Cloudflare or Akamai, that massively over-provision data centers in an
attempt to absorb attack traffic and perform filtering and scrubbing techniques. Although
widely adopted by industrial settings, such approaches carry the risk of turning the DDoS
landscape into an unsustainable bandwidth war between attackers and cloud providers, fur-
thering the stress on the network infrastructure, especially as we enter the era of unprece-
dented Tbps attack traffic levels [98]. They further do not provide any solutions to the
cost imbalance problem; the burden of defending DDoS attacks is falling increasingly on the
shoulders of the victim and the network, while the barrier of entry for DDoS is getting lower.
Capability-based approaches [29, 99, 100] attempt to authorize network traffic that tra-
verse congested links by requiring senders to obtain specific authorization tokens from a
destination server. The server can then request specific rate limiting mechanisms or band-
width allocation schemes. It is the job of the network (i.e., the routers) to implement the
mechanisms and validate the capabilities. In addition, capability-based approaches require
routers to reserve a fraction of their bandwidth for capability request packets; that capa-
bility request channel can also be subject to denial of service (or denial of capabilities)
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attacks [30]. Furthermore, both CDN- and capability-based approaches do not provide any
protection against attacks that target links other than the victim’s direct upstream link,
such as the Crossfire [101] and the Coremelt [102] attacks.
In this chapter, we present Midgard, an end-to-end solution that combines (1) routing
defenses, (2) network capabilities, (3) client puzzles, and (4) cloud elasticity and deployability
to provide resistance to large-scale, multi-vectored DDoS attacks. Midgard is comprised of
traffic management and policing boxes and routers that reside in a victim’s upstream ISP, and
uses client puzzles as network capabilities to influence routing and traffic policing decisions
on the path to the victim. We implement Midgard on a custom box running general
purpose Linux and the elasticity and provisioning of cloud networks to provide a deployable
solution. We implemented Midgard using the Linux kernel’s AF XDP sockets that allow us
to maintain near line-rate processing speeds. We evaluated our implementation using a set
of experiments on the DETER testbed. Our results show that the use of client puzzles to
drive traffic policing decisions improves the network’s ability to sustain volumetric DDoS
attacks, and restore the balance between the cost of launching and defending such attacks.
4.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Midgard is designed as an easy-to-deploy end-to-end solution to bandwidth- and state-
exhaustion DDoS attacks occurring at Layers 3 and 4 of the networking stack. Dealing
with application layer attacks is beyond Midgard’s scope as it requires application level
information and control over the actual victim’s resources. We designed Midgard to bring
about the advantages of (1) capabilities for rate limiting and traffic policing, (2) client puzzles
for balancing the cost of attacks and defenses, and (3) cloud deployments for initial attack
containment. In what follows, we identify a set of desirable properties that a DDoS solution
must provide for it to be effective.
Cost Balance and Fairness. Solutions such as traffic filtering, capabilities, and cloud-
powered overlays and CDN, put the burden of providing resistance of large scale attacks
solely on the victim’s shoulders (and the cloud provider, though the victim must bear the
monetary cost). However, motivated by the quick increase in the scale and diversity of
attacks, the barrier of entry for attackers is at an all-time low, especially with the advent
of DDoS-for-hire services. This cost imbalance has greatly tipped the scale in favor of the
attackers and has effectively provided them with an easy pass to an ever increasing scale of
DDoS attacks.
Midgard addresses this cost imbalance problem by leveraging client puzzles at the net-
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work level, and essentially forcing attackers to provide “payment” for their share of the
traversed links’ bandwidth. This also carries the additional benefit of alerting users of com-
promised bot machines of the possibility of security breaches.
However, client puzzles suffer from two major disadvantages. First, the puzzles do not
provide fairness guarantees to low-powered devices as well as devices that have a generally
low traffic sending rate. Second, similar to the 51% attack in cryptocurrencies, attackers
with large botnets that can control a larger aggregate hashing power than the legitimate
clients will end up controlling the largest fraction of the bandwidth, and thus achieve their
goals of the denial of services; we refer to such a case as the majority-hashing attack. The
per-computation fairness model introduced in [30] and [103] (1) disfranchises low-powered
IoT and mobile devices, (2) does not reward legitimate clients that send lower volumes of
traffic, and (3) provides little resistance to the majority-hashing attack. Midgard addresses
these issues with client puzzles by combining traffic policing and capability-base rate limiting
with client puzzles at the victim’s upstream ISP level.
Deployability. Midgard’s design introduces the following deployability challenges. First,
since Midgard employs client puzzles, it will require software updates at the affected clients.
This is an essential part of our end-to-end solution paradigm. Second, adopting client puzzles
requires Midgard to provide a puzzle distribution mechanism. [30] and [103] suggest using
DNS servers and ICMP messages as puzzle distribution schemes, respectively. We discuss
the shortcoming of these approaches in Section 4.4.1 and discuss how Midgard leverages
the two ways nature of Internet communication (from the point of view of the client) to
distribute puzzles without the need for trusted third parties or ICMP messages.
Finally, Midgard’s capabilities-based policing and rate-limiting requires upgrades to the
network hardware, as it needs enforcement at the network level (routers and switches). We
leverage recent advances in SDN and programmable networking to provide an incremen-
tally deployable adoption scheme that minimizes the need for hardware upgrades. Addi-
tionally, unlike previous capabilities-based and client puzzles approaches [29, 32, 99, 103],
Midgard only requires updates to the networking equipment at the victim’s upstream ISP,
and does not require implementation across administrative domains. In fact, we believe that
Midgard can be provided as a subscription-based service for the clients of an ISP, thus
alleviating the one-time cost of its deployment.
Resistance to Cloud Bypass Attacks It is possible for attackers to circumvent current
cloud-based DDoS solutions by exposing the victim’s IP address and sending attack traf-
fic directly to it (rather than going through DNS) [104, 105, 106, 107]. We discuss how
Midgard provides resistance to such circumvention attempts in Section 4.4.2.
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Figure 4.1: Overview of Midgard. The Midgard server distributes client puzzles and
creates capabilities that the victim’s ISP uses to police ingress traffic.
4.3 MIDGARD OVERVIEW
We show a high-level overview of Midgard in Figure 4.1. The Midgard server (or box)
resides at the edge of the victim’s ISP. We envision that Midgard’s protection mechanism
can be provided as a subscription to interested clients, similar to Amazon’s AWS Shield [108].
Deployment of Midgard within a single ISP provides the benefits of network-level protec-
tion without the need for agreements that span multiple authoritative domains such as
those necessary for other mechanisms [29]. Furthermore, we leverage the recent advances
in SDNs and programmable networking hardware to provide cost effective deployment and
maintenance of Midgard within the ISP’s network.
When under a DDoS attack, all traffic destined to the victim is redirected to the overly pro-
visioned Midgard server, in a way similar to that performed by cloud-protection providers
and adopted in [104]. However, unlike cloud protection services, Midgard only uses the
over-provisioned cloud to absorb the initial impact of the attack. It does not perform any
traffic scrubbing and rather attempts to stop the attack at the source. To that end, the
Midgard server acts as a puzzles distribution service and handles the generation, distribu-
tion, and verification of the cryptographic challenges. When a sender’s (whether malicious
or benign) puzzle verification is successful, the server will then create a cryptographic capa-
bility based on the state of the downstream links to the victim, the sender’s puzzle difficulty,
and the sender’s past behavior.
Unlike the work in [104], beyond dropping packets with incorrect puzzle solutions, the
Midgard server does not perform any direct routing decisions. It will create the capability
nonce that the downstream ISP routers will then use to enforce the traffic policies. This
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reduces the workload of the Midgard server while also reducing the stress on the routers’
processors and memory, and requiring no inter-router communication, as compared with
prior capability-based approaches [29].
Finally, unlike previous capability and cloud-based approaches, by using client puzzles,
Midgard gets the added benefit of protecting Midgard’s internal maintained state from
state-exhaustion attacks, thus proving resistance to multi-vectored DDoS and reducing the
attack surface introduced by the added mechanisms. In fact, in Midgard’s setup, client puz-
zles serve a dual purpose. First, as originally intended in [71], the puzzles protect Midgard’s
state from state-exhaustion attacks since every sender will need to solve a puzzle to occupy
an entry in the server’s memory. Second, Midgard translates the received puzzle solutions
into capabilities that downstream routers will use to perform traffic policing, thus eliminat-
ing the need for a capability requests channel and efficiently dealing with denial of capability
attacks.
4.4 MIDGARD ARCHITECTURE
Midgard aims to provide a synergy between the most efficient DDoS protection mecha-
nisms in the goal of providing strong resistance to large scale, multi-vectored, DDoS attacks.
The Midgard box is composed of 3 agents: (1) the puzzle generation and distribution agent,
(2) the puzzle to capabilities translation agent, and (3) the network state estimation agent.
On the other hand, routers in the victim’s upstream ISP network run a capabilities enforce-
ment and policing agent. In what follows, we discuss the design and architecture of each of
these agents.
4.4.1 Puzzle Generation and Distribution
Once an attack is detected, the Midgard server will start asking each sender to solve a
cryptographically hard puzzle in order to gain a “right of entry” into the victim’s upstream
ISP network. Previous puzzle based defenses often made it the responsibility of the sender
(i.e. the client) to initiate the puzzles protocol. Portcullis [30] requires users to send DNS
queries to specific domains to obtain a valid puzzle nonce. Users will then keep solving
harder and harder puzzles until they are able to obtain a valid capability. Mirage [109]
redirects senders to specific puzzle servers that will handle the dissemination of puzzles, and
Congestion Puzzles [103] requires users to continuously probe the network for congestion
and receive puzzles from routers in the form of special- purpose ICMP message.
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Such approaches violate our deployability requirement for the following reasons. First,
they require the cooperation and approval from authoritative DNS server to store and deliver
puzzles. Second, they require the presence of dedicated servers or CDNs thus increasing the
cost and trust requirements of deployment. Third, ICMP message are ill-equipped to handle
puzzle distribution since (1) clients should not be expected to explicitly probe the network
for congestion information and (2) more importantly, senders behind NATs or firewalls will
not be able to receive such messages; typical firewall configurations often block ingress ICMP
messages or only allow ingress traffic that matches previously recorded outgoing traffic.
In this work, we adopt a different strategy. We believe that any puzzle-based protocol
should always be initiated by the destination when it detects the presence of an attack. It is
therefore the responsibility of the Midgard server to generate and distribute puzzles to the
senders. By doing that, Midgard requires no support from DNS authorities and remains
within the same trust boundary as the victim server and its upstream ISP. Additionally,
Midgard leverages the experimental capabilities of IP’s Experimental Congestion Notifica-
tion (ECN) [110, 111]1 and IP header options to signal congestion and distribute puzzles,
thus eliminating the dependency on ICMP messages and the requirements for clients to send
probe messages.
When congestion is detected at the downstream links to the victim, the Midgard server
start generating puzzles and capabilities. After receiving a packet from sender si destined
to the victim’s IP address IPv, the server will generate a puzzle nonce xi such that
xi = H (T, IPv, K) (4.1)
where T is the current server’s timestamp, K is a secret only known to the Midgard server,
and H is a publicly known preimage resistance cryptographic hash function, such as SHA3.
Similar to the approach in [30], we specifically do not include si’s IP address to avoid the
problems introduced by devices behind NATs and attackers with spoofed IP addresses. The
server will subsequently send a packet back to si with the ECN bits of its IP header set to
01 and the nonce xi and the timestamp T included in the packet’s IP options. The server
will also forward si’s packet to the downstream routers to be served as legacy traffic, i.e., it
will receive a best-effort treatment by the downstream routers.
In order to be able to deliver its puzzle packets and avoid such packets being dropped
by sender-side firewalls, the Midgard server will peak into the sender si’s transport layer
protocol and send the puzzle in a packet carrying a header for the same protocol and destined
1Restrictions on experimentation with ECN were relaxed in RFC [111] which provides us with a deployable
option for puzzle distribution.
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to the same port numbers. Achieving this is trivial for the case of TCP: the server can simply
send a TCP RST packet containing the puzzle nonce, to which the sender will respond with a
new connection handshake request (TCP SYN) along with the puzzle solution. Alternatively,
to avoid the overhead of initiating a new connection, the server can send the puzzle nonce
to si through a TCP KeepAlive message. In the case of UDP, since the protocol contains
no state information, Midgard will simply send a payload-free UDP packet to the same
originating port but with the IP ECN bits set and the nonce in the IP options. This will
indicate to si that the destination is under attack and that it should start solving puzzles. In
the cases of UDP and TCP KeepAlive messages, since parsing and processing of IP headers
will happen prior to transport headers, the puzzles agent at the sender can safely ignore
these packets and flag to the application the need for solving puzzles for the next packets.
The Client’s Agent. Upon receiving a packet with the ECN bits set and with a puzzle
nonce, the sender si will generate a random client nonce r, select a puzzle difficulty d it is
ready to commit to, and generate the solution y such that
H (y||xi||d||r) = b0b1b2 . . . bd−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
0 bits
bdbd+1 . . . bm−1 (4.2)
where H is the same publicly known hash function that the server used to generate xi and
m is the bit length of H’s output. Assuming H is chosen well, the sender’s best option is to
find y by brute force, and is expected to perform an average of 2d−1 hash operations to find
the solution [71, 112]. si will finally attach r, d, T , and y to its next packet destined to IPv
and set the ECN bits of the IP packet to 02.
Upon receiving such a packet, the Midgard server will first regenerate xi (according to
Equation (4.1)) and check that the first d bits of the outcome of Equation (4.2) are 0. If the
puzzle solution is correct, the server will generate a capability nonce ci for si and create a
mapping in its table from si’s nonce r to its capability ci. It will include ci in the IP header
options of si’s packet and set the ECN bits of the IP packet to 11 informing the downstream
routers that congestion has occurred that they should use the capability to perform traffic
policing.
Dealing with puzzle reuse. As shown in Figure 4.2, an attacker that can sniff a sender’s
packets (either by compromising the sender itself, or by capturing packets on the fly) can
observe the sender’s nonce r and solution y and use them to send its own traffic, thus sending
packets on the original sender’s dime. Although acknowledged in previous research [30, 103],
little attempts have been done to alleviate this problem; in [103], the authors dismiss this
challenge by assuming that the attackers have limited access to the sender’s packets, while
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Figure 4.2: Puzzle distribution mechanism. Upon receiving the first packet from the user,
the Midgard server forwards that packet in best-effort and sends a nonce and a timestamp
to the user. The user then solves the puzzle at a certain difficulty and adds the solution
to every packet it sends to the victim server. Upon receiving such packets, the Midgard
server validates the solution and forwards the packet to the victim server while tagging it
with the computed user’s capability. However, in such a case, an attacker that can sniff the
user’s packets can steal the user’s solution and send packets on its behalf.
in [30], the authors suggest caching puzzle solutions at routers (by using Bloom filters) to
detect puzzle reuse, which then increase the memory load on the routers and opens up a new
vector of attack. We note that public key cryptography is not an adequate solution in this
case since key exchange and signature time can quickly become bottlenecks in our protocol,
thus defeating the entire purpose of Midgard.
In this work, we adopt a different strategy. We treat puzzle solutions similarly to one-time
pads, i.e. each puzzle once attached to a packet will henceforth be discarded. To that end,
we leverage recent results [90] showing that puzzles defined as in Equation (4.2) have strong
difficulty guarantees: namely that solving n such puzzles costs about n times the cost of
solving a single one. Therefore, instead of solving a single puzzle of difficulty d, the sender
si will solve n = 2
k sub-puzzles each having a difficulty d′ = d− k. Using the strong puzzle
notion, this will guarantee that si will perform the same amount of work, on average, as it
would have had it solved a single puzzle of difficulty d, since the expected number of hash
operations it must perform is
n× 2d′−1 = 2k × 2d−k−1 = 2d−1 (4.3)
Formally, upon receiving a puzzle nonce xi, si will generate n sub-puzzles {y1, . . . yn} such
that
H (yj||j||xi||n||d′||r)) = b0b1 . . . bd′−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
0 bits
bd′dd′+1 . . . bm−1 (4.4)
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Figure 4.3: Countering puzzle reuse by malicious attackers. Unlike Figure 4.2, instead
of solving a single puzzle and tagging each packet, the user solves n sub-puzzles of lower
difficulty and tags each packet with a different solution. Each solution allows the user to
send only one packet before being discarded, therefore preventing attackers from reusing
puzzles even if they can sniff the user’s packets.
for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The sender can then attach < r, n, d′, T, j, yj > to every packet it
sends to the victim server. The sub-puzzles in this case will then serve the dual purpose of
rate limiting the senders as well as allowing si to specify that it wishes to send n packets
using the same puzzle nonce, and thus using the same capability (note however that the
Midgard server can only guarantee that si will be able to send ≤ n packets). An attacker
that can capture y1, y2, . . . , yk for a certain k < n cannot reuse them to send any packets.
Also, since puzzles are strongly difficult, the attacker cannot infer anything about the next
solution yk+1. Finally, at the Midgard end, the server can keep track of the next sub-puzzle
to expect by keeping a counter of the packets, p, sent by si (as it will need to do that for
capability enforcement). It can discard any solution with j < p. We illustrate how the
Midgard protocol defeats puzzle reuse in Figure 4.3.
4.4.2 Traffic Policing
In order to provide a fair allocation of resources, the Midgard service leverages the fact
that a legitimate (and a conforming malicious) user will send n packets while solving a sub-
puzzle for each of them. Since the timestamp t0 at which the puzzle was generated is always
echoed in the sub-puzzle solutions (and cannot be manipulated on a correct solution), the
service can estimate how long did it take the user to produce a solution for a sub-puzzle of a
certain difficulty as well as the rate at which that user is sending her packets. We illustrate
the estimation process in Figure 4.4.
Let hi be user i’s hashing rate and Xj(d) be a random variable representing the time
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Figure 4.4: Hashing and flooding rate estimation process.
needed by client i to produce a solution for sub-puzzle j at a difficulty d. For ease of
notation, we will drop the (d) indexing since the puzzle difficulty is always known to both
the user and the Midgard service. From the puzzle definition in [71] and the results in [90],
we know that the Xj’s are i.i.d ∼ Uniform(0, 2dhi ] random variables with E[Xj] = 2
d−1
hi
, ∀j.
Additionally, let αj ≥ 0 be a random variable representing the time interval that the user
holds off on sending packet j after having solved its corresponding sub-puzzle. In other
words, a user, after sending packet j, will wait Xj+1 +αj+1 before sending packet j + 1. We
note that the Midgard service does not know the distribution of the αj random variables as
they are dependent on the application and the behavior of the users. In addition, malicious
users would want to get αj ↘ 0, ∀j.
Finally, let R̂TT j be the round trip time taken between the time the Midgard service first
sent the puzzle nonce xi and the time it received the solution yj. We note that R̂TT 1 = RTTi
where RTTi is the round trip time between the Midgard service and the user, which can
be estimated using TCP packets [113, 114] or through dedicated services [115, 116]. This
model illustrates an important feature of client puzzles, namely that they impose physical
constraints on any bot machine to flood the network. Since the random variables Xj depend
on the computational prowess of the machine performing the puzzle computation, for a fixed
difficulty d, the attacker’s flooding rate is bound by the computational limitations of her
botnet machines.
Estimation. Let tj be the time when the Midgard service receives a packet containing
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a solution yj, we can thus compute
∆Tj = tj − t0 =
j∑
k=1
Xk +RTTj +
j∑
k=1
αk, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n (4.5)
Then by taking pairwise subtractions of observed ∆Tj values, we can build the following
sequence 
δ1 := ∆T1 = X1 + α1 +RTTi,
δj := ∆Tj −∆Tj−1 = Xj + αj +
(
R̂TT j − R̂TT j−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸

for j > 1
(4.6)
We note that R̂TT j − R̂TT j−1 =  is the instantaneous packet delay variation from the user
to the Midgard service (often referred to as jitter).
Equation (4.6) translates to the Midgard services obtaining a series of observations
{δ1, δ2, . . . , δn} that it can use to estimate the user’s computational power as well as their
sending rates. Since at every observation, the system of variables to be estimated is al-
ways under-determined, Midgard cannot estimate both Xj and αj. Instead, we use the
observations to estimate the sum Xj + αj.
We implemented Midgard in a modular way that allows ISPs to implement different es-
timators given the knowledge they have about the network and their users. For the purposes
of this chapter, we describe one of those possible estimators.
Our Midgard estimator draws on the approaches to estimate a TCP packet’s round-trip-
time to infer network congestion [52]. Upon receiving its first observation δ1 from user i, the
Midgard server computes its first estimate λˆ1 by simply subtracting its previously known
from δ1. Subsequently, Midgard uses the low-pass filter to adjust its estimates using the
low-pass filter update rule as shown in Equation (4.7).{
λˆ1 = δ1 −RTTi
λˆj = β × λˆj−1 + (1− β)× (δj − δj−1) , for j > 1, 0 < β < 1
(4.7)
By using the low-pass filter with β > 0.5, the Midgard estimator is less sensitive to
fluctuations in the clients’ computation times (Xj+1 + αj+1 − (Xj + αj)) by placing more
emphasis on the prior estimates. This is particularly important since the Xj random vari-
ables are uniformly distributed over the range (0, 2
d
hi
], for a difficulty d and hashing rate hi.
Considering the worst-case scenario where an attacker attempts to flood the victim server
(i.e. αj = 0, ∀j ≥ 0), Xj+1 − Xj has a triangular distribution over the interval [−2dhi , 2
d
hi
].
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This fact can introduce higher variability in the observed differences δj+1− δj and cause the
estimator to fluctuate. The low-pass filter counters this behavior by placing more emphasis
on the previously computed estimates and lesser emphasis on the differences in observations.
Computing and enforcing traffic policies. As discussed earlier, Midgard allows the
server seeking protection to choose their own puzzle-based traffic policing mechanisms. In
other words, given the estimated values for λˆij, the ISP customers can choose the mechanism
that assigns capabilities and allocates the appropriate share of bandwidth for each user. This
approach is similar to that presented in [104] aiming to enforce destination-based policies at
cloud-based protection providers.
In this chapter, we provide an illustrative policy that assigns each user a share of the
bandwidth that is inversely proportional to its sending rate. Specifically, the Midgard
server assigns a weight ωij for each user i’s packet j, and then instructs the downstream
routers to perform weighted-fair-queueing based on the assigned weights.
Let ωk be the weight that the Midgard server assigned to user k’s last packet. Upon
receiving packet j from user i, Midgard updates i’s weight to
ωij =
λˆij∑
k λ
k
(4.8)
To enforce the traffic policy, the Midgard service will stamp all downstream packets
pertaining to user i with its current computed weight ωij. If user i behaves in a regular
predictable way, then its weights {ωi1, . . . , ωin} will not change much and due to the design
of Midgard’s estimator, will minimally be affected by path instability.
The routers downstream of Midgard will parse the packet weight and perform weighted-
fair-queueing on all packets destined to the victim IP address. For those packets that do not
contain weights, but still have their ECN bits set, the downstream routers will treat those
packets as best-effort packets.
Finally, we note that throughout the period where the attack is taking place, we configure
the ISP’s edge routers to drop any packets destined to the victim’s IP address that arrive
on an ingress port. Ignoring packets those packets serves the dual purpose of preventing
cloud-bypass attacks as well as preventing an attacker from assigning false weights to its
traffic. Note that unlike in previous work [29, 30, 103, 104], since the Midgard service
and the downstream routers reside within the same trust boundary, we do not need explicit
authentication on and thus do not require a key management infrastructure. We believe that
the benefits of Midgard’s ISP-level deployment alleviates many of the challenges facing the
deployments of previous DDoS defense mechanisms.
57
Li
n
u
x
 K
e
rn
e
l
Network Hardware
N
IC
XDP sk_buff
M
id
ga
rd
 S
ta
te
 (B
PF
 M
ap
s)
AF
_X
DP Linux Network 
Stack
Device Driver
U
se
rs
p
ac
e Midgard Application
Generate Puzzle Verify solution and Generate capability
1
2
Figure 4.5: Workflow implementation of Midgard using AF XDP. Dashed arrows correspond
to data communication between the user application and the kernel maps. This workflow
shows only the lifetime of the packets that are destined to the victim. After passing through
the network hardware, packets bypass the Linux kernel’s networking stack and are directly
passed to userspace. Packets that follow the path labeled with (1) are packets that do not
contain nonces and thus require Midgard to generate a new puzzle. On the other hand,
packets following the (2) path contain nonces and thus will undergo the verification and
capability generation procedures.
4.5 IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented Midgard using the capabilities provided by the Linux eXpress Data
Path (XDP) and its associated userspace AF XDP sockets. XDP allows for safe, fast, and
programmable packet processing by integrating a limited in-kernel virtual machine (namely
the extended BSD packet filter, eBPF) with userspace applications without sacrificing security
and isolation [117]. By leveraging XDP, the Midgard proxy implementation bypasses the
kernel networking stack and allows for zero-copy packet processing by the Midgard appli-
cation. This optimization, in turn, reduces the possibility that Midgard’s would become a
bottleneck in the DDoS defense mechanism.
Figure 4.5 shows the path of a packet as it passes through the Midgard server. For
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brevity, we only show the path taken by packets destined to the victim server. After the
network hardware captures the packet, it passes it to the Linux kernel for processing. The XDP
module sits within the networking device driver and bypasses the need for creating an sk buff
structure as is typically performed. Instead, the module passes the packet’s memory area
ownership to the userspace Midgard application through the use of the AF XDP interface.
Packets that do not contain a client nonce and a puzzle solution follow path 1 where the
application will generate a puzzle nonce, send it back to the client, and forward the packet in
a best-effort manner through the Linux network stack using raw sockets. On the other hand,
the application verifies packets that contain solutions (path 2 ) and generates capabilities
for the packet’s associated client nonce. The application then forwards the packet to the
destination using raw sockets through the Linux network stack. In Section 4.6, we show that
our implementation adds little overhead to the packet processing pipeline.
Maintaining State at the Server. For each client the solves puzzles, the Midgard
server must maintain some metadata in order to process the requests and generate the
capabilities. However, we note that the puzzles protocol itself is stateless, i.e. the server
does not need to maintain the created nonce to validate a solution; it can recreate the original
nonce from the solution itself and then validate it in two hashing operations.
As described in Section 4.4, to detect reused puzzles, the Midgard server maintains an 8
bit counter that is reset every 256 packets. Any packet received with a puzzle index that is
less than the current counter would be discarded. However, when implementing this set up in
practice, we noticed that packets might arrive out-of-order due to network delays. Therefore,
using a monotonically increasing counter risks dropping packets that contain valid solutions.
To address this challenge, we modified our approach as follows. Instead of an 8 bits counter,
the Midgard server maintains a circular 64-bit vector ` for each sender si. For any puzzle
solution yj, the bit `j is set if and only if yj has been received and validated. We show the
details of our modified implementation in Algorithm 4.1. To allow for packets to arrive out-
of-order, we split the 64-bit vector into four buckets, each of width 16 bits. Upon receiving
solution yj, the Midgard server drops the packet if bit j is set. Otherwise, we first set bit
j, then clear the bucket ( j
16
+ 1)%4 and invalidate the bucket ( j
16
+ 2)%4. By doing this, the
server guarantees that only the 16 packets from the bucket ( j
16
−1)%4 to arrive out-of-order,
while earlier packets are dropped. On average, this approach guarantees that a packet can
be delayed by up to 8×RTT , which is enough to account for lost or delayed packets under
TCP. Unlike previous approaches [30], our implementation does not store any solutions and
only requires tracking a 64 bit value for each sender.
Overall, for each user, the Midgard server maintains 336 metadata bits composed of
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Algorithm 4.1: Checking for solution reuse in Midgard.
1 count← bitvec < 64 > ()
2 Func CheckForReusedSolutions
Inputs : packet p, solution yj
Outputs: {ACCEPT, DROP}
3 mask ← 1 << j
4 if count ∧mask then
5 DropPacket(p)
6 return DROP
7 else
/* clear our the next bucket */
8 bucket← ( j16 + 1)%4
9 mask ← ∼ (0xFFFF << (bucket ∗ 16))
10 count← count ∧mask
/* disable the bucket after */
11 bucket← ( j16 + 2)%4
12 mask ← (0xFFFF << (bucket ∗ 16))
13 count← count | mask
/* set the matched entry */
14 mask ← 1 << j
15 count← count | mask
16 return ACCEPT
the following fields: 32 bits nonce, 32 bits timestamp to record the time the last puzzle
was generated, 64 bits to track the number of packets sent by this user, 64 bits to track
the number of bytes sent by this user, 64 bits for the puzzle reuse counter, 8 bits for the
puzzle difficulty, 8 bits for the number of sub-puzzles the user committed to, and finally a
64 bit pointer to a timer function. To account for users dropping out or merely ending their
sessions, the Midgard server maintains a timer for each user. That timer is reset every time
a new valid puzzle solution is received. One the timer expires, all metadata corresponding
to that user is deleted, and the memory can be reused for new users.
We believe that 336 bits are an acceptable state to maintain for each user for the following
reasons. First, since we implementMidgard on a dedicated server running Linux, we benefit
from access to large amounts of free memory (in the order of GB to TB). Second, even the
Midgard is managing 1 million simultaneous active users, the total memory needed is
106× 336 = 420MB, which can be easily supported by any standard Linux machine, let alone
a dedicated server.
Client-side Implementation. Midgard requires clients to parse the puzzle packets and
to generate solutions for each IP packets sent subsequently. Therefore, we wrote a kernel
patch to the Linux 4.18 kernel that allows any general-purpose machine to parse IP options
and recognize puzzle nonces sent from a server. If the kernel detects a puzzle nonce, it
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sets a flag in the corresponding socket’s data structure and saves the nonce along with its
corresponding timestamp. Anytime an application wants to send an IP packet, the kernel
checks the puzzle flag in the socket and creates a new solution if the nonce has not yet
expired. If the nonce has expired, the kernel sends does append any options, signaling to
the Midgard server that it is requesting a new nonce. In our implementation, we allow
the users to change the number of puzzles to solve as well as the difficulty of every puzzle
through the use of the kernel’s sysctl interface.
Deployability. We designed Midgard to be easily deployable within an ISP network.
With the advent of SDN and Network Function Virtualization (NFV), ISPs can easily deploy
a Midgard server as a virtual function that can be spun anytime a DDoS attack is detected
against a protected victim. In addition, an NFV deployment of Midgard allows ISPs to
easily scale up against larger attacks by spawning additional virtual appliances, as described
in [33]. ISP customers that subscribe to the Midgard protection service need not make any
changes to their software or infrastructure. They should only provide custom traffic policing
policies that the ISP can deploy on the Midgard servers.
On the other hand, clients that wish to communicate with a server that uses the Midgard
protection service must be able to support client puzzles at the IP layer. To that end,
the server can distribute our simple Linux kernel patch to clients that wish to add this
functionality. Alternatively, to accommodate users behind firewalls, legacy devices, and low-
powered IoT devices, the ISP can designate puzzle supernodes to act as proxies on behalf
of such clients, similar to those deployed by Skype [118], PlanetLab [119], and in [120].
In such a case, instead of communicating directly with the victim server, clients would be
redirected to a puzzle supernode that will solve puzzles on their behalf and tag their packets
with the corresponding solutions. However, this mechanism comes at the cost of requiring
authentication to make sure that bot machines do not use supernodes as part of their DDoS
attack. We plan to explore the challenges of using puzzle proxies in our future work. Finally,
we note that by using the IP options, our implementation does not cause packet drops along
the paths between clients and the server since routers typically ignore such option fields.
4.6 EXPERIMENTS
We now turn to evaluate Midgard and measure its impact on the resiliency of our
networks against DDoS attacks. Therefore, in this section, we set out to answer the following
research questions.
RQ 4.1 What is the overhead of implementing Midgard on the operation of a network?
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Figure 4.6: Performance evaluation of TCP and UDP upload streams. Vanilla refers to the
default Linux routing implementation, AF XDP refers to the Midgard server running without
any puzzles, and Diff-XX refers to the client solving puzzles of difficulty XX. Our results show
that Midgard does not incur a performance penalty when compared to the default Linux
kernel routing implementation. Midgard is more UDP- friendly as the puzzle expirations
cause TCP streams to shrink their congestion window to accommodate the resulting packet
retransmissions.
RQ 4.2 What is the overhead of running the Midgard kernel patch on the users of a
service that employs the Midgard protection?
RQ 4.3 How does Midgard distribute bandwidth when under attack?
To answer these questions, we implemented the Midgard service on an Ubuntu Linux
server running Ubuntu 18.04 with 16 processors and 16 GB of RAM. Since it is unethical
and impractical to launch massive DDoS attack in thewild, we ran all of our experiments
in an isolated environment on the DETER testbed. To capture the intended behavior of a
typical Midgard implementation, we set the bandwidth of the Midgard server’s ingress
to 1Gbps. At the same time, the bottleneck link at the victim has a much lower bandwidth
of 10Mbps. This setup makes it easy to overload the victim’s ingress without affecting the
links driving traffic into the Midgard server, as would be the caste with over-provisioned
cloud providers and ISPs.
4.6.1 Performance Benchmarks
To answer RQ 4.1 and RQ 4.2, we ran performance benchmarks using the iperf [121]
network performance measurement tool. Figures 4.6a and 4.6b show the performance results
of running TCP and UDP upload benchmarks, respectively. Under this benchmark, a client
attempts to send as much traffic as possible to the victim server using the appropriate
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Figure 4.7: Performance evaluation of TCP and UDP download streams. Vanilla refers to
the default Linux routing implementation, AF XDP refers to the Midgard server running
without any puzzles, and Diff-XX refers to the client solving puzzles of difficulty XX. Unlike
the upload benchmarks, TCP streams are not affected by the presence of the puzzles when
the client is solving at a low difficulty (< 10 bits). When the puzzles become more difficult,
the client’s acknowledgment packets will be delayed, thus causing a drop in throughput.
protocol. Similarly, Figures 4.7a and 4.7b show the performance results of running TCP
and UDP download benchmarks, respectively. Under this benchmark, a client attempts to
download as much data as possible from the victim server using the appropriate protocol.
First, in all of our benchmarks, running the Midgard server without any puzzle requests
incurs no performance penalty. In such cases, the Midgard server bypasses the Linux
kernel networking stack, performs a table lookup for the victim server’s IP address, and then
forwards the packet as is on the corresponding interface. The fact that Midgard bypasses
the kernel’s networking stack and uses zero-copy to transfer the packet to user space allows
it to offset the performance overhead to the table lookups. Therefore, our implementation
highlights the benefits of using AF XDP sockets for running network applications at line-rate.
Second, we note that our current Midgard implementation is not friendly to TCP
streams. Specifically, our TCP upload benchmark results (Figure 4.6a) show a sever drop
in throughout at the client, even at small puzzle difficulties. Upon further investigation,
we discovered that Midgard’s puzzle expiration and redistribution mechanism introduces
a periodic small time window in which packets would be dropped. For that duration, the
Midgard server has marked the puzzle as expired, but the new nonce has not been up-
dated at the client yet. Therefore, packets generated from the client are still using the
previous nonce, and thus fail the server’s validation checks. Therefore, TCP will detect
those dropped packets and interpret them as a sign of network congestion, thus reducing its
congestion window and causing the observed drop in throughput. One possible remediation
for this behavior is for the Midgard server, at each nonce renewal, to save the previous
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Figure 4.8: Bandwidth allocation results for the Midgard puzzle-based weighted fair queue-
ing scheme. UDP-XX refers to a client attempting to send UDP traffic to the victim server,
at its maximum bandwidth possible, while solving puzzles of difficulty XX bits. The results
show that the Midgard server allocates more bandwidth to clients that solve harder puzzles
(thus sending traffic at a lower rate).
nonce for a short time period. During this period, the server will attempt to validate puzzle
solutions using both the current and the previous nonces, thus avoiding dropping TCP pack-
ets while the client updates its nonce. However, this will introduce an additional memory
overhead since the server must maintain two nonces (i.e. two timestamps) for each client.
We plan to explore this tradeoff in our future work.
Finally, unliked TCP, UDP streams dot not suffer from the same performance drop since
they do not perform any congestion control. As shown in Figure 4.6b, no drop in throughput
is observed at the client when the puzzle difficulty is low (< 8 bits). When the difficulty of
the puzzles increases, the client will need to wait larger and larger amounts of time before
sending each packet, effectively rate-limiting a flooding client, which is the intended behavior
of the client puzzles.
4.6.2 Bandwidth Allocation
To answer RQ 4.3, we turn to studying the bandwidth allocation scheme of Midgard’s
puzzle-based weighted fair-queueing scheme. Figure 4.8 shows the bandwidth allocation
scheme of Midgard’s mechanism when faced with 5 clients that are attempting to flood the
victim server with UDP traffic. Each client attempts to send as much traffic as possible while
solving puzzles at different difficulties. Our results show that clients solving harder puzzles
(UDP-12, UDP-10a, and UDP-10b) occupy the larger share of the bandwidth, while clients
solving easier puzzles (thus sending at higher rates) end up with the smaller share of the
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bandwidth (< 10%). Our results show that, by combining client puzzles with simple weighted
fair queueing, the Midgard server can reward users that are investing more resources into
sending more difficulty puzzles with a higher share of the bandwidth. On the other, users
that are solving easier puzzles, or alternatively are using more powerful machines to flood
the victim server, end up with a lower share of the bandwidth thus limiting the impact
of their attack. This naive bandwidth allocation scheme showcases that the Midgard
server achieves a notion of puzzle-fairness by encouraging users to invest their computational
resources into solving harder puzzles and benefit from a higher share of the bandwidth.
4.7 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we presented Midgard, a DDoS resiliency service that combines the ben-
efits of cloud elasticity and provisioning, client puzzles, and network capabilities to enhance
network resiliency. Midgard is a service that resides at the edge of a victim server’s ISP
and serves to absorb the attack traffic and rate-limit misbehaving users. When under attack,
Midgard asks each user to solve a computational puzzle with a user-chosen difficulty, and
then uses each packet’s travel time to estimate that user’s computation prowess. Based on
its estimates, the Midgard then assigns each packet a capability that indicates the share
of bandwidth that each user can use. We designed Midgard as a flexible and extensible
service that allows customers to implement their traffic estimation and bandwidth alloca-
tion policies at the edge of their upstream ISP. We implemented Midgard using the AF XDP
sockets in the Linux kernel that allow us to keep the overhead of our implementation to
a minimum. We deployed Midgard on an experiment network on the DETER testbed and
evaluate it under different attack scenarios. Our results show that Midgard can effectively
absorb volumetric attacks and rate-limit attackers while keeping its performance overhead
to a minimum. We envision that Midgard would be implemented as a service provided by
ISPs to their customers to defend against DDoS attacks.
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CHAPTER 5: BIFROST: CIRCUIT-LEVEL VERIFICATION OF DATA
PLANE PROGRAMS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Programmable data planes allow for a significant shift in the paradigms of modern net-
work designs. Data plane-specific programming languages, such as P4 [122], allow network
designers to design, develop, modify, and test packet-forwarding protocols and pipelines in a
hardware-agnostic manner. This has led to an increase in the flexibility and programmability
of network design.
Data plane descriptor languages are more limited in their functionality and semantics than
other general purpose languages, therefore one might assume that they are more resistant
to security risks. However, languages such as P4 also expose a whole new set of potential
bugs in their implementations. For example, data planes programs that are compiled and
programmed onto target devices require a mechanism for the CPU and the networking
hardware to communicate. This is often implemented using a specialized packet header that
the packet parser can recognize and forward accordingly. Such packets contain important
metadata information, such as the value for the ingress port, that are to be written onto the
switch’s metadata registers. In current implementations of the popular switch.p4 program,
such packet headers are not sanitized. Consequently, an attacker can craft a CPU header,
prepend it onto its packets, and overwrite each of their packets’ ingress post in order to
bypass Access Control Lists (ACLs) and perform privilege escalation [123].
On a larger scale, undiscovered bugs in networked systems can have drastic impacts on
performance and security [124, 125, 126]; experts estimate the cost of downtime in data cen-
ters to be $7,900 per minute [11]. Data plane programmability may worsen this problem by
introducing new classes of bugs largely prevented by traditional fixed-function switch hard-
ware, such as overwriting header fields1 and invalid headers due to read-before-write2 [127].
With our ever-increasing dependence on networked systems across all sectors of our economy
and lives, it becomes increasingly important to ensure that any increase in function does not
lead to any sacrifices in security and reliability.
Current approaches to testing programmable data planes perform exhaustive testing using
simulation and automatic packet generation software [128]. However, due to computational
and time limitations, complete coverage of all execution paths can never be achieved us-
ing testing alone. Additionally, such testing approaches can confuse bugs that occur in
1https://github.com/p4lang/switch/issues/97
2https://github.com/p4lang/switch/pull/102
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the data-plane program with those that occur due to hardware-specific compilation. A
complementary strategy is to perform static verification leveraging satisfiability (SAT) and
Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers to verify annotated data-plane programs. Sev-
eral approaches [128, 129, 130, 131, 132] use symbolic execution to perform verification.
However, these techniques become language dependent; each data-plane programming de-
scription requires different software and verification techniques. More fundamentally, these
existing techniques target Turing complete languages. However, data plane programs de-
scribe bounded and restricted hardware pipelines that are simpler to verify.
In this work, we explore the fundamental property of data plane programs – namely, that
they describe restricted hardware pipelines – to achieve scalable verification. We present
BiFrost: a tool for the formal verification of data plane programs using hardware veri-
fication techniques. BiFrost translates data plane programs into functionally equivalent
sequential circuits and uses well-established sequential circuit abstraction and verification
techniques to achieve expressive and scalable static verification. Specifically, the bounded-
ness and the features of data plane programs make them ideal candidates for BiFrost’s
translation: they operate on bounded inputs, their loops are linearly bounded by the number
of packet headers, and they do not use dynamic memory allocation. BiFrost specifically
targets P4 programs, however, it can be easily extended and applied to different languages
since it performs verification at the hardware level.
Our goal in designing BiFrost is to achieve scalable and effective verification of data
plane programs to detect and fix design-time programming bugs. To achieve that goal, we
adopt the following approach:
Bit-level Semantics. By translating data plane programs into functionally equivalent
sequential circuits, BiFrost can reason about packets in terms of the individual bit fields.
Rather than looking at high-level descriptions of packet headers and their fields, BiFrost
can reason about bits that cross the boundaries of headers and their fields. Furthermore,
depending on the target property it is trying to verify, BiFrost can identify individual
bits that are deemed to be non-relevant for the verification tasks. For example, if a target
property depends only on the lower 8 bits of an IP address, BiFrost can identify that the
first 24 bits of the address are irrelevant and replace them with don’t care values.
Support for Various Specification Types. To provide developers with the flexibility of
defining various properties about their data plane programs, we design BiFrost to support
first order logic (FOL) properties expressed at multiple program locations. In addition to
built-in header validity checks, BiFrost supports guarantee and assert statements as well
as program pre- and post-conditions.
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Domain-specific Transformation and Abstraction. We leverage knowledge about
the data plane programs’ functioning and boundedness to generate sequential circuits that
are optimized for scalable verification. For example, since parser loops are linearly bounded,
we unroll all such loops and avoid generating complex circuitry that is hard to verify. In
addition, we provide means to abstract the control plane tables, thus incurring possible false
positives, in favor of proving properties for all possible values in such tables.
Sequential Verification. By targeting sequential verification, BiFrost unlocks a plethora
of optimization and abstraction techniques that can aid the verifier in achieving scalable ver-
ification. Those techniques, both structural [133, 134, 135] and functional [136, 137, 138,
139, 140], often have no counter-parts in traditional software verification.
In this chapter, we make the following contributions. We design and build BiFrost, a
tool for the scalable verification of data plane programs using sequential circuit verification
techniques. First, we define the operational semantics of data plane programs in terms of
sequential circuits (Section 5.5.1). We introduce the BiFrost transformations that generate
a functionally equivalent sequential circuit to an input data plane program (Section 5.5.2).
We introduce optimizations and abstraction techniques (Section 5.6) to aid in scaling to
larger programs and more complex properties. We implement BiFrost (Section 5.7) and
conduct an exhaustive evaluation of its scalability using 11 benchmark programs. Our
experiments show that BiFrost can verify the header-validity of complex programs in
< 3 minutes. We also showcase two case studies (Section 5.8) where we used BiFrost to
(1) detect a header-validity bug in the ecn.p4 tutorial program and (2) verify functional
properties about the calc.p4 program.
5.2 BACKGROUND ON PROGRAMMABLE DATA PLANES
Software Defined Networking (SDN) decouples traffic decisions, made in the control plane,
from traffic forwarding, made in the data plane. A logically centralized controller makes traf-
fic forwarding decisions (e.g., computing routes, load balancing, enforcing security policies)
and populates the tables in the data plane via the southbound API. Traditionally, forwarding
devices have been regarded as fixed-function hardware pipelines that operate on a fixed set
of packet headers. However, recent efforts have focused on extending the programmability
into the data plane to support custom packet formats, new networking protocols, line-rate
applications [141, 142, 143], and security countermeasures [144, 145, 146, 147].
Data plane programming languages, such as P4 [122, 148] and NPL [149], grant develop-
ers the ability to program packet forwarding devices using abstract declarative constructs
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Figure 5.1: An abstract pipeline of a simple programmable switch.
that are later compiled onto a device’s hardware. Figure 5.1 illustrates the abstract packet
forwarding pipeline of a simple programmable switch. Incoming packets are first handled by
a parser that operates on user-specified header formats. After extracting the headers and
setting appropriate metadata fields, the parser forwards the packet into one or more match-
action pipelines (the ingress and egress pipelines in Figure 5.1). During this stage, the
switch queries a set of read-only match-action tables, populated at runtime by the control
plane, that determine what actions are to be undertaken depending on the values contained
in the packet’s headers. Actions can manipulate packet header fields (such as performing
MAC address swapping) or packet metadata (such as setting the packet’s egress port or
marking it to be dropped).
Finally, the deparser is responsible for reassembling an output packet by serializing the
packet’s headers and its payload according to a user-specified order. The packet is finally
queued into the appropriate egress port’s queue awaiting to be sent on the wire. Unfortu-
nately, in an effort to favor efficient compilation, data plane programming languages lack
notions of type safety, thus introducing several classes of undefined behaviors and design-time
bugs [129, 150]. Such bugs can lead to runtime failures such as wrong forwarding decisions,
forwarding loops, or device crashes. More importantly, malicious attackers can exploit these
flaws to launch impactful attacks such as denial of service or privilege escalation [123].
Comparison to Active Networks. Active networking [151, 152, 153] is an early ap-
proach to incorporate programmability and flexibility into network architectures. It allows
network operators, developers, and even end-users, to encapsulate program fragments into
communication packets that forwarding devices can parse and execute locally. To that end,
routers and switches would run a network operating system that would enable them to exe-
cute the code fragments and implement applications such as content caching, firewalls, and
quality of service mechanisms.
However, unlike SDNs and programmable data planes, active networks did not see widespread
adoption and were later dropped by the networking community. First, active network do
not present a clear-cut separation between forwarding decisions (the control plane) and for-
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warding behavior (the data plane); it is up to the developer to identify where each operation
is implemented thus creating several compatibility and reliability challenges. Second, and
more importantly, by allowing forwarding devices to include program fragments, active net-
works pause critical security challenges. Making sure that only authenticated users can
executed such programs on routers and switches would require authentication mechanisms.
Such mechanisms, which typically rely on asymmetric key cryptography, can become bot-
tlenecks on the forwarding critical path. In addition, if active networking is to be achieve
widespread adoption, it is unclear who would the authority responsible for maintaining keys
and certificates.
Finally, programmable data planes have benefited for recent and fast-paced developments
in Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASIC) that allow for programmability without
sacrificing performance. By requiring forwarding devices to run an operating system, active
networking introduces a performance penalty that most network developers are not willing
to pay. On the other hand, by leveraging the power of ASICs, forwarding devices can
be programmed while maintaining line-rate processing at every point in the network. For
example, the recent Barefoot Tofino ASIC [154] is fully programmable while maintaining a
processing rate of 6.5 Tbps.
5.3 A CASE FOR HARDWARE VERIFICATION
A key characteristic of hardware description programs is that they must account for the
physical limitations of their target device. That is, they must be tailored to model hardware.
A circuit’s capabilities are often vastly simpler than general-purpose software and therefore
have vastly smaller state spaces. Therefore, when we consider verification approaches that
search the state space of a program exhaustively, hardware is a much more scalable candidate.
We use this fact to relate this approach to data plane verification. Data plane programs
specify bounded forwarding pipelines, even simpler than standard hardware, that describe
the lifetime of a network packet. That is, a packet’s journey from a switch’s ingress point
to its commitment to a specific egress port, so long as it is not discarded in case of errors
or policy violations. Thus, it is appropriate and efficient to limit the scope of verification to
the specificities of a switch’s forwarding behavior throughout the lifetime of a packet.
In this section, we argue that data plane programs are an excellent contender for hard-
ware verification. We first provide an introduction to the techniques used in such verification
efforts, then showcase the benefits of using hardware verification in this context. For the re-
mainder of this text, we use the terms hardware verification and sequential circuit verification
interchangeably.
70
5.3.1 Introduction to Hardware Verification
Hardware verification enjoys a mature and rich history of development and deployment
in both industrial and academic settings [155, 156, 157, 158, 159]. Its motivation stems
from the costly fact that post-production, circuits and silicon chips cannot be patched upon
the detection of a design-time bug; they must be recalled and replaced. For example, the
infamous Intel FDIV bug is reported to have cost the company $475 million in replacement
and reputation costs [160]. It is therefore of paramount importance to catch design-time
bugs before production.
Hardware verification techniques aim to provide formal guarantees that a circuit satisfies
its design specifications and to discover potential bugs. Model Checking is popular approach
to general verification that is rooted in hardware. This technique exhaustively explores,
either explicitly or symbolically, a system’s state space to examine whether any reachable
states can lead to a violation of the user specifications [161]. If any such states are found,
a concrete counterexample can be returned to the developer for debugging. However, this
technique is plagued by the state-space explosion problem where the number of reachable
states in a program is exponential in several parameters (number of inputs, width of variable
types, etc.), thus hindering the scalability and practicality of the verification efforts.
To improve scalability, a common technique is to impose limits on the space of the pro-
gram. Several approximations and abstractions (such as counterexample-guided abstraction
refinement [162]) are often employed to prune unnecessary explorations. Another common
approach is explicit user annotations. Additionally, Bounded Model Checking (BMC) is an
orthogonal technique that can be employed to find bugs in traces up to a specified length
k of the program’s execution. BMC is particularly popular in the hardware sphere because
the precise state space of the hardware description is known at the time of synthesis. That
is, because there are physical limitations of hardware programs, language features such as
loops must be unrolled at the time of synthesis and the finite-state representation of the
program is fixed.
The accessibility of a hardware program’s state space is a key characteristic in other ver-
ification techniques. In addition to BMC and symbolic execution, circuit-specific reduction
and abstraction procedures, such as structural analysis [133, 134], retiming [136, 137, 138],
rewriting [135] and register sweeping [139, 140], are often employed to improve scalability.
5.3.2 Why Hardware Verification?
Building on the successes of hardware verification in improving the design-time correctness
of sequential circuits, we argue that formal hardware verification is better suited for data
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Figure 5.2: MAC address swap operation in BiFrost. Considered as a general purpose
operation (left-hand side), the statement involves several operations for packet extraction
and memory copy. Interpreted as a sequential circuit, the assignment operation can be done
in a single clock cycle by simply wiring the dstAddr register as an input to srcAddr register.
plane verification than general-purpose software verification techniques. Hardware verifica-
tion has made strides in exploring the large state space of its programs. It is more difficult
for software verification techniques to seek the same extensive approach because their state
space is exponentially more massive.
Specifically, as in [163], we identify two important properties that verification tools must
achieve, namely expressiveness and scalability. In this chapter, we show that sequential
circuit verification can be effectively used to achieve these properties in data plane programs.
Expressiveness. The expressiveness of a hardware verification formalism determines
what constructs (e.g. data-types, formats, number representations, etc.) can be used in the
verification process. This also determines the set of possible properties that the verification
tool can reason about. For example, reasoning about timing and delays is necessary for
sequential verification, while it is not a requirement for high-level programming such as C or
Python.
Scalability. Verification techniques, both software and hardware, are plagued by several
problems that hinder their scalability. First, determining the satisfiability of a Boolean
formula (referred to as the SAT problem) is NP-complete. Second, more expressive languages
are usually undecidable. Third, the number of states that a program or circuit can reach
grows exponentially with the size of its inputs, and can also be infinite [164]. To combat
those problems, verification tools often employ various abstractions and heuristics to verify
larger and larger designs.
First, data plane programming languages (e.g. P4) are highly domain-specific. They pro-
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action ipv4_forward(macAddr_t dstAddr , egressSpec_t port) {
standard_metadata.egress_spec = port;
hdr.ethernet.srcAddr = hdr.ethernet.dstAddr;
hdr.ethernet.dstAddr = dstAddr;
hdr.ipv4.ttl = hdr.ipv4.ttl - 1;
}
Figure 5.3: Sample P4 code fragment for swapping MAC addresses.
vide a strict set of constructs that allow for the description of the packet processing pipeline
in a packet forwarding device. Those constructs have therefore strict semantics that are
tailored towards building a pipeline that is guaranteed to only execute a constant number
of operations for each byte of an input packet [122]. Often, language features such as loops
and pointers are omitted completely. Therefore, we argue that sequential circuit verification
is more expressive than its software counterparts in capturing and reasoning about the se-
mantics of data plane programs. For example, consider the code snippet shown in Figure 5.3
that performs MAC address swapping for an egress packet. Considered as a general pur-
pose software program, this step involves multiple instructions to parse the content of the
packet, extract the Ethernet header and the source and destination MAC addresses (e.g.,
hdr.ethernet.srcAddr and hdr.ethernet.dstAddr), and memory copy operations for swap-
ping the addresses. This can complicate the verification process as the programs become
larger and larger. On the other hand, leveraging the fact that a P4 program strictly describes
a packet forwarding pipeline, we can consider the input packet to be simply a register, and
then the process of parsing and swapping the MAC addresses as well as decrementing the
TTL value can be done in a single shot (i.e., in a single clock cycle). Figure 5.2 illustrates how
this process can be performed in a single clock cycle by considering the circuit properties of
the P4 processing pipeline.
Second, sequential circuit verification of data plane programs allows for bit-level reasoning
about the forwarding pipelines, allowing for several optimizations that have no counterpart in
the software verification realm. For example, consider that a network operator is interested
in proving a safety property about hosts that are in a specific subnet, say 192.168.100.0/24.
When performing verification, it is only the lower 8 bits of any packet’s IP address that will
have an impact on the safety property; the upper 24 bits will remain constant throughout. By
reasoning at the bit-level, a hardware verifier can quickly realize that only the lower 4 bits of
its inputs are important. It will then discard the upper 24 bits from the analysis, significantly
reducing its search space compared to treating the IP address as a single variable, as a
software verifier would. Therefore, bit-level analysis can greatly enhance the scalability of
the verification process.
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Finally, network operators often have networking devices from different vendors that use
different compilations of the same data plane program. To ensure correct operation, they
must then have guarantees that all of the devices are running a functionally equivalent version
of the data plane program. By translating the original program into an equivalent circuit,
hardware verifiers can allow operators to reason about the functional equivalence between
different compilations (for different targets) of the same program. This allows developers to
isolate unexpected behavior to the actual devices that the programs run on, rather than the
logic of the program itself.
5.4 OVERVIEW OF BIFROST
Our key insight in this work is that sequential synthesis, reduction, and verification tech-
niques provide various avenues for scalable and expressive verification of data plane programs.
This insight rests on the observation that data plane programs, unlike general-purpose pro-
grams, describe bounded forwarding pipelines targeted for deployment on programmable
hardware switches. Therefore, to avoid expensive network outages and security risks, se-
quential circuit verification is suitable for verifying data plane programs and uncovering
design-time bugs.
BiFrost is composed of three main components, shown in Figure 5.4. Given a data plane
program P , BiFrost first employs several program transformation techniques (Section 5.5)
to build a functionally equivalent sequential circuit S. Functional equivalence guarantees
that each and every execution path in P corresponds to a sequence of executions in S that
generates the same output, and vice versa. Second, BiFrost accepts program specifications
in the form of (1) guarantee statements, (2) assertions, (3) preconditions, and (4) postcondi-
tions, and generates verification conditions that are added as primary outputs in the circuit
S (Section 5.6). In addition, BiFrost provides built-in support for header-validity checking
to detect reads and writes to invalid header fields.
Finally, BiFrost passes the circuit S, along with its primary outputs, to the sequential
synthesis and verification tool ABC [165] to perform verification tasks. ABC is equipped with
a wide variety of synthesis, reduction, and abstraction techniques that reduce the size of the
circuit and constrain the verification search space. Subsequently, BiFrost asks ABC to check
if there is any setting of S’s inputs (i.e., an input packet) that will lead to the invalidation
of any of S’s primary outputs. This corresponds to a violation of the data plane program’s
specification. If no such setting is discovered, BiFrost marks the program as verified. On
the other hand, BiFrost interprets ABC’s counterexample to generate a violating packet
along with an execution trace that will allow developers to debug their implementations.
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Figure 5.4: High Level Overview of BiFrost. Given a data plane program, BiFrost first
translates it into a functionally equivalent sequential circuit. Then, it parses a set of program
specifications, expressed in First Order Logic, to generate verification conditions. Those
conditions are then translated into circuit components and connected as primary output to
the generated circuit. Finally, BiFrost uses the ABC verifier to check if the specifications
are satisfied, or to return a counter example, in the form of a network packet, for developers
to debug their programs.
5.5 BIFROST SYSTEM DESIGN
In this section, we present BiFrost’s main transformation of a P4 program into an
equivalent sequential circuit. Our design of this system builds upon the specification provided
in the official P416 specifications document [166] and are not specific to a certain target
switch.
We first present definitions that we use to show that our transformation preserves P4’s
operational semantics and produces a sequential circuit that is functionally equivalent to the
original program. We then elaborate to describe in detail how BiFrost implements and
processes specific elements of a P4 program.
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5.5.1 Definitions
We start by defining a sequential circuit and its semantics in the context of BiFrost.
We then proceed to describe the transformations that, given a P4 program P , produces a
sequential circuit S that is functionally equivalent to P .
Definition 5.1 (Sequential Circuit). A sequential circuit S is a tuple (G,R, clk, I,O, E)
where G is a set of logic gates and arithmetic blocks, R is a set of clocked registers, clk
is a monotonically increasing clock, I is a set of inputs, and O ⊆ R is a set of outputs.
For brevity, we define V = {G ∪ R ∪ I ∪ O} to be the set of circuit components. Therefore,
E = V × V is a set of edges that define the connectivity between the components of S.
A register rn ∈ R is a set n of one-bit latches (or memory elements) such that the value
held by each latch of rn is updated every time the clock clk increments. For clarity, we
abuse notation and drop the asterisk for registers, and use |r| = n to represent the number
of latches in a given register r. The set of edges E captures the logic connectivity of the
different components of S. In other words, S is a directed graph that represents the input-
output relationships between the different components V of S.
Definition 5.2 (Fanins and fanouts). Given a component v ∈ V, we define the fanins of v
as the set of components ω ∈ V that have directed edges to v. More formally, fanins (v) =
{ω ∈ V | (ω, v) ∈ E}.
Conversely, the fanout of v is the set of components u ∈ V such that v has a directed edge
to u. Formally, fanouts (v) = {u ∈ V | (v, u) ∈ E}
Definition 5.3 (Well formed circuits). A sequential circuit S = (G,R, clk, I,O, E) is said
to be well-formed iff
∀(r ∈ R, i ∈ I, o ∈ O). (|fanins (r) | = 1) ∧ (|fanins (i) | = 0) ∧ (|fanouts (o) | = 0) (5.1)
Well-formed sequential circuits according to Definition (5.3) can be used to represent the
functionality of any finite (or infinite) state program. In this work, we restrict our attention
to well-formed sequential circuits.
Semantics of sequential circuits. We now present the semantics of sequential circuits
to define functional equivalence. We then show how BiFrost’s transformations create se-
quential circuits that are functionally equivalent to their P4 counterparts. The following
definitions apply to a sequential circuit S = (G,R, clk, I,O, E).
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Definition 5.4 (Valuation). Let B bet the set of Boolean values {0, 1} and N be the set of
natural numbers. A valuation ` is a function V × N+ → BN where
`(v, c) =
{
b0 b1 . . . b|v| if v ∈ R ∪ I ∪ O,
G (`(u, c) | u ∈ fanins (v)) if v ∈ G
(5.2)
where c ∈ N is the value of the circuit’s clock, bi ∈ B for i ≥ 0 is the value of a single bit
and G is the combinatorial operation represented by the gate v ∈ G.
As an example, the valuation of a conjunction gate g with fanins r1 and r2, at clock cycle
c, is `(g, c) = `(r1, c) ∧ `(r2, c).
Definition 5.5 (State). At a specific clock cycle c ∈ N+, the state of S is the set σc ={
`(r1, c), `(r2, c), . . . , `(r|R|, c)
}
of all valuations over the circuit’s registers. For brevity, we
write σc(r) = `(r, c).
Definition 5.6 (Trace). A trace tr (S, k) over S and of length k ∈ N+ is a sequence of
states 〈σ0, σ1, . . . , σk−1〉, such that, ∀r ∈ R,
`(r, c) =
{
r0 ∈ B|r| if c = 0,
` (fanins (r) , c− 1) if c ≥ 1
(5.3)
where r0 represents the initial values of the latches of r.
Similarly, given a P4 program P that operates on an input packet p and a match-action
table T , with syntax and semantics as defined in [148, 166], a state of P represents the values
held by the header fields and internal structures (e.g., metadata) of P at a given instant k.
Thus a trace tr (P , k) is a sequence of states that capture the values of P ’s variable for
0 ≤ j < k.
Definition 5.7 (Functional equivalence). Given a P4 program P with a set of headers
and internal variable X , and a sequential circuit S = (G,R, clk, I,O, E) are functionally
equivalent, denoted as P ≈ S, iff
∃ f : X → R s.t. f is injective, and,
∀ (packet p, table T , k > 0, tr1 := tr (P , k)) .
∃k2 ≥ k, tr2 := tr (S, k2) s.t. ∀(0 ≤ i < j ≤ k, x ∈ X ).
∃ m,n s.t. 0 ≤ m < n ≤ k2 ∧
σ1i(x) = σ2m(f(x)) ∧ σ1j(x) = σ2n(f(x))
(5.4)
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In other words, functional equivalence indicates that the circuit S captures the functional
behavior of the P4 program P ; given the same set of inputs P and T , there exists a mapping
of P ’s variables X to registers R in S, such that the execution of P on X yields the same
states as the execution of S on R. Therefore, both P and S would produce the same output
packet, even if their execution paths are different.
5.5.2 Transformation
We now turn our attention to defining BiFrost’s transformation Φ, such that given an
input P4 program P , S = Φ(P ) is a sequential circuit such that P ≈ S. In what follows,
we characterize a P4 program P , accepting an input packet p, by its match-action tables
T and its set of variables X = {H ∪M}, where H and M are the set of header fields and
standard metadata in P , respectively.
Variables and Packets. In the context of the sequential circuit S, all variables and their
types are captured by collections of fixed number of one-bit latches (i.e. registers). The
interpretation of these bits differ only in the context of the operations involving them (e.g.
one’s complement addition vs two’s complement addition).
We start BiFrost’s transformation by constructing the set R. We create a register
r := Φ(x) for each variable x ∈ X , such that |r| = |x| (i.e., r is composed of |r| one-bit
latches). For each header h ∈ H, we also create a one-bit register, denoted by Φ(h).valid,
capturing the validity of h’s extraction from the input packet p. To represent P ’s input
packet p, we create a register β such that |β| = ∑h∈H |h|. For verification purposes, we
restrict our attention to the headers of p since the p’s data payload does not affect the
behavior of the switch.
Next, to capture P ’s control flow (i.e., the path of execution taken by p ∈ P), we create
a control register, ctrl, that captures the execution state of the circuit S. The number of
latches in ctrl is determined in a post-processing step after accounting for all of S’s unique
execution states. Formally, we writeR := Φ(X )∪{Φ(h).valid,∈ H}∪{ctrl} and I := {β}.
Finally, the set of gate G that we use is the standard set of logic gates in addition
to some function blocks such as adders, subtractors, and multipliers. Formally, G :=
{∧,∨,¬,, +,−, ∗, et.c}. We note, however, that inBiFrost’ final AIG circuit, GAIG = {∧,¬}
contains only the conjunction and negation operations, from which all other gates can be
constructed.
Statements and Functions. For each statement s of P , BiFrost assigns a unique
identifying label l (s) indicating when s should be executed. When the ctrl register’s value
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matches the label of a statement s, that statement is executed and its impacts on the circuit’s
state is observed in the following clock cycle.
Algorithm 5.1 shows BiFrost’s transformations of P4 statements. The function Mux
creates a multiplexer gate m in the sequential circuit S with semantics ` (m(e, v0, v1)) =
`(e) ? `(v1) : `(v0). The function AdjustRegisterEdges(r,m, E) removes r’s current
fanin and replaces it with an edge from m to r. BiFrost leverages this operation to
continuously update the graph G’s structure to reflect multiple assignments for every register.
This effectively creates a cascade of multiplexers that determine a register’s value based on
the value of the ctrl register.
For an assignment statement s, BiFrost creates a multiplexer that transfers the value
of s’s right hand expression into the target register r when the ctrl register reaches l (s).
In addition, BiFrost updates the next value of the ctrl register to the label of the next
statement following s (denoted by s.next). On the other hand, if s is a conditional statement,
it only affects the control flow of the program P and does not affect the values of the
S’s registers. Therefore, BiFrost creates two multiplexers that assign ctrl’s next value
depending on the value of s’s condition.
Finally, for each function f ∈ P (we treat P4 actions as functions as well), BiFrost
creates a set of registers for f ’s arguments as well as a special register for its return address.
When encountering a function call s to f , BiFrost assigns s’s argument values to f ’s
arguments (lines 23 – 25), saves the label of s’s next statement (i.e. ) to f ’s return address
register (line 27), and then transfers the control to f ’s first statement (line 26). We note
that this transformation allows us instantiate only one circuit block for each function, and
then reuse that same block with different argument values for each function call. This allows
us to avoid inlining the function body for each function, thus avoiding expensive replications
of circuit blocks. The fact that sequential circuits allow us to reuse memory elements is at
the core of BiFrost’s expressiveness and succinct representation of data plane programs.
Parsers. A parser in P4 programs represent a finite state machine that define the behavior
of a programmable switch upon receiving an input packet. Every state in a parser defines
a set of operations to perform on the packet’s headers (e.g.extract) and the transition into
the next based on some condition over those headers’ fields. Therefore, we can view the
parser as nested conditional statements where the next parser state to visit is determined
by the current state as well as the values of the variables involved in that state (which often
are packet header fields, but can also be local variables).
By interpreting parsers as nested conditional statements, BiFrost assigns each state α
in the parser a unique label and then uses the same conditional statement transformation
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Algorithm 5.1: Statement handling in BiFrost
1 Func AdjustRegisterEdges
Inputs : r ∈ R, v ∈ V, E
2 ω ← fanins (r)
3 E ← E \ {(ω, r)}
/* fanins (r)← {v} */
4 E ← E ∪ {(v, r)}
5 Func HandleStatement
Inputs : Statement s, Circuit S
6 if s is assignment then
7 r ← Φ(s.target)
8 v ← Φ(s.expression)
9 m1 ← Mux(ctrl = l (s) , v, fanins (r))
10 AdjustRegisterEdges(r,m1, E)
11 m2 ← Mux(ctrl = l (s) , l (s.next) , fanins (ctrl))
12 AdjustRegisterEdges(ctrl,m2, E)
13 else if s is conditional then
14 e← Φ(s.condition)
15 m1 ← Mux(ctrl = l (s) ∧ e, l (s.true) , fanins (ctrl))
16 m2 ← Mux(ctrl = l (s) ∧ ¬e, l (s.false) ,m1)
17 AdjustRegisterEdges(ctrl,m2, E)
18 HandleStatement(s.true, S)
19 HandleStatement(s.false, S)
20 else if s is function call then
21 f ← s.function
22 r ← f.return register
23 foreach a ∈ Φ(f.args) do
24 ma ← Mux(ctrl = l (s) , s.args[a], fanins (a))
25 AdjustRegisterEdges(a,ma, E)
26 m1 ← Mux(ctrl = l (s) , l (f) , fanins (ctrl))
27 m2 ← Mux(ctrl = l (s) , l (s.next) , fanins (r))
28 AdjustRegisterEdges(ctrl, m1, E)
29 AdjustRegisterEdges(r, m2, E)
30 else if s is return call then
31 f ← s.function
32 r ← f.return register
33 m1 ← Mux(ctrl = l (s) , r, fanins (ctrl))
34 AdjustRegisterEdges(ctrl, m1, E)
in Algorithm 5.1 to generate the equivalent circuit block.
Packet Extraction and Lookahead. BiFrost translates packet extraction and looka-
head operations by simply connecting wires (i.e. edges in E) from a subset of the input
packet’s bits to the appropriate header fields. The subset of the packet’s bits that must be
accessed is determined by the order and size of each header parsed in each previously visited
states. Therefore, packet extraction operations will depend on runtime information of the
program’s execution.
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Algorithm 5.2: BiFrost’s static analysis algorithm.
1 Func AnalyzeParserState
Inputs : Parser State α, Transition Key key, i
Outputs: Extraction Indices Map M
2 foreach Operation op ∈ α.operations do
3 if op is extract then
4 M [op]←M [op] ∪ {(key, i)}
5 i← i+ op.hdr size
6 else if op is lookahead then
7 M [op]←M [op] ∪ {(key, i)}
8 foreach (α, α′, k) ∈ α.transitions do
9 k′ ← key ∧ k
10 AnalyzeParserState(α′, k′, i)
/* Initial call for handling the parser */
11 α0 ← parser’s initial state
12 M ← AnalyzeParserState(α0, True, 0)
To address this challenge, BiFrost performs a static analysis of each state in the P4
program’s parser and determines the subset of input bits that must be read at each extraction
operation. Algorithm 5.2 presents BiFrost’s packet extraction analysis algorithm. For each
parser state α, BiFrost maps each extract or lookahead operation with a pair (key, index)
where index represents the index of the first bit to extract in the input packet when the
condition key is satisfied. Additionally, for each extraction operation in α, the index i is
updated based on the size of the header to extract (Note that lookahead operations do not
update the index, as defined by the P4 specification). Then, for each transition (α, α′, k),
BiFrost propagates the indices to the operations of α′ by creating they update key condition
key ∧ k. Finally, when generating the sequential circuit S, BiFrost creates a cascade of
multiplexer that determine the subset of the input packet’s bits that will mapped to each
header register based on the keys captured in Algorithm 5.2.
Finally, we note that BiFrost currently only supports fixed-width packet headers where
the length of each packet is predetermined at compile-time We acknowledge that this poses a
limitation on the developers’ ability to parse variable size options (such IPv4 options fields).
However, after surveying 11 publicly available P4 programs, we found none that use variable-
sized headers. Nevertheless, we plan to provide support for such parsing abilities in future
version of BiFrost.
Match-Action Tables. Data plane programs only describe the data forwarding behav-
ior of a networking device, the control plane provides that device with the contents of its
forwarding table to drive the functioning of match-action pipelines. For the matching part
of the table, BiFrost flattens all the matching conditions into an equivalent combinatorial
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Algorithm 5.3: Least Prefix Match Transformation
1 Func AssignEntryLabels
Inputs : Table Entries T , Key k, S
2 T ′ ← Sort(T)
3 entries← []
4 foreach i, (e, a, ) ∈ Enumerate(T ′) do
5 network addr ← k & e.mask
6
entries[i].label← (network addr = e.addr)∧i−1∧
j=0
¬ entry[j].label

/* D is the runtime data for each table entry. */
7 foreach i, ( , a,D) ∈ Enumerate(T’) do
8 foreach v ∈ a.parameters do
9 λ← (ctrl = l (a)) ∧ (entries[i].label)
10 m← Mux(λ,D(v), fanins (v))
11 AdjustRegisterEdges(v, m, E)
12 loc←
(⋃|entries|
j=0 entries[j].label
)
∧ ctrl = l (T )
13 m← Mux(loc, l (a), fanins (ctrl))
14 AdjustRegisterEdges(ctrl, m, E)
circuit (i.e., one without any clocked registers) depending the type of the matching proce-
dure (exact, lpm, or ternary). Algorithm 5.3 shows an example of how this is performed for
least-prefix-match tables. BiFrost identifies the logic clause that would lead to the selec-
tion of each action defined by the table, and then transfers control to that specified action if
its clause is satisfied. For cases when multiple matches are possible, BiFrost sorted the list
of possible actions by order of priority and then for each lower priority match entry, adds a
clause specifying that all higher priority match entries must be false.
After selecting the appropriate action based on its match entry’s clause, BiFrost transfers
control to the start of each action, and assigns the action parameters to the set of values
defined in the match-action table. This is followed by normal execution of the all the
statements in the action using the values specified by the appropriate table entry.
Checksums. BiFrost provides circuit blocks to perform IPv4 checksum calculation and
verification operations as defined in RFC 1071 [167]. Since circuit area is not our primary
design goal, we save on clock cycle and circuit complexity by implementing those blocks
as combinatorial blocks, i.e. the entire calculation or verification task completes within one
clock cycle. We achieve this property by flattening the checksum algorithm into a series of
one’s complement full adders operating on pairs of 16 bits registers; this is the counterpart
of loop unrolling in compiler design techniques [168].
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<Property > → Assert(<Expression >) |
Guard (<Expression >) |
<Expression >.
<Expression > → ∀ (<VariableList >) <Expression > |
∃ (<VariableList >) <Expression > |
(<Expression >) |
<Expression > <Op> <Expression > |
¬ <Expression > |
Variable |
.
<VariableList > → Variable |  |
Variable, <VariableList >.
<Op > → {+,−, ∗,==,∧,∨, =⇒ , etc}.
Figure 5.5: BiFrost’s grammar for defining properties.
Functional Equivalence. BiFrost’ transformation Φ on a program P maps each P4
statement and parser state to a unique control location captured by the value of the circuit
S’s ctrl register. As shown in Algorithm 5.1, Φ preserves the semantics of each statement
s by operating on the circuit registers R that correspond to any affected header or variable
in P . Therefore, it is clear that, by construction, any trace tr1 := tr (P , k) of length k on
P corresponds to a trace tr2 := tr (S, k′) on S such that k′ ≥ k and ever state σ1 ∈ tr1
has an equivalent state σ2 ∈ tr2, thus proving the functional equivalence between P and its
corresponding circuit S = Φ (P).
5.6 VERIFICATION METHODOLOGY
5.6.1 Specifying Program Properties
BiFrost accepts data plane program specifications in the form of First Order Logic
(FOL) formulae provided by developers as annotations to the input program. Figure 5.5
shows BiFrost’ property specification grammar; properties are either assertions (Assert)
or guards (Guard) tied to a specific statement in the data plan program. Assertions are
properties that must hold when the specific control location is reached during execution,
while guards provide constraints on the inputs to the program or specific actions and func-
tions. In addition, BiFrost accepts properties in the form of pre and post conditions on
the program as defined in Hoare triples [169]. Contrary to assertion and guards that are
statement specific, pre and post conditions are global to the program. In other words, a pre
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condition provides constraints on the input packet of the data plane program, while the post
condition specifies assertions that must hold at the end of the processing pipeline.
When applying the circuit transformation Φ, BiFrost translates each property into
its equivalent combinatorial circuit and creates the verification conditions guard =⇒
assertion and precondition =⇒ postcondition as circuit outputs. When verifica-
tion starts, the verifier will try to find input assignments (i.e., an input packet) that will
cause the verification conditions to be violated. If no such assignments can be found, the
properties are deemed to be satisfied.
Header Validity. In addition to developer-provided specifications, BiFrost provides
built-in support for header validity checks. During the transformation, for each statement
s that reads or write to a program header h, BiFrost adds the verification condition
ctrl = l (s) =⇒ IsValid(h) where IsValid corresponds to h’s validity bit being set to
1. Then, at the end of the transformation, BiFrost creates the conjunction of all such
validity conditions and add them as an output to the generated circuit S, to be checked for
violations during the verification phase.
5.6.2 Control Plane Abstraction
Data plane programs specify the forwarding behavior of a switch, while the control plane
controls the content of the switch’s match-action tables. In that regard, the transformation
we introduced in Section 5.5 operates on a single snapshot of the target switch’s tables.
Therefore, any properties proven by BiFrost are only proven with regard to that specific
snapshot of tables.
To make the verification process more general, BiFrost provides avenues for abstracting
the control plane tables, thus proving properties for the programmable switch regardless
of the content of its tables. To achieve that goal, BiFrost provides developers with the
option to abstract the match-action tables by replacing them with free input variables that
non-deterministically choose actions and runtime data. During the transformation, when
BiFrost encounters a table lookup, it uses a set of free inputs to non-deterministically
choose an action from that table’s allowed actions. It then assigns that actions’ parameters
to free inputs of the same bit width. In such a case, when BiFrost proves a property, that
property will hold on the data plane program regardless of the contents of its tables, i.e., for
any function of the control plane.
The abstraction of the control plane tables introduces two important challenges. First, by
adding more free inputs, the abstraction greatly increases the verifier’s search space, which
can often make the verification process computationally intractable. We address this issue in
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BiFrost by (1) allowing developers to provide Guard conditions on the control plane tables
to constrain the search space, and (2) performing bounded model checking on the length of
the switch’s pipeline (as discussed in the following subsection).
Second, abstracting the match-action tables violates the functional equivalence property of
BiFrost’s transformation and produces a circuit S that over-approximates the input data
plane program P . This might lead the verifier to find false positive counterexamples; such
counterexamples, although they violate the program’s properties, are not possible program
traces and thus must not be considered. To address this challenge, BiFrost provides the
developer with a detailed trace of each generated counterexample (showing the content of
the input packet as well as every header and variable throughout the pipeline), thus allowing
them to sort through the true positives and the false positives. However, we plan to explore
techniques such as Counter Example Guided Abstraction Refinement (CEGAR) [162] to use
false positives for adding constraints to the abstracted match-action tables.
5.6.3 Bounded Model Checking
To provide higher-levels of scalability, and to address the challenges brought-upon by the
abstraction of the match-action tables, we leverage the boundedness of the programmable
switches to perform bounded model checking (BMC) with provable pipeline length guarantees.
Based on the observation that data plane programs are linear in the number of headers
in incoming packets, during BiFrost’s transformation, we estimate an upper bound on
the number of clock cycles needed to process a single packet, from the moment it enters
the pipeline until it is written onto the appropriate output port. If the program’s parser
is acyclical, the upper bound, B, is simply equal to the largest control flow label generated
during the transformation. On the other hand, if the parser contain a cycle of length l,
then we estimate the upper bound as B + k × n× l where n is the number of headers in the
program, and k > 1 is a constant multiplier.
Next, BiFrost proves that the estimated bound B holds over any possible program exe-
cution. It first abstracts the program’s match-action tables. Then, it adds a simple counter
C that is incremented every clock cycle, and creates the post condition Γ := C ≤ B. Finally,
it launches a verification process to prove that Γ is always satisfied, i.e., for all input packets
and for all match-action tables, the switch’s pipelines fully processes the packet in less than
B clock cycles. The verification of this boundedness property is more efficient than the ver-
ification of program-specific properties since it is restricted to the transitions made during
execution, and not the actual content of the registers. For programs with cyclical parsers,
BiFrost starts with k = 1 and then keeps increasing k as long as it finds counterexamples to
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the Γ. Since the program is linear in n, we are guaranteed to find a k such that boundedness
condition holds.
Once the bound B is proven, BiFrost can then perform BMC on the original specification
with the clock cycle bound set to B. If no counter example is generated, the verifier asserts
that the no input assignment can violate the program’s properties in B clock cycles. Coupled
with the previous boundedness proof, this is enough to guarantee the program’s properties
hold for any execution possible execution path.
5.7 IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented BiFrost in C++ using 13 869 lines of code. Our implementation is
modular and extensible, allowing developers to provide support for different data plane
programming languages and transformations for designer-specific extern blocks. We plan
to release BiFrost as an open-source tool that developers can easily use to verify their
implementations.
The current version of BiFrost accepts the input P4 program in its JSON format, as
generated by the p4c reference compiler. We extend the JSON format to support the speci-
fication of FOL properties. To support modular and extensible transformations, BiFrost
first translates the input program into an intermediate, high-level, circuit representation,
and exposes its API to future developers. Finally, BiFrost uses the ABC API to generate
the AIG and perform the verification tasks. BiFrost comes pre-equipped with several re-
duction, abstraction and verification techniques, but also provides a built-in interactive shell
that allows developers to interact with the ABC verifier.
To validate the correctness of our implementation, we generated input and output packets
by simulating each of our test P4 programs using the P4 behavioral model version 2 (bmv2).
We then use the input packet to simulate our generated AIG and verifies that it outputs the
correct packet at its egress.
5.7.1 Handling Parser Loops
If the input P4 program employs header stacks, parser loops may arise to extract all the
headers from the packet into the stack. Although such loops are always bounded by the
maximum number of headers in the stack, the exact number of iterations undertaken by the
parser is not known until the packet is received. The last extracted header in the stack can
be later accessed using the stack’s last operator.
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To keep our transformations simple and efficient, instead of introducing complex circuitry
to track loop counters, we choose to unroll parser loops to allow for the extraction of all
of the possible headers in the stack. Subsequently, the stack’s last operator is simply a
constant value obtained from the corresponding unrolled parser state, and can be later one
manipulated using push and pop operations. Although unrolling increases the sizes of the
sequential circuit, it favors simplicity and thus aids in scaling verification efforts.
5.7.2 Register Arrays Reads and Writes
P4 supports register arrays that can be accessed using index values computed during
the program’s execution. To support such arrays in BiFrost, we implement a very simply
index-based memory manager that allows reads from and writes to arrays of registers. When
reading the value of a certain register a[i], BiFrost creates a hierarchy of multiplexers that
compare the value of i to the possible index values allowable for the register array a. Since all
values are mutually-exclusive, only one value is returned, which corresponds to the contents
of the register a[i]. Similarly, we translate each write to a register element into writes to
all the elements in the array, out of which only one will be activated based on the runtime
value of the index. If the index is out of bound, all accesses will fail and an out of bound
error is produced.
5.7.3 Counterexamples
When the verification procedures in ABC generate a counterexample, BiFrost lifts that
counterexample back into the original program and generates (1) a pcap file containing the
violating packet (or subset thereof) and (2) a trace that shows the state observed during
the processing of that packet. To that extent, we maintain a reverse lookup map between
the circuit’s control locations and their corresponding P4 program locations (such as table
lookups, parser states, and action primitives). Note that the counterexample might include
only a subset of the program’s variables since several variables, or their individuals bits, can
be removed during the reduction and abstraction phase.
5.8 EVALUATION
In this section, we set out to evaluate BiFrost and answer the following research ques-
tions:
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RQ 5.1 How effective is BiFrost in proving data plane program properties and generating
counterexamples?
RQ 5.2 What are the benefits of using sequential circuit verification when verifying data
plane program properties?
RQ 5.3 How scalable is BiFrost when attempting to verify large P4 programs?
5.8.1 Case Study I: Header Validity Bug in ecn.p4
We first illustrate the benefits of employing data plane program verification. Using
BiFrost, we uncovered a read from an invalid header bug in one of the P4 tutorial ex-
amples ecn.p43. The goal of the exercise is to develop a programmable switch that performs
layer 3 forwarding while providing support for Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) bits
to signify that the switch has encountered congestion in its queues, without the need for
dropping packets. When a packet arrives, the program parses its Ethernet header and then
parses an IP header if the Ethernet type is set to 0x0800. In its ingress pipeline, the switch
performs an IP address lookup in its match-action tables to determine the packet’s egress
port, decrement its TTL value, and assign its MAC source and destination addresses. This
pipeline is guarded against invalid header accesses by only performing the lookup if the
packet’s IPv4 header is valid.
At the egress pipeline, the switch reads the packet’s ECN bits and checks its queue depth
to determine if it should notify the receiver that it has encountered congestion. However, in
this case, the developers did not guard against non-IP headers; the switch attempts to read
the ECN bits of the packet even if its IPv4 header was not previously set to valid during
the parsing stage. The switch’s behavior at this stage is not defined by the P4 specifica-
tion [148], it is rather determined by the target architecture, thus introducing vulnerabilities
that malicious entities can exploit [123].
Using BiFrost, we were able to discover and locate this bug in the ecn.p4 program,
as shown in Figure 5.6. BiFrost generated a counterexample trace showing that when
execution reached control location 0x0E (which corresponds to the start of the MyEgress
pipeline), the header validity property was violated. Lifting this counterexample back into
the program’s source code shows that the conditional statement at the start of the pipeline
accesses the ecn field of the ipv4 while the header is invalid.
3We confirmed this issue with the tutorial developers. The example solution was provided for illustrative
purposes so no corrective action was taken.
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control MyIngress(inout headers hdr,
  inout metadata meta,
  inout standard_metadata_t
    standard_metadata) {
  ...
  action ipv4_forward(macAddr_t dstAddr, 
                      egressSpec_t port) {
    standard_metadata.egress_spec = port;
    hdr.ethernet.srcAddr = hdr.ethernet.dstAddr;
    hdr.ethernet.dstAddr = dstAddr;
    hdr.ipv4.ttl = hdr.ipv4.ttl - 1;
  }
  ...
  apply {
    if (hdr.ipv4.isValid()) {
      ipv4_lpm.apply();
    }
  } 
}
control MyEgress(
  inout headers hdr,
  inout metadata meta,
  inout standard_metadata_t
    standard_metadata) {
  action mark_ecn() {
    hdr.ipv4.ecn = 3;
  }
  apply {
    if (hdr.ipv4.ecn == 1 ||
                 hdr.ipv4.ecn == 2) {
      if (standard_metadata.enq_qdepth >=
                             ECN_THRESHOLD) {
        mark_ecn();
      }  
    }
  }
}
{
  “epoch”: 4,
  
  ...
  
  “__cstate__”:         0x0E (MyEgress.Start),
  “ethernet.$valid$”:   0x01,
  “ethernet.dstAddr”:   0x000000000000,
  “ethernet.srcAddr”:   0x000000000000,
  “ethernet.etherType”: 0x0000,
  
  ...
  
  “ipv4.$valid$”:       0x00,
  
  ...  
}
No guard against 
invalid reads
Guard 
against 
invalid 
reads
Figure 5.6: Bug discovered in ecn.p4. The leftmost code snippet shows the ingress pipeline
where invalid header reads are guarded against using an if statement. The center code
snippet shows the egress pipeline where the ecn bits of the ipv4 header of the packet are read
even if that packet is invalid. The rightmost snippet shows an except of the counterexample
generated by BiFrost when attempting to validate the program’s header validity. It shows
that the validity property was invalidated when execution reached the start at of the egress
pipeline, where the Ethernet header was valid while the IPv4 header was not.
5.8.2 Case Study II: Verifying Functional Properties in calc.p4
To answer RQ 5.2, we use the simple calculator example, calc.p4, provided by the P4
language tutorials4, to illustrate the efficacy of sequential circuit reduction, abstraction,
and verification techniques in proving functional program properties. calc.p4 implements a
simple calculator that, after parsing a packet’s Ethernet header, parses a custom header that
contains two 32-bit operands, an 8-bit operation field, and a 32-bit result. Depending on the
type of the operation field, the switch will perform a certain arithmetic or logic operation
on the two operands and store the result in the corresponding header field. It will then send
the packet back to the user on the same port from which it was received.
To verify that the program was implemented correctly, we annotate it with pre and post
conditions to capture its correct behavior. For example, for the addition operation, we verify
the property
∀(packet headers h).
(h.eth.valid ∧ h.calc.valid ∧ h.calc.op = 0x2b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pre condition
=⇒
(h.calc.res = h.calc.operand a + h.calc.operand b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
post condition
(5.5)
where h represents the set of packet headers extracted by the parser, h.eth and h.calc
are the packet’s Ethernet and custom calculator packet headers, respectively. The clause
h.calc.op = 0x2b makes sure the packet is intended to request an addition operation, while
4https://github.com/p4lang/tutorials/blob/master/exercises/calc/solution/calc.p4
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Table 5.1: Verification results for calc.p4. PI and Lat. stand for primary inputs and
latches, respectively. BMC represents bounded model checking and PDR represents property
directed reachability.
P
AIG size
(Original)
AIG size
(Abstracted) Method
Time
(sec.)
PIs Lat. Gates PIs Lat. Gates
calc 240 1589 4650 144 346 1227 PDR Timeout
calc 240 1589 4650 144 346 1227 BMC 23.35
calc-8 168 941 3330 72 202 819 PDR 57.43
the post condition ensures that after processing the packet, the result indeed includes the
addition of the two operands.
We set out to fully verify property (5.5) for all of its input space (14 bytes for the Ethernet
header and 16 bytes for the calc header). As show in Table 5.1, BiFrost generates an AIG
with 240 free inputs (PIs) that represent the 30 bytes header space of the input packet. After
performing sequential circuit reduction techniques, the number of free inputs is reduced to
144, capturing only the Ethernet header’s type field (16 bits) and the calc header (16 bytes).
In other words, BiFrost was able to eliminate the source and destination MAC addresses
since they have no impact on property (5.5).
However, when first attempting to verify the property using property directed reachabil-
ity [170, 171], after 5 minutes, the ABC verifier produced an undecided result; it did not find a
counterexample within the allocated time limit, but was not able to prove the property. This
is a reflection of the still very large input space (2144 values after reduction) of the program,
and the relative complexity of property (5.5). Effectively, verifying property (5.5) amounts
to verifying a full Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) over two 32-bit operands. To validate our
intuition, we reduced the size of the operands from 32 bits to 8 bits and were able to fully
verify the property in 1 minute (row 3 of Table 5.1).
Nevertheless, we would still like to a conclusive verification result for calc.p4. To that end,
we leveraged our circuit bounding technique to perform BMC. During the transformation,
BiFrost estimated that processing a single packet through the switch’s pipeline takes no
more than 69 clock cycles. We then launched a separate verification procedures and formally
proved that execution always completes within that bound, which the ABC verifier quickly
verifies. Finally, instead of using PDR, we ran BMC with a bound of 69 clock cycles and
were able to verify property (5.5) in 24.5 seconds. What the BMC result asserts is that for
all input values, the property is always satisfied within the first 69 clock cycles of execution.
Coupled with BiFrost’s verified circuit bound, this guarantees that the program satisfies
its specification.
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5.8.3 Scalability Benchmarks
Finally, to answer RQ 5.3, we evaluate BiFrost on 11 open source P4 programs. These
programs represent a range of data plane applications such as simple forwarding, multicas-
ting, quality of service mechanisms, and a data plane-only firewall. For each program, we
verified the header validity property for all possible control plane settings by abstracting
the contents of the tables and replacing them with free inputs. As in [129], we chose the
header validity property since it generalizes to any data plane program. However, we note
that unlike [129], BiFrost does not require any inputs from the control place. Our verifi-
cation results hold for any control place configuration. We conducted our experiments on a
server-class machine with 32 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2450 v2 @ 2.50GHz processors and
64GB of memory space.
Table 5.2 shows the results of our experiments. We report on the size of the generated
sequential circuit before and after abstraction in terms of the number of primary inputs,
latches, and logic gates. We also breakdown the performance profiles in terms of transfor-
mation, abstraction, and verification times. We first note that BiFrost can verify header
validity for most programs in less than a second. Some of those programs have a relatively
large input space (such as 38 bytes for the headers in basic tunnel). firewall.p4 is the
program with the largest running time (> 2 minutes). Although we believe this is accept-
able for verification, we attribute the runtime increase for firewall.p4 to the fact that it
implements a complex firewall and maintains two Bloom filters, each with 4096 elements,
that use crc16 and crc32 as hashing functions. This is exemplified by the large increase in
the size of the generated circuit compared to the other benchmarks. The presence of such
data structures can complicate the generate circuit and this increase the verification time.
Second, we note that over all the experiments, BiFrost achieves > 80% reduction in
the size of the generated sequential circuit. This further emphasize the power of sequential
reduction and abstraction techniques in eliminating the parts of the circuit that do not
contribute to the property being verified. Furthermore, for resubmit.p4 and multicast.p4,
the ABC verifier was able to flatten the circuit into a combinatorial circuit and prove that
the header validity property is a tautology, as showcased by the elimination of all circuit
components during the abstraction phase. This is due to the fact that these two programs
only include Ethernet headers, thus making it simple for ABC to completely flatten the circuit
into one combinatorial formula.
Finally, we used BiFrost to uncover another header validity bug in vpc.p45. VPC imple-
ments a virtual private cloud in programmable switches. After parsing an Ethernet header,
5https://github.com/joncastro/p4vpc
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Figure 5.7: A sample topology comprised of four hosts connected to two programmable
switches. s1 and s2 are programmable switches. Numbers on the links represent each switch’s
port number.
the switch reads an ARP header, arp rarp. Subsequently, if arp arp.protoType is 0x0800, the
switch parses another ARP header called arp rarp ipv4. However, in its ingress pipeline,
after checking arp rarp’s validity, the switch assumes that arp rarp ipv4 is present, without
checking that arp arp.protoType is indeed 0x0800. In such a case, an attacker can craft a
packet that will lead the switch to read from an invalid header, thus introducing an un-
defined behavior. We confirmed this bug by tracing BiFrost’s counterexample into the
original program.
Overall, we believe that our results showcase that BiFrost can scale to real world data
plane programs, and can leverage the power of sequential synthesis and verification to achieve
scalable and efficient verification for different properties.
5.9 GENERALIZATION TO NETWORK PROPERTIES
BiFrost currently only support properties that express correctness and safety specifica-
tions about a single programmable switch. In other words, those properties only relate to
the lifetime of a packet once it enters a switch through the ingress port until it leaves that
switch at the output port. However, network verification, and specifically when dealing with
security properties, requires an overall view of the network that allows developers to express
reachability and safety properties about a deployed network. In this section, we discuss how
BiFrost can be extended to support such verification tasks.
Consider the simple network topology shown in Figure 5.7. The network is composed
of four hosts connected to two programmable switches, forming four different subnetworks.
Assume in this case, that the network developer set up a firewall program that blocks
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ssh traffic from hosts on the subnetwork 10.0.1.0/24 to the host 10.0.4.4. To verify
the correctness of her deployment, the developer would like to verify that the data plane
programs deployed on the switches correctly block ssh traffic to the target host. Formally,
the developer can express this property as ∀packet p,
(p.ip.srcAddr ∈ 10.0.1.0/24 ∧ p.ip.dstAddr = 10.0.4.4 ∧ p.tcp.dstPost = 22)
=⇒ isDropped (p)
(5.6)
To verify this property using BiFrost, we first translate data plane programs that the
developer implemented into their equivalent sequential circuits. However, unlike the single-
switch verification tasks, each circuit will have different inputs and outputs that correspond
to the number of different input and output ports available. Then, given the network topol-
ogy, we can connect the corresponding circuit inputs and outputs in accordance to the
connectivity profiles between the switches. Since we are interested in security properties,
we do not place restrictions on the packets originating from every host. In other words, we
allow packets on ingress ports to take on any values, even if they are not consistent with the
network topology. This allows us to capture the case where a compromised host masquerades
as a different host and send traffic on its behalf.
Finally, we project the property that the developer would like to verify onto the generated
sequential circuit by adding appropriate primary outputs at each switch. For example, the
firewall correctness property we previously discussed can be translated into two properties
at each switch as follows. At switch s1, ∀packet p,
(p.ip.isValid() ∧ p.ip.dstAddr = 10.0.4.4) =⇒ (p.metadata.eport = 3) (5.7)
and at s2,
∀packet p. (p.ip.isValid() ∧ (10.0.1.0 ≤ p.ip.srcAddr ≤ 10.0.1.255))
=⇒ ((p.tcp.isValid() ∧ p.tcp.dstPort = 2) =⇒ isDropped(p))
(5.8)
The first property at switch s1 ensures that the switch is forwarding packets destined to
10.0.4.4 on the correct output port. The second property ensures that switch s2 drops all
packets originating from 10.0.1.0/24, destined to 10.0.4.4, and containing a valid TCP
header with a destination port of 22. Note that in this case, we did not restrict that packets
on switch s2 to be received on the ingress port 1 since an attacker that has compromised
host 10.0.3.3 can send packets destined to 10.0.4.4 with a spoofed source IP address
of 10.0.1.1. Therefore, the switch s2 should drop all packets that satisfy the criterion, no
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matter the ingress port the switch receives them on. We plan to extend BiFrost to support
such transformations and properties in a future release.
5.10 RELATED WORK
Network Verification. Recently, a number of tools have been proposed to verify software-
defined networks. Anteater [172] performs static analysis on the contents of the forwarding
tables of data plane devices to detect violations of certain operator-provided invariants.
It translates network invariants into SAT formulas and checks them using a SAT solver.
HSA [173] statically checks failure conditions for software-defined networks in a protocol-
independent way. It analyzes equivalence classes of related packets to perform reachability
analysis, loop detection and slice isolation. These works perform static verification by ana-
lyzing snapshots of the programmable data plane against specified network properties. While
these tools can be used to detect violations of static properties across devices, they cannot
be used to detect issues in the packet processing procedures within the switches.
P4 Packet Generation. Several approaches generate packets in various ways to trigger
bugs at runtime in P4 programs. p4rl [174] proposed a test packet generation tool that
uses reinforcement learning to decide on which fuzzing actions to take when generating test
cases. p4pktgen [128] uses symbolic execution to automatically generate test cases from
specifications of P4 programs. The generated packets contain test packets, table entries,
and expected paths. Suriya et al [175] provide complementary work to p4pktgen to localize
bugs for P4 program at runtime. However, the test generation based approaches can be
expensive when the search space grows. Static verification can be seen as a complementary
approach to exhaustive testing.
P4 Verification. There are also works that perform static verification of P4 programs
using symbolic execution. p4v [129] performs automatic verification of P4 data planes using
Dijkstra’s algorithm (GCL) [176] and the Z3 theorem prover [177] to check properties and
compute counter examples. Vera [130] translates P4 programs into an equivalent SEFL
representation and uses Symnet [178] to perform symbolic execution on the generated model.
It explores fixed snapshots of the control plane and uses symbolic table entries to check
specified policies. Neves et al [179] present a tool that takes as input a data plane program
manually annotated with assertions. It translates the program and its assertions into a
C program and checks its correctness with symbolic execution. Unlike BiFrost, these
approaches treat data plane programs similarly to general-purpose programs and heavily
rely on symbolic execution. BiFrost’s BMC approach to verify large programs has no
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counterpart in any other general-purpose approach.
Model Checking. Traditional verification approaches use symbolic execution for model
checking such as SymNet [178] and NuSMV [180]. They translate program invariants into
boolean expressions and explore all possible code paths to perform model checking. The
closest work to BiFrost is that in [181] where the authors propose to translate a restricted
subset of general-purpose programs into sequential circuits. BiFrost builds upon the ap-
proach presented in [181] but uses several domain-specific transformations and optimizations
targeted for data plane programs. The boundedness of data plane programs makes them
better candidates for such a transformation than general purpose programs.
5.11 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we presented BiFrost, a tool for the scalable verification of data plane
programs using sequential circuit synthesis and verification. BiFrost exploits the bound-
edness of data plane programs to generate efficient and functionally equivalent circuits.
BiFrost then uses the ABC verifier to reduce the size of those circuit and perform sequential
verification for different types of properties. Our results show that BiFrost can scale to
real-world programs by leveraging the power of sequential reduction and verification, and
that BiFrost is able to prove complex properties and detect bugs in open source programs.
In the future, we plan to explore the following research paths. First, BiFrost currently
supports the verification of the forwarding path of a single programmable switch. How-
ever, many network-wide properties depend on the interactions between different switches.
Therefore, we would like to extend BiFrost to support the verification of network-wide
properties that span the lifetime of a packet across several interconnected switches. Second,
one of the promises of programmable data planes is flexibility; a network operator can deploy
a program on switches from different vendors and expect them to behave in the same way.
However, each vendor provides its own proprietary compiler and there is not guarantee that
all switches will behave similarly. We plan to use our sequential circuit transformation to
provide operators with the means to verify the functional equivalence of the different imple-
mentations. Using sequential equivalence checking, BiFrost’s generated circuit can serve
as an oracle that can be used to attest for the functional equivalence between the different
compilations.
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CHAPTER 6: SSHIELD: A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH TO
RESPOND TO ATTACKER LATERAL MOVEMENT
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the increasing number of targeted and complex network attacks, namely
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), organizations need to build more resilient systems.
Resiliency is a system’s ability to maintain an acceptable level of operation in light of abnor-
mal, and possibly malicious, activities. The key feature of resilient systems is their ability
to react quickly and effectively to different types of activities. There has been an ever-
increasing amount of work on detecting network intrusions; Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs) are widely deployed as the first layer of defense against malicious opponents [182].
However, once alarms have been raised, it may take a network administrator anywhere from
weeks to months to effectively analyze and respond to them. This delay creates a gap be-
tween the intrusion detection time and the intrusion response time, thus allowing attackers
a sometimes large time gap in which they can move freely around the network and inflict
higher levels of damage.
An important phase of the life cycle of an APT is lateral movement, in which attack-
ers attempt to move laterally through the network, escalating their privileges and gaining
deeper access to different zones or subnets [183]. As today’s networks are segregated by
levels of sensitivity, lateral movement is a crucial part of any successful targeted attack. An
attacker’s lateral movement is typically characterized by a set of causally related chains of
communications between hosts and components in the network. This creates a challenge for
detection mechanisms since attacker lateral movement is usually indistinguishable from ad-
ministrator tasks. It is up to the network administrator to decide whether a suspicious chain
of communication is malicious or benign. This gap between the detection of a suspicious
chain and the administrator’s decision and response allows attackers to move deeper into the
network and thus inflict more damage. It is therefore essential to design response modules
that can quickly respond to suspicious communication chains, giving network administrators
enough time to make appropriate decisions.
Intrusion Response Systems (IRSs) combine intrusion detection with network response.
They aim to reduce the dangerous time gap between detection time and response time.
Static rule-based IRSs choose response actions by matching detected attack steps with a
set of rules. Adaptive IRSs attempt to dynamically improve their performance using suc-
cess/failure evaluation of their previous response actions, as well as IDS confidence met-
rics [184, 185]. However, faced with the sophisticated nature of APTs, IRSs are still unable
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to prevent network attacks effectively. Rule-based systems can be easily overcome by adap-
tive attackers. Adaptive systems are still not mature enough to catch up with the increased
complexity of APTs.
In this chapter, we present a game-theoretic network response engine that takes effec-
tive actions in response to an attacker that is moving laterally in an enterprise network.
The engine receives monitoring information from IDSs in the form of a network services
graph, which is a graph data structure representing vulnerable services running between
hosts, augmented with a labeling function that highlights services that are likely to have
been compromised. We formulate the decision-making problem as a defense-based zero-sum
matrix game that the engine analyzes to select appropriate response actions by solving for
saddle-point strategies. Given the response engine’s knowledge of the network and the loca-
tion of sensitive components (e.g., database servers), its goal is to keep the suspicious actors
as far away from the sensitive components as possible. The engine is not guaranteed to
neutralize threats, if any, but can provide network administrators with enough time to ana-
lyze suspicious movement and take appropriate neutralization actions. The decision engine
will make use of the monitoring information to decide which nodes’ disconnection from the
network would slow down the attacker’s movements.
An important feature of our approach is that, unlike most IRSs, it makes very few pre-
game assumptions about the attacker’s strategy; we only place a bound on the number
of actions that an attacker can make within a time period, thus allowing us to model the
problem as a zero-sum game. By not assuming an attacker model beforehand, our engine
can avoid cases in which the attacker deviates from the model and uses its knowledge to trick
the engine and cancel the effectiveness of its actions. We show that our engine is effectively
able to increase the number of attack steps needed by an attacker to compromise a sensitive
part of the network by at least 50%. Additionally, in most cases, the engine was able to
deny the attacker access to the sensitive nodes for the entire period of the simulation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We describe the motivation behind our
work in Section 6.2. We then present an overview of our approach and threat model in
Section 6.3. Section 6.4 formally presents the response engine and the algorithms we use. We
discuss implementation and results in Section 6.5. We review past literature in Section 6.6,
present challenges and future directions in Section 6.7, and conclude Section 6.8.
6.2 MOTIVATION
The life cycle of an APT consists of the following steps [183, 186, 187]. The first is
intelligence gathering and reconnaissance, which is followed by the establishment of an entry
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point into the target system. Subsequently, the attacker establishes a connection to one
or more command and control (C&C) servers, and uses these connections to control the
remainder of the operation. Following C&C establishment is lateral movement, wherein the
attacker gathers user credential and authentication information and moves laterally in the
network in order to reach a designated target. The last step includes performance of specific
actions on the targets, such as data exfiltration or even physical damage [188].
Lateral movement allows attackers to achieve persistence in the target network and gain
higher privileges by using different tools and techniques [183]. In a number of recent security
breaches, the examination of network logs has shown that attackers were able to persist and
move laterally in the victim network, staying undetected for long periods of time. For exam-
ple, in the attack against the Saudi Arabian Oil Company, the attackers were able to spread
the malware to infect 30,000 personal machines on the company’s network through the use of
available file-sharing services [189]. In the Ukraine power grid breach, attackers used stolen
credentials to move laterally through the network and gain access to Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) dispatch workstations and servers. The attackers had enough
privileges to cause more damage to the public power grid infrastructure [190]. Furthermore,
through the use of USB sticks and exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in the Windows
operating system, the Stuxnet malware was able to move between different workstations in
an Iranian nuclear facility until it reached the target centrifuge controllers [188].
Early detection of lateral movement is an essential step towards thwarting APTs. However,
without timely response, attackers can use the time gap between detection and administra-
tor response to exfiltrate large amounts of data or inflict severe damage to the victim’s
infrastructure. It took network administrators two weeks to effectively neutralize threats
and restore full operation to the Saudi Arabian Oil Company’s network [189]. Furthermore,
attackers attempt to hide their lateral movement through the use of legal network services
such as file sharing (mainly Windows SMB), remote desktop tools, secure shell (SSH) and
administrator utilities (such as the Windows Management Instrumentation) [183]. This
stealthy approach makes it harder for network administrators to decide whether the traffic
they are observing is malicious lateral movement or benign user or administrative traffic.
In this work, we present a game-theoretic approach for autonomous network response to
potentially malicious lateral movement. The response actions taken by our engine aim to
protect sensitive network infrastructure by keeping the attacker away from it for as long as
possible, thus giving network administrators enough time to assess the observed alerts and
take effective corrective actions to neutralize the threats.
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Figure 6.1: Our defender model. The defense module uses IDS alerts and monitoring data
along with observed attacker steps to build a network model. Trying to protect a sensitive
node σ, it builds a zero-sum game and solves for the saddle-point strategies in order to select
an appropriate response action a. The Response Deployment module is then responsible for
the implementation of a in the network.
6.3 OVERVIEW
We assume, in our framework, the presence of network level IDSs (such as Snort [191] and
Bro [192]) that can provide the response engine with the necessary monitoring information.
The response engine maintains the state of the network in the form of a network services
graph, a graph data structure that represents the active services between nodes in the
network. It then uses IDS information to define a labeling function over the graph that
marks suspicious nodes and communications used for a possible compromise. Using the
labels, the engine observes chains of communications between likely compromised nodes.
Such chains are considered suspicious and require the engine to take immediate response
actions. The engine considers all suspicious chains as hostile; its goal is to prevent any
attackers from reaching specified sensitive nodes in the network, typically database servers
or physical controllers.
From the observed states, the response engine can identify compromised nodes and possible
target nodes for the attacker. It will take response actions that disconnect services from
target nodes so that it prevents the attacker from reaching the sensitive node. This step
can provide the network administrators with enough time to assess the IDS alerts and
take appropriate actions to neutralize any threats. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate high-
level diagrams of our response engine and a sample observed network state with 10 nodes,
respectively.
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Figure 6.2: An illustration of our game model. The attacker has compromised 3 nodes in the
network, and has four potential targets to compromise next. The defender, seeing the three
compromised nodes, has to decide where the attacker is going to move next and disconnect
services from the node, thus slowing down the attack.
Our threat model allows for the presence of a sophisticated attacker that has already es-
tablished an entry point in an enterprise network, typically using spear phishing and social
engineering, and aims to move laterally deeper into the network. Starting from a compro-
mised node, the attacker identifies a set of possible target nodes for the next move. We
assume that the attacker compromises one node at a time in order to avoid detection. We
argue that this assumption is reasonable since attackers typically want to use legitimate ad-
ministrator tools to hide their lateral movement activities [193]. Therefore, unlike computer
worms that propagate widely and rapidly [194], lateral movement tends to be targeted, slow
and careful. We will explore more sophisticated types of attackers with multi-move abilities
in our future work.
Figure 6.2 illustrates an example network services graph with ten nodes, where an attacker
has established a point of entry and already compromised three nodes. We highlight the
target nodes that the attacker can choose to compromise next. We assume no prior knowledge
of the strategy by which the attacker will choose the next node to compromise. Building our
response engine on the assumption of like-minded attackers would lead to a false sense of
security, since attackers with different motives would be able to overcome the responses of
our engine, or possibly use them to their own advantage. Therefore, we formulate a defense-
based game that attempts to protect a sensitive node in the network, regardless of the goals
that the attacker is trying to achieve.
6.4 THE RESPONSE ENGINE
In this section, we formally introduce our response decision-making problem and its for-
mulation as a zero-sum game. We provide formal definitions for the network state, attack
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and response actions, and attack and response strategies, and then present how we build
and solve the matrix game. We formulate the response engine’s decision-making process
as a complete information zero-sum game, in which the players are the engine and a po-
tentially malicious attacker. We assume that both players take actions simultaneously, i.e.,
no player observes the action of the other before making its own move. In what follows,
without loss of generality, we use the term attacker to refer to a suspicious chain of lateral
movement communications. The response engine treats all communication chains as mali-
cious and takes response actions accordingly. We use the terms defender and response engine
interchangeably.
6.4.1 Definitions
Definition 6.1 (Network services graph). A network services graph (NSG) is an undirected
graph G =< V,E > where V is the set of physical or logical nodes (workstations, printers,
virtual machines, etc.) in the network and E = V × V is a set of edges.
An edge e = (v1, v2) ∈ E represents the existence of an active network service, such as file
sharing, SSH, or remote desktop connectivity, between nodes v1 and v2 in the network.
For any v ∈ V , we define a neighborhood(v) as the set
neighborhood(v) = {u ∈ V | ∃(u, v) ∈ E} (6.1)
Definition 6.2 (Alert labeling function). Given an NSG G =< V,E >, we define an Alert
Labeling Function (ALF) as a labeling function ` over the nodes V and edges E of G such
that
For v ∈ V, `(v) =
{
True iff v is deemed compromised,
False otherwise.
(6.2)
For e = (u, v) ∈ E, `(e) =
{
True iff `(u) = True ∧ `(v) = True,
False otherwise.
(6.3)
A suspicious chain is then a sequence of nodes {v1, v2, . . . , vk} such that
v1, v2, . . . , vk ∈ V,
(vi, vi+1) ∈ E ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, and
`(vi) = True ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
(6.4)
We assume that an ALF is obtained from monitoring information provided by IDSs such
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as Snort [191] and Bro [192]. A suspicious chain can be either a malicious attacker moving
laterally in the network, or a benign legal administrative task. The goal of our response
engine is to slow the spread of the chain and keep it away from the sensitive infrastructure
of the network, thus giving network administrators enough time to assess whether the chain
is suspicious or not, and take appropriate corrective actions when needed.
Definition 6.3 (Network state). We define the state of the network as a tuple
s = (Gs =< Vs, Es >, `s) (6.5)
where Gs is an NSG and `s is its corresponding ALF. We use S to refer to the set of all
possible network states.
For a given network state s, we define the set of vulnerable nodes Vs as
Vs =
u |
u ∈ ⋃
v∈Vs∧`s(v)=True
neighborhood(v)
 ∧ `s(u) = False
 (6.6)
Definition 6.4 (Attack action). Given a network state s ∈ S, an attack action ae is a
function over the ALFs, in which a player uses the service provided by edge e = (v, v′) such
that `s(v) = True and v
′ ∈ Vs, in order to compromise node v′. Formally we write
ae(`s) = `
′ such that `′(v′) = True ∧ `′(e) = True (6.7)
For a network state s, the set of possible attack actions As is defined as
As = {ae | e = (u, v) ∈ Es ∧ `s(u) = True ∧ v ∈ Vs} (6.8)
Definition 6.5 (Response action). Given a network state s, a response action dv is a function
over the NSG edges, in which a player selects a node v ∈ Vs, and disconnects available services
on all edges e = (u, v) ∈ Es such that `s(u) = True. Formally, we write
dv(Es) = E
′ such that E ′ = Es\ {(u, v) ∈ Es | `s(u) = True} (6.9)
For a network state s, we define the set of all possible response actions Ds as
Ds = {dv | v ∈ Vs} (6.10)
Definition 6.6 (Response strategy). Given a network state s with a set of response actions
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Ds, a strategy pr : Ds −→ [0, 1]|Ds| where
∑
dv∈Ds pr(dv) = 1 is a probability distribution
over the space of available response actions.
A response strategy pr is a pure response strategy iff
∃ dv ∈ Ds such that pr(dv) = 1 ∧ (∀dv′ 6= dv, pr(dv′) = 0) (6.11)
A response strategy that is not pure is a mixed response strategy. Given a network state s,
after solving a zero sum game, the response engine samples its response action according to
the computed response strategy.
Definition 6.7 (Attack strategy). Given a network state s and a set of attack actions As,
an attack strategy pa : As −→ [0, 1]|A| where
∑
ae∈As pa(ae) = 1 is a probability distribution
over the space of available attack actions As.
Definition 6.8 (Network next state). Given a network state s, a response action dv ∈ Ds
for v ∈ Vs, and an attack action ae ∈ As for e = (u,w) ∈ Es, using Equations (6.7) and
(6.9), we define the network next state (nns) as a function S × Ds ×As −→ S where
nns(s, dv, ae) = s
′ where
{
(Gs′ =< Vs, dv(Es) >, `s) iff v = w,
(Gs′ =< Vs, dv(Es) >, ae(`s)) otherwise
(6.12)
6.4.2 Formulation as a zero-sum game
The goal of our response engine is to keep an attacker, if any, as far away from a network’s
sensitive node (database server, SCADA controller, etc.) as possible. In the following, we
assume that the engine is configured to keep the attacker at least threshold nodes away
from a database server σ containing sensitive company data. The choices of threshold and
σ are determined by the network administrators prior to the launch of the response engine.
Figure 6.3 shows the steps taken by our response engine at each time epoch t0 < t1 < t2 <
. . . < t. In every step, the defender constructs a zero-sum defense-based matrix game and
solves it for the saddle-point response strategy from which it samples an action to deploy.
Assume that in a network state s, the response engine chooses to deploy action dv ∈ Ds
for v ∈ Vs, and the attacker chooses to deploy action ae ∈ As for e = (u,w) ∈ Es. In
other words, the defender disconnects services from node v in the network while the attacker
compromises node w starting from the already compromised node u. If v = w, then the
attacker’s efforts were in vain and the response engine was able to guess correctly where
the attacker would move next. However, when v 6= w, the attacker would have successfully
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1: for each time epoch t0 < t1 < t2 < . . . do
2: (1) Obtain network state s = (Gs, `s).
3: (2) Compute the sets of possible attack and response actions As and Ds
4: (3) Compute the payoff matrix Ms = BUILD GAME(As,Ds, threshold, σ)
5: (4) Compute the equilibrium response strategy pˆr
6: (6) Sample response action dv ∈ Ds from pˆr
7: end for
Figure 6.3: The steps taken by our response engine at each time epoch. The engine first
obtains the state of the network from the available monitors, and uses it to compute the
sets of possible attack and response actions As and Ds. It then builds the zero-sum game
matrix Ms using Algorithm 6.1, and solves for the equilibrium response strategy pˆs. It finally
samples a response action dv from pˆs that it deploys in the network.
compromised the node w. Note that this is not necessarily a loss, since by disconnecting
services from certain nodes on the path, the response engine might be redirecting the attacker
away from the target server σ. Furthermore, by carefully selecting nodes to disconnect, the
engine can redirect the attacker into parts of the network where the attacker can no longer
reach the target server σ, and thus cannot win the game. The attacker wins the game when
it is able to reach a node within one hop of target server σ. The game ends when (1) the
attacker reaches σ; (2) either player runs out of moves to play; or (3) the attacker can no
longer reach σ.
Let sp(u, σ) be the length of the shortest path (in number of edges) in Gs from node
u to the target server σ. We define the payoffs for the defender in terms of how far the
compromised nodes are from the target server σ. A positive payoff indicates that the attacker
is more than threshold edges away from σ. A negative payoff indicates that the attacker
is getting closer to σ, an undesirable situation for our engine. Therefore, we define the
payoff for the defender when the attacker compromises node w as sp(w, σ)− threshold. If
sp(w, σ) > threshold then the attacker is at least sp(w, σ) − threshold edges away from
the defender’s predefined dangerous zone. Otherwise, attacker is threshold−sp(w, σ) edges
into the defender’s dangerous zone. Moreover, when the defender disconnects a node w that
the attacker wanted to compromise, two cases might arise. First, if sp(w, σ) = ∞, i.e., w
cannot reach σ, then it is desirable for the defender to lead the attacker into w, and thus
the engine assigns dw a payoff of 0 so that it wouldn’t consider disconnecting w. Otherwise,
when sp(w, σ) < ∞, by disconnecting the services of w, the defender would have canceled
the effect of the attacker’s action, and thus considers it a win with payoff sp(w, σ) <∞.
Algorithm 6.1 illustrates how our response engine builds the zero-sum matrix game. For
each network state s, the algorithm takes as input the set of response actions Ds, the set
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of attack actions As, the defender’s threshold, and the target server to protect σ. The
algorithm then proceeds by iterating over all possible combinations of attack and response
actions and computes the defender’s payoffs according to Equation (6.13). It then returns
the computed game payoff matrix Ms with dimensions |Ds| × |As|.
Formally, for player actions dv ∈ Ds and ae ∈ As where v ∈ Vs and e = (u,w) ∈ Es, we
define the response engine’s utility as
ud(dv, ae) =

0 iff v = w ∧ sp(w, σ) =∞
sp(w, σ) iff v = w ∧ sp(w, σ) <∞
sp(w, σ)− threshold iff v 6= w
(6.13)
Since the game is zero-sum, the utility of the attacker is ua(ae, dv) = −ud(dv, ae).
For a response strategy pr over Ds and an attack strategy pa overAs, the response engine’s
expected utility is defined as
Ud(pr,pa) =
∑
dv∈Ds
∑
ae∈As
pr(dv)ud(dv, ae)pa(ae) (6.14)
Similarly, the attacker’s expected payoff is Ua(pa,pr) = −Ud(pr,pa).
In step 4 of Figure 6.3, the response engine computes the saddle-point response strategy
pˆr from which it samples the response action to deploy. pˆr is the best response strategy that
the engine could adopt for the worst-case attacker. Formally, for saddle-point strategies pˆr
and pˆa,
Ud(pˆr, pˆa) ≥ Ud(pr, pˆa) for all pr, and
Ua(pˆa, pˆr) ≤ Ua(pa, pˆr) for all pa
(6.15)
Finally, the engine chooses an action dv ∈ Ds according to the distribution pˆr and deploys
it in the network. In this chapter, we assume that response actions are deployed instanta-
neously and successfully at all times; response action deployment challenges are beyond the
scope of this work.
6.5 IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
We implemented a custom Python simulator in order to evaluate the performance of our
proposed response engine. We use Python iGraph [195] to represent NSGs, and imple-
ment ALFs as features on the graphs’ vertices. Since the payoffs for the response engine’s
actions are highly dependent on the structure of the NSG, we use three different graph topol-
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Algorithm 6.1: Algorithm Ms = BUILD GAME (Ds,As, threshold, σ)
1: Inputs: Ds,As, threshold, σ
2: Outputs: Zero-sum game payoff matrix Ms
3: for each response action dv ∈ Ds do
4: for each attack action ae ∈ As do
5: let e← (u,w)
6: if v = w then
7: if sp(w, σ) =∞ then
8: Ms(v, w)← 0
9: else
10: Ms(v, w)← sp(w, σ)
11: end if
12: else
13: Ms(v, w)← sp(w, σ) − threshold
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
ogy generation algorithms to generate the initial graphs. The Waxman [196] and Albert-
Baraba´si [197] algorithms are widely used to model interconnected networks, especially for
the evaluation of different routing approaches. In addition, we generate random geometric
graphs, as they are widely used for modeling social networks as well as studying the spread of
epidemics and computer worms [198, 199]. Because of the lack of publicly available data sets
capturing lateral movement, we assume that the Waxman and Albert-Baraba´si models pro-
vide us with an appropriate representation of the structural characteristics of interconnected
networks.
We use the geometric graph models in order to evaluate the performance of our engine in
highly connected networks. We pick the initial attacker point of entry in the graph ω and
the location of the database server σ such that sp(ω, σ) = d, where d is the diameter of the
computed graph. This is a reasonable assumption, since in APTs, attackers usually gain
initial access to the target network by targeting employees with limited technical knowledge
(such as customer service representatives) through social engineering campaigns, and then
escalate their privileges while moving laterally in the network.
We implement our response engine as a direct translation of Figure 6.3 and Algorithm 6.1,
and we use the Gambit [200] Python game theory API in order to solve for the saddle-point
strategies at each step of the simulation. We use the NumPy [201] Python API to sample
response and attack actions from the computed saddle-point distributions. As stated earlier,
we assume that attack and response actions are instantaneous and always successful, and
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thus implement the actions and their effects on the network as described in the network
next-state function in Equation (6.12).
We evaluate the performance of our response engine by computing the average percentage
increase in the number of attack steps (i.e., compromises) needed by an adversary to reach
the target server σ. We compute the average increase with respect to the shortest path that
the attacker could have adopted in the absence of the response engine. Formally, let k be
the number of attack steps needed to reach σ and d be the diameter of the NSG; then, the
percentage increase in attack steps is k−d
d
× 100. If the attacker is unable to reach the target
server, we set the number of attack steps k to the maximum allowed number of rounds of
play in the simulation, which is 40 in our simulations.
In addition, we report on the average attacker distance from the server σ as well as the
minimum distance that the attacker was able to reach. As discussed earlier, we measure
the distance in terms of the number of attack steps needed to compromise the server. A
minimum distance of 1 means that the attacker was able to successfully reach σ. We also
report and compare the average achieved payoff for the defender while playing the game.
We ran our simulations on a Macbook Pro laptop running OSX El Capitan, with 2.2 GHz
Intel Core i7 processors and 16 GB of RAM. We start by describing our results for various
defender threshold values for an NSG with 100 nodes, and then fix the threshold value
and vary the number of nodes in the NSG. Finally, we report on performance metrics in
terms of the time needed to perform the computation for various NSG sizes.
6.5.1 Evaluation of threshold values
We start by evaluating the performance of our response engine for various values of the
threshold above which we would like to keep the attacker away from the sensitive node σ.
We used each graph generation algorithm to generate 10 random NSGs, simulated the game
for threshold ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, and then computed the average values of the metrics over
the ten runs.
Table 6.1 shows the structural characteristics in terms of the number of vertices, average
number of edges, diameter, and maximum degree of the graphs generated by each algo-
rithm. All of the graphs we generated are connected, with the geometric graphs showing the
largest levels of edge connectivity, giving attackers more space to move in the network. The
Waxman and Baraba´si generators have lower levels of edge connectivity, making them more
representative of network services topologies than the geometric graphs are.
Figure 6.4a shows the average percentage increase in attacker steps needed to reach the
target (or reach the simulation limit) for the various values of threshold. The results show
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Table 6.1: Characteristics of generated NSGs (averages)
NSG Generator |V | |E| Diameter Max Degree
Baraba´si 100 294 4 50.2
Waxman 100 336.6 4.9 13.7
Geometric 100 1059.8 5.2 34.5
that in all cases, our engine was able to increase the number of steps needed by the attacker
by at least 50%. Considering only the Waxman and Baraba´si graphs, the engine was able to
increase the number of steps needed by the attacker by at least 600%. This is a promising
result that shows the effectiveness of our engine, especially in enterprise networks. Further,
the results show that smaller values for threshold achieve a greater average increase in
attacker steps. This is further confirmed by the average defender payoff curves shown in
Figure 6.4b, in which smaller values of threshold achieve greater payoffs. In fact, this
result is a direct implication of our definition of the payoff matrix values in Equation (6.13).
The smaller the values of threshold, the more the engine has room to take actions that
have a high payoff, and the more effective its strategies are in keeping the attacker away
from the server.
Figures 6.4c and 6.4d show the average distance between the attacker and the server, and
the minimum distance reached by the attacker, respectively. For the Waxman and Baraba´si
graphs, the results show that our engine keeps the attacker, on average, at a distance close
to the graph’s diameter, thus keeping the attacker from penetrating deeper into the network.
For both types of graphs, Figure 6.4d confirms that the attacker was unable to reach the
target server (average minimum distance ≥ 1).
In the case of the geometric graphs, Figure 6.4d shows that the attacker was almost
always able to reach the target server. We attribute this attacker success to the high edge
connectivity in the geometric graphs. Although our engine is able to delay attackers, because
of the high connectivity of the graph, they may find alternative ways to reach the server.
Nevertheless, our response engine was always able to cause at least a 50% increase in the
number of attack steps needed to reach the server.
In summary, the results show that our response engine is able to effectively delay, and on
average prevent, an attacker that is moving laterally in the network from reaching the target
database server. It was effectively able to increase the number of attack steps needed by
the adversary by at least 600% for the graphs that are representative of real-world network
topologies. In addition, even when the graphs were highly connected, our engine was still
able to increase the attacker’s required amount of attack steps by at least 50%.
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Figure 6.4: Performance evaluation of our response engine with varying threshold values.
Figure 6.4a shows that our engine was able to increase the number of compromises needed
by the attacker by at least 55%. Figure 6.4b illustrates that the zero-sum game’s payoff for
the defender decreases almost linearly as the threshold increases. Figure 6.4c shows that
the average attacker’s distance from σ is very close to the NSG’s diameter, while Figure 6.4d
shows that, with the exception of the geometric NSG, our engine was able to keep that
attacker from reaching the target data server σ. It was able, however, in the geometric NSG
case, to increase the number of compromises needed to reach σ by at least 55%.
6.5.2 Scalability
Next, we measured the scalability of our response engine as the network grew in size. We
varied the number of nodes in the network from 100 to 300 in steps of 50 and measured the
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Figure 6.5: Performance evaluation of our response engine with increasing number of nodes
in the network. Figure 6.5a shows that our engine maintains high levels of performance even
when the network grows larger. The engine is also capable of keeping the attacker at an
average distance close to the graph’s diameter in the cases of the Waxman and Baraba´si
NSGs, as shown in Figures 6.5b and 6.5c.
average percentage increase in attack steps as well as the attacker’s average distance from
the target σ. Figure 6.5 shows our results for averages measured over five random NSGs
generated by each of the NSG generation algorithms. We set the defender’s threshold values
to those that achieved a maximum average increase in attack steps as shown in Figure 6.4a,
which are 5 for geometric NSGs, 2 for Baraba´si NSGs, and 3 for Waxman NSGs.
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Figure 6.6: Computational performance evaluation of the engine for larger networks. Our
response engine scales well with the increase in the size of the network.
As shown in Figure 6.5a, our response engine can scale well as the size of the network
increases, providing average percentage increases in attack steps between 550% and 700%
for Waxman NSGs, 750% and 1150% for Baraba´si NSGs, and 50% and 220% for geometric
NSGs. These results show that as the number of nodes, and thus the number of connection
edges, increases in the network, our engine is able to maintain high-performance levels and
delay possible attackers, even when they have more room to evade the engine’s responses and
move laterally in the network. This is further confirmed by the results shown in Figures 6.5b
and 6.5c. For the Waxman and Baraba´si NSGs, the response engine is always capable of
keeping the attacker at an average distance from the target server equal to the diameter of
the graph. For the geometric NSGs, the attacker is always capable of getting close to and
reaching the target server, regardless of the diameter of the graph. Our engine, however, is
always capable of increasing the number of attack steps required by at least 50%, even for
larger networks.
6.5.3 Computational performance
Finally, we evaluated the computational performance of our game engine as the scale of
the network increased from 100 to 300 nodes. We used the same values for threshold as
in the previous subsection, and measured the average time to solve for the saddle-point
strategies as well as the average size of the matrix game generated during the simulation.
Since all of the payoff matrices we generated are square, we report on the number of rows
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in the matrix games. The rows correspond to the number of available attack or response
actions for the players (i.e., for a state s, we report on |As| = |Ds|). Our engine makes use
of the ExternalLogitSolver solver from the Gambit software framework [200] to solve for
the saddle-point strategies at each step of the simulation. In computing our metrics, we
averaged the computation time and matrix size over 10 random graphs from each algorithm,
and we limited the number of steps in the simulation (i.e., the number of game turns) to 10.
Figure 6.6b shows that for all NSG-generation algorithms, the size of the payoff matrices
for the generated zero-sum game increases almost linearly with the increase in the size of
the nodes in the network. In other words, the average number of available actions for each
player increases linearly with the size of the network. Consequently, Figure 6.6a shows that
the computational time needed to obtain the saddle-point strategies scales very efficiently
with the increase in the size of the network; the engine was able to solve 50 × 50 matrix
games in 15 seconds, on the average. The short time is a promising result compared to the
time needed by an administrator to analyze the observed alerts and deploy strategic response
actions.
In summary, our results clearly show the merits of our game engine in slowing down the
advance of an attacker that is moving laterally within an enterprise network, and its ability
to protect a sensitive database server effectively from compromise. For all of the NSG-
generation algorithms, our engine was able to increase the number of attack steps needed
by an attacker to reach the sensitive server by at least 50%, with the value increasing to
600% for the Waxman and Baraba´si NSG-generation algorithms. The results also show that
our engine is able to maintain proper performance as networks grow in size. Further, the
computational resources required for obtaining the saddle-point strategies increased linearly
with the number of the nodes in the network.
6.6 RELATED WORK
Several researchers have tackled the problem of selecting cyber actions as a response to
intrusions. The space can be divided into three parts; automated response through rule-
based methods, cost-sensitive methods, and security games.
In rule-based intrusion response, each kind of intrusion alert is tagged with a suitable
response. The static nature of rule-based intrusion response makes it predictable and limits
its ability to adapt to different attacker strategies. Researchers have extended rule-based
intrusion response systems to become cost-sensitive; cost models range from manual assess-
ment of costs to use of dependency graphs on the system components to compute a response
action’s cost. In all of those cases, the process of selecting a response minimizes the cost of
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response actions over a set of predefined actions that are considered suitable for tackling a
perceived threat. Stakhanova surveyed this class of systems in [194]. While cost-sensitive
intrusion response systems minimize the cost of responding, they are still predictable by
attackers, and a large effort is required in order to construct the cost models.
Bloem et. al. [202] tackled the problem of intrusion response as a resource allocation
problem. Their goal was to manage the administrator’s time, a critical and limited resource,
by alternating between the administrator and an imperfect automated intrusion response
system. The problem is modeled as a nonzero-sum game between automated responses and
administrator responses, in which an attacker gain (utility) function is required. Obtaining
such functions, however, is hard in practice, as attacker incentives are not known. The
problem of finding attacker-centric metrics was tackled by ADAPT [203]. The ADAPT
developers attempted to find a taxonomy of attack metrics that require knowledge of the
cost of an attack and the benefit from the attack. ADAPT has created a framework for
computing the metrics needed to set up games; however, assigning values to the parameters
is still more of an art than a science.
Use of security games improved the state of IRSs, as they enabled modeling of the inter-
action between the attacker and defender, are less predictable, and can learn from previous
attacker behavior [21, 22]. In [204], the authors model the security game as a two-player
game between an attacker and a defender; the attacker has two actions (to attack or not
attack), and the defender has two actions (to monitor or not monitor). The authors consider
the interaction as a repeated game and find an equilibrium strategy. Nguyen et. al. [205]
used fictitious play to address the issue of hidden payoff matrices. While this game setup is
important on a high level and can be useful as a design guideline for IDSs, it does not help
in low-level online response selection during a cyber attack.
To address the issue of high level abstraction in network security games, Zonouz [206]
designed the Response and Recovery Engine (RRE), an online response engine modeled
as a Stackelberg game between an attacker and a defender. Similar to work by Zhu and
Bas¸ar [207], the authors model the system with an attack response tree (ART); the tree is
then used to construct a competitive Markov decision process to find an optimal response.
The state of the decision process is a vector of the probabilities of compromise of all the
components in the system. The authors compute the minimax equilibrium to find an optimal
response. The strategy is evaluated for both finite and infinite horizons. Scalability issues are
tackled using finite lookahead. The game, however, has several limitations: (1) the model
is sensitive to the assigned costs; (2) the model required a priori information on attacks
and monitoring (conditional probabilities) which is not available; and (3) the system uses a
hard-to-design ART to construct the game.
114
6.7 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
The goals of our response engine are to provide networked systems with the ability to
maintain acceptable levels of operation in the presence of potentially malicious actors in the
network, and to give administrators enough time to analyze security alerts and neutralize
any threats, if present. Our results show that the engine is able to delay, and often prevent,
an attacker from reaching a sensitive database server in an enterprise network. However, the
response actions that our engine deploys can have negative impacts on the system’s provided
services and overall performance. For example, disconnecting certain nodes as part of our
engine’s response to an attacker can compromise other nodes’ ability to reach the database
service. This can have severe impacts on the system’s resiliency, especially if it is part of a
service provider’s infrastructure. In the future, we plan to augment our engine with response
action cost metrics that reflect their impact on the network’s performance and resiliency.
We plan to add support for a resiliency budget that the engine should always meet when
making response action decisions. In addition, we will investigate deployment challenges
for the response actions. We envision that with the adoption of Software Defined Networks
(SDNs), the deployment of such actions will become easier. Our engine can be implemented
as part of the SDN controller and use the southbound API to deploy its response actions.
In the context of APTs, attackers are often well-skilled, stealthy, and highly adaptive
actors that can adapt to the changes in the network, including the response actions deployed
by our engine. We will investigate more sophisticated models of attackers, specifically ones
that can compromise more than one node in each attack step, and can adapt in response
to our engine’s deployed actions. In addition, knowledge of the attacker’s strategies and
goals would provide our response engine with the ability to make more informed strategic
decisions about which response actions to deploy. Therefore, we plan to investigate online
learning techniques that our engine can employ in order to predict, with high accuracy, an
attacker’s strategies and goals. However, the main challenge that we face in our framework’s
design and implementation is the lack of publicly available datasets that contain traces of
attackers’ lateral movements in large-scale enterprise networks. In addition to simulations,
we will investigate alternative methods with which we can evaluate our response engine and
the learning techniques that we devise.
6.8 CONCLUSION
Detection of and timely response to network intrusions go hand-in-hand when secure and
resilient systems are being built. Without timely response, IDSs are of little value in the
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face of APTs; the time delay between the sounding of IDS alarms and the manual response
by network administrators allows attackers to move freely in the network.We have presented
an efficient and scalable game-theoretic response engine that responds to an attacker’s lat-
eral movement in an enterprise network, and effectively protects a sensitive network node
from compromise. Our response engine observes the network state as a network services
graph that captures the different services running between the nodes in the network, aug-
mented with a labeling function that captures the IDS alerts concerning suspicious lateral
movements. It then selects an appropriate response action by solving for the saddle-point
strategies of a defense-based zero-sum game, in which payoffs correspond to the differences
between the shortest path from the attacker to a sensitive target node, and an acceptable
engine safety distance threshold. We have implemented our response engine in a custom
simulator and evaluated it for three different network graph generation algorithms. The re-
sults have shown that our engine is able to effectively delay, and often stop, an attacker from
reaching a sensitive node in the network. The engine scales well with the size of the network,
maintaining proper operation and efficiently managing computational resources. Our results
show that the response engine constitutes a significant first step towards building secure and
resilient systems that can detect, respond to, and eventually recover from malicious actors.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
The pervasiveness of targeted and sophisticated cyber attacks has pushed system designers
to face the unfortunate reality that attacks are now the norm. With the increased dependence
of our critical infrastructure on networking platforms, failure to address such attacks can
have devastating consequences. The perfectly hardened and secure system is now a myth;
system design has moved from an era focused on robustness and hardening, to one focused on
cyber resilience. Much like fault-tolerant design, cyber-resilient systems admit the presence
of malicious attacks and attempt to provide continuous service, even if in a degraded state,
throughout the lifetime of an attack. Such systems then move into a period of graceful
restoration of full service after threats have been detected and neutralized. Such continuity
and restoration of service are a necessary safeguard against the drastic economic and societal
consequences of cyber attacks.
In this dissertation, we set out to show that the cyber resilience posture of our networked
infrastructure can be enhanced through systematic integration of sound theoretical analysis
and practically realizable design. We first presented the motivation for cyber resilience and
its various definitions in Chapter 2. We also illustrated how, in foundational work on TCP
congestion control, the integration of control theory and practical design led to the emergence
of a reliable communication protocol that can handle changes in the state of the network,
and that still occupies that largest portion of today’s Internet traffic.
To validate our thesis, we focused on two aspects of resilience: (1) inter-networking re-
silience, and (2) intra-networking resilience. At the inter-networking level, we focused on
DDoS attacks, which continue to plague the Internet to this day. We presented CPuzzle
(Chapter 3) and Midgard (Chapter 4) to combat DDoS attacks at the transport and net-
work layers, respectively. At the core of CPuzzle and Midgard’s designs is the observation
that achieving resilience to DDoS attacks must involve end users, since the cost of launch-
ing such attacks is vastly smaller than the cost of defending against them in the network.
CPuzzle is an enhancement to TCP that provides resilience to state-exhaustion attacks
by forcing users and attackers to solve computational puzzles. We set the difficulty of the
puzzles by using a sound game-theoretic model that uses easy-to-obtain parameters. Our
analysis shows that the model illustrates an important trade-off between a TCP server’s
provisioning and the difficulty of the challenges it can ask its users to solve. Our results
from deploying CPuzzle on the DETER testbed show that it increases resilience to state-
exhaustion attacks by increasing the cost of launching an attack and effectively rate-limiting
attacks that attempt to overwhelm the TCP server’s state.
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We designed Midgard (Chapter 4) to extend CPuzzle’s results into the network layer
and provide resilience to volumetric DDoS attacks. Current approaches to DDoS protection
rely heavily on the availability of vast bandwidth resources that can absorb incoming attacks
and filter out malicious traffic. That has effectively transformed the DDoS battlefield into
a continuous bandwidth war between attackers and cloud providers. Unfortunately, recent
DDoS attacks have shown that attackers are gaining the ability to compromise larger and
larger botnets, especially with the advent of IoT devices with poor security measures, and
are able to launch unprecedented attacks. Midgard attempts to enhance our networks’
resilience to volumetric attacks by combining the benefits of cloud protection services with
the benefits of employing client puzzles. We designed Midgard to be resilient to puzzle
reuse by leveraging the puzzles’ cryptographic properties. We then designed a controller
that estimates each user’s computational prowess and allocates bandwidth resources in a
fairness-preserving manner. We deployed Midgard on a sample topology on DETER. Our
results show that Midgard can effectively hinder the effects of volumetric DDoS attacks
by rate-limiting misbehaving users and allocating more bandwidth to benign clients.
At the intra-networking level, we introduced sShield (Chapter 6), a game-theoretic engine
that actively manipulates network topologies to protect high-value assets (such as data
stores) from potential attackers who are moving laterally in a network. We modeled the
problem as a zero-sum game between an attacker who aims to compromise a high-value
asset and a defender who wants to prevent said attacker from reaching the asset. Using
the game-theoretic decisions, sShield can manipulate the network connectivity to build a
protective entourage around the asset to prevent the attacker from reaching it.
sShield’s practicality is enabled by the advent of SDN that decouple a network’s control
plane (i.e., the logic used to make traffic decisions) from the data plane (the forwarding
pipelines at each individual switch). Unfortunately, programmability and flexibility in the
data plane can lead to design-time bugs, which poses serious security and reliability chal-
lenges and thus hinders the network’s resilience. Therefore, we designed and implemented
BiFrost (Chapter 5), a tool for the static verification of programmable data-plane programs
that uses sequential circuit analysis and verification techniques. Our design of BiFrost is
based on the observation that data plane programming languages describe a limited hard-
ware pipeline with no dynamic memory allocation. Therefore, instead of treating data plane
programs as general-purpose programs, BiFrost translates them into equivalent sequential
circuits. BiFrost then leverages a rich set of sequential analysis, abstraction, synthesis, and
verification techniques to scalably verify that the data plane programs do not read or write
invalid header fields and that they satisfy user-defined properties. We evaluated BiFrost
on a set of real-world data plane programs. We found two header-validity bugs in publicly
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available programs and showed that BiFrost can efficiently verify large and complex data
plane programs.
7.1 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Our societies are becoming more and more dependent on interconnected devices for pro-
viding essential and critical services. It is therefore of paramount importance to adopt a
“resiliency mindset” to safeguard our infrastructure against failures and an avalanche of
targeted and sophisticated attacks. To that end, we believe that our designs must be built
on a strong theoretical foundation that can be manifested in practical implementations. We
believe that the goals we set out to achieve in this thesis are aligned with the recent move
in the security community, pioneered by several government agencies [20, 40, 208, 209, 210],
to establish a “science of security” that guides the performance of security research and
experimentation.
We believe that our work in CPuzzle and Midgard shows that end-user involvement
in the process of protecting our networks against DDoS attacks can be beneficial. In fact,
such approaches have already been implemented to protect login forms from brute-force
attacks, for example, through the use of CAPTCHAs. Unfortunately, such approaches re-
quire direct involvement of the user and can often be cumbersome, especially if requested
frequently [211, 212]. In CPuzzle and Midgard, the user’s involvement in the protection
service is seamless and does not require direct intervention. Rather, our theoretical modeling
takes into consideration the users’ preferences in terms of the amount of computational effort
they are willing to contribute to tolerate an attack. Therefore, we envision that the integra-
tion of theory and practicality showcased in our DDoS resilience designs can be extended
to other applications and protocols, which will be especially important now that attackers
are capable of easily acquiring botnets consisting of hundreds of thousands to millions of
unsuspecting machines.
Furthermore, our design of sShield provides a motivating example of how network pro-
grammability can be leveraged to deploy dynamic network responses that can adapt the
state of the network in the face of failures and attacks. Specifically, the decoupling of the
control plane from the data plane allows network controllers to access a vast array of com-
putational resources. For example, controllers can run on commodity machines or powerful
servers. Such computational resources can be used to perform decision algorithms (such as
the game-theoretic approach we presented) that are based on sound theoretical models with
real-time inputs from the data plane. For example, our game-theoretic model in sShield
can be extended to perform deception actions. Such actions would lead an attacker who
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is moving laterally in a network to an isolated subnetwork (i.e., an active honeypot) where
administrators can safely analyze the threat and take response actions.
Finally, the deployment of programmable networks must be accompanied by extensive
testing and verification of network programs, especially as we are moving into the era of
full programmability of both the control-plane and the data-plane. In that context, our
design of BiFrost illustrates how repurposing traditional verification techniques for data-
plane programs can achieve high levels of scalability and detect design bugs. However, some
faults can occur because to the interactions among multiple forwarding devices. Therefore,
we plan to extend BiFrost to support the verification of network-wide properties across
multiple programmable switches. In addition, as shown in [213], attackers can use data plane
devices to exploit security vulnerabilities in the control plane and carry out unauthorized
traffic decisions. Therefore, network verification would not be complete if it did not support
verification of the interactions between the data-plane and the control-plane devices, ensuring
that one cannot be used to inject faults and exploit vulnerabilities in the other. We believe
that the problem resembles that of verifying the properties that account for the interaction
between software APIs and hardware devices [214, 215], and we plan to extend BiFrost to
provide support for such verification efforts.
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